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Abstract
In the American system of representative government, the public’s preferences influence public
policy through a mediated process in which elected representatives respond to their constituents’
preferences primarily because of the threat of electoral sanction. One often-overlooked part
of this process of representation is the role of how politicians perceive public opinion among
their constituents. Because of limitations of their information environment and psychological
biases in processing that information, politicians may not perceive their constituents’ opinions
accurately, with profound consequences for representation. Working with a team of collaborators,
I have conducted a series of surveys of political elites and additional analyses that provide new
insight into how politicians understand and perceive their constituents. In this dissertation, I
investigate politicians’ perceptions of public opinion. Drawing on original evidence from surveys
of thousands of candidates running for state legislature, county party leaders, and ordinary citizens,
my collaborators and I show that misperceptions of public opinion are rampant in American
politics. We also show that, among elites, these misperceptions are asymmetrically biased — on
average, Republican politicians believe the public is much more supportive of conservative policies
than it actually is. Democrats do not show a similar bias, failing to overestimate support for their
own policies. In additional analyses, I show that state legislative candidates’ information sources
may leave them particularly susceptible to misperceptions of public opinion, and I consider how
asymmetries in citizen participation contribute to the asymmetric misperceptions we found among
candidates running for office in 2012 and 2014. I also present evidence that ordinary citizens
also overestimate the conservatism of citizens. In sum, the project provides unique evidence that
misperceptions of what the public believes are an important force in American politics.
xi
Chapter 1
Introduction
In April 2013, the U.S. Senate took up the Manchin-Toomey gun control bill, which would have
required background checks on firearm sales at gun shows and over the Internet. In the aftermath
of the school shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary in Newtown, Conn., tightening gun restrictions,
especially closing the so-called “gun show loophole" that allowed people to buy firearms at gun
shows with no background checks, was very popular among the public. In a CBS News poll
conducted that month, 88 percent of respondents favored background checks for all gun buyers,
a total that included 86 percent of Republicans and 95 percent of Democrats. Such widespread
agreement among the public seems almost unbelievable in an era of mass and elite partisan
polarization, but it was clear that tightening gun control laws in this small way was broadly popular
among the American public.
Despite the overwhelming popularity of the bill, almost all Republican senators voted against
it, except Pat Toomey (Pa.), Mark Kirk (Ill.), Susan Collins (Maine) and John McCain (Ariz.).
Four Democrats also voted against the bill—Heidi Heitkamp (N.D.), Max Baucus (Mont.), Mark
Begich (Alaska) and Mark Pryor (Ark.).1 The bill’s defeat was seen as a major win for pro-gun
forces such as the National Rifle Association. Why would so many senators vote against a large
national opinion majority on a salient issue? Why would these Democrats buck party pressures
and public opinion to vote against a bill that commanded support from large opinion majorities in
every state?
1Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nevada) also voted against the bill as a procedural move so that he could bring it
up again.
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Many activists express frustration when they believe that public opinion is on their side of a
political issue but they lose legislative battles. Such outcomes are not uncommon. In recent years,
large majorities have supported gun control laws, reforms to the nation’s immigration policies, and
employment nondiscrimination policies to protect lesbian, gay and bisexual people. On all of these
issues, Congress and many states have failed to respond to public opinion with legislation.
Political observers and activists often argue that such outcomes mean that the political system
has been captured by special interests. These arguments often underlie calls for campaign finance
reform and other efforts to connect legislative outcomes more closely to the mass public’s
preferences. Many of these criticisms of American government suppose that politicians willfully
disregard the preferences of the majority—they know they are working against the will of the
public, but they think they can get away with it. According to some people who hold this
view, American democracy is broken, and only structural reforms can push politicians back to
following the will of the majority. Implicit in these critiques is the notion that politicians know
that the public wants a different outcome, but they willfully spurn public opinion and implement
counter-majoritarian policies.
However, these outcomes are also consistent with another possibility—politicians simply might
not know what the public believes. They might lack reliable information about public opinion
and thus have to rely on subjective impressions that are prone to bias. At first glance, this
theory may seem at odds with many assumptions about how politicians behave. Politicians have
strong incentives to pay attention to the public, who can vote them out of office or make them
look foolish by protesting their actions. Most observers characterize politicians as risk-averse
and concerned with re-election, attributes that should make them pay close attention to their
constituents’ preferences.
Even though politicians have incentives to learn their constituents’ preferences on important
issues, it is reasonable that politicians might not always accurately perceive what their constituents
believe. Their information about public opinion may be incomplete or biased, making the
“electorate in their heads" look very different from the real population. Information is especially
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limited for state and local politicians. In the absence of reliable or complete information about
their constituents’ preferences, they might rely on heuristics to form impressions. They might
sincerely try to respond to a perceived constituency, despite the fact that it might not reflect reality.
If the politicians have systematically false beliefs about their constituents’ preferences, they might
behave in ways that make them look biased, even though they are actually trying to represent the
district fairly.
Politicians are not immune to the psychological biases that affect how humans process
information. These biases can be especially strong when the information may challenge our
preferences or self-image. However, scholars rarely acknowledge that politicians are subject to
the same limits of attention and memory as all people are. When these cognitive limitations collide
with the responsibility to make consequential decisions on policy, biases can emerge. Perceptions
of constituents are likely to be colored by politicians’ own attitudes and incentives.
I focus on the possibility that misperceptions of public opinion are common and consequential
for representation. By investigating what politicians and the public believe about public opinion on
major issues of contemporary politics, I uncover important evidence about how information and
perceptions interact in contemporary American politics. I find that candidates for state-level offices
and local party leaders have systematic patterns of misperceptions that affect both parties. These
misperceptions persist across a variety of issues. Allowing for politicians to have false beliefs about
public opinion means that we need to make significant changes to prominent models of how public
preferences are translated into public policy.
Political analysts and scholars tend to take one of two approaches to evaluating how
information about the public’s preferences influences legislators. Usually, they simply ignore
the fact that politicians might imperfectly perceive public opinion. This leads analysts often to
make one of two equally implausible assumptions—either politicians know everything about their
constituents’ opinions, or they don’t care at all. A long tradition of theoretical models assumes that
politicians have complete information about voters’ preferences (Downs 1957), largely ignoring
the possibility that representatives may imperfectly perceive constituents’ opinions.
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Other scholars acknowledge that politicians’ relationships to the public might be biased.
These arguments usually do not engage in a meaningful way with the ways in which politicians
process information about public opinion. Instead, they usually find correlations between opinions
among certain subsets of the population, like the wealthy, and political outcomes (Bartels
2010; Gilens 2012). Sometimes they compare summary measures of the public’s and elites’
ideologies and find gaps between the two (Bafumi and Herron 2010; Fiorina and Abrams 2012).
However, the mechanisms for groups to have unequal influence are rarely identified. Scholars have
rarely considered whether this unequal influence operates through the mechanism of influencing
politicians’ perceptions of public opinion.
The answers to important questions about representation in American politics require getting
information directly from politicians. We cannot simply guess how they perceive the world by
observing their behavior in campaigns and in office. In this project, I address these questions using
survey data collected directly from state and local-level American politicians, including many
sitting officeholders.
For many years, getting access to a large sample of political elites to ask them about how they
perceive public opinion was a challenge. At some levels of government, like the US Congress, it
is almost prohibitively difficult to get access to officeholders. Politicians are extremely risk-averse
and want to protect themselves from saying anything that might make them look bad or be used
against them in an electoral campaign. However, advances in mass communication have facilitated
access to political elites in ways that allow scholars to survey more populations of political
elites than ever before. Many elites, especially at the state and local levels, are willing to answer
confidential questions with a remarkable degree of candor.
I use original surveys of elites and the mass public to investigate what people believe about
public opinion in the contemporary United States. I find that politicians and the public alike
generally have inaccurate perceptions of public opinion on the most salient issues in contemporary
American politics. Moreover, these misperceptions are not just inaccurate—perceptions of public
opinion are also consistently biased. On almost every issue I test, politicians and the public
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overestimate support for the conservative side of the issue. Both Democrats and Republicans
overestimate public support for conservative positions.
I take these misperceptions of public opinion as a launching point to investigate several
issues related to political representation. Using original survey data from thousands of American
politicians and political elites, I consider how politicians learn about their constituents and how
their psychological biases play into their perceptions. Using these insights, I recast our assumptions
about representation in American government to reflect the reality of how politicians perceive their
constituents.
In Chapter Two, I lay out a theory of how inaccurate or biased beliefs about public opinion
can shape politicians’ actions in campaigns and in office. I draw attention to common mistakes
that scholars of representation might make if they assume that politicians have perfect or unbiased
information about public opinion. I introduce the survey data that I use to evaluate how politicians
perceive and relate to their constituents. These data come from two sources. The National
Candidate Study is a survey of candidates running for state legislature. The National Survey of
Party Leaders is a survey of the chairs and leadership of county-level political parties across
the country. David Broockman, Nicholas Carnes, Melody Crowder-Meyer and I collaborated to
conduct these surveys in 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2016. Both of these groups of political elites have
an important role in shaping representation and political outcomes. These politicians and activists
play essential roles in the building of the political parties, in structuring the candidate choices
available to voters, and in policymaking. Working with a team of colleagues, I conducted surveys
that tap these political actors’ experiences, perceptions, and priorities.
In Chapter Three, coauthored with David E. Broockman, we review evidence that elites
have biased perceptions of public opinion. Across a variety of prominent issues in contemporary
politics, politicians running for state legislature tend to overstate the support for conservative policy
positions among their constituents. This pattern is particularly pronounced among Republican
politicians.
In Chapter Four, I draw on more evidence from the elite surveys, focusing on potential
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mechanisms for these patterns of misperceptions. The results suggest that politicians’ thinking
about their constituents and their districts privileges conservative citizens and issue positions. I
consider evidence about how politicians engage with their constituents and the activities they take
part in during campaigns. I find that state legislative candidates engage in activities that are likely
to bring them in contact with unrepresentative groups of their constituents, exacerbating biases
induced by differential participation by citizens in the public sphere.
In Chapter Five, coauthored with David E. Broockman, Nicholas Carnes, and Melody
Crowder-Meyer, I present evidence on one potential consequence of these patterns of
misperceptions—asymmetries in the role of ideology in candidate recruitment. Using evidence
from the survey of party leaders, I find that Republican party leaders strongly privilege ideological
purity in their decisions of which candidates to recruit, preferring conservative candidates to
moderates even when it may not be electorally optimal to do so. Democratic party leaders also
care about ideology, but they prefer to encourage moderate candidates to run. These asymmetries
in preferences for candidates track the party leaders’ perceptions of public opinion in their states
and counties.
In Chapter Six, I turn to the mass public. I explain why what ordinary citizens’ believe about
public opinion are consequential for mass political behavior. I present results from an original
survey that show that members of the public tend to know very little about public opinion in their
states. However, on average, their perceptions exhibit the same pattern of bias that elites’ do — the
public also overestimates the popularity of conservative positions. However, partisanship does not
moderate beliefs as much for the public as it does for elites.
In Chapter Seven, I conclude. I summarize the findings and contributions of the dissertation
project and highlight its limitations. I outline an agenda for future research that will continue to
illuminate how perceptions of public opinion influence representation in American politics.
The project provides insights into why we see some political outcomes that seem not to reflect
public preferences. Many politicians simply do not know what the public prefers on some of the
most salient issues. The partisan-ideological asymmetries that I find can also help to explain some
6
of the features of contemporary American politics that are particularly vexing to scholars and
activists, like the persistence of asymmetric polarization. In future work, I will investigate the
conditions that can lead to these patterns of asymmetric perceptions of public opinion further, as
well as investigate ways to improve the correspondence between politicians’ perceptions and the
public’s true beliefs.
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Chapter 2
Understanding Politicians’ Perceptions of Public Opinion
How well do political outcomes in the United States represent public opinion? Many scholars and
pundits are concerned with the correspondence between political outcomes and public opinion.
1 This central question of to what extent public opinion controls the activities of legislators has
animated the study of political representation for decades. Modern polling methods give us more
insight than ever on the public’s attitudes about a host of political issues, but debates over the
extent to which public policy reflects the will of the people persist. Scholars and activists are
keenly interested in the extent to which governance reflects the will of the people. Prominent
normative and empirical debates also consider the extent to which the public has stable and
coherent preferences that should be represented by elites or whether elites should (or do) use their
best judgement and act in a “trustee" role rather than simply following constituents’ preferences.
In many theories of representation, a central premise is that the public, through elections,
controls the activities of its representatives and that representatives in turn respond to their
constituents’ preferences. However, the influence of public opinion on public policy is mediated
through representative institutions. These institutions of government are designed to rely upon
politicians’ ability to perceive and adapt to the public’s demands. This mediation of public opinion
complicates simple notions of democratic governance. Achen and Bartels (2016) contrast actual
governance to a “folk theory of democracy," a straw man theory in which the public perfectly
monitors what politicians do in office and politicians perfectly adapt to the public’s preferences.
1The development of this theory has benefited greatly from my collaboration with David E. Broockman, Melody
Crowder-Meyer, and Nick Carnes. I thank Arthur Lupia for helpful feedback.
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According to many theories, re-election-seeking politicians make great efforts to translate
opinion into policy faithfully, as they feel powerful incentives to respond to public opinion in their
constituencies. For example, Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson (1995) depict legislators as highly
attuned to public opinion, “like an antelope in an open field, [cocking] their ears...keen to pick
up the faintest signals.” A rich empirical tradition comports with this view, painting an optimistic
portrait of politicians’ motivation and ability to accurately perceive and respond to public opinion
(Bartels 1991; Brody and Page 1972). Others doubt that politicians pay much attention to public
opinion among the citizenry as a whole (Bartels 2008; Hacker and Pierson 2011). By this account,
politicians feel much more accountable to the wealthy, party leaders, interest groups, or their own
views than to rank and file voters’ preferences (Bawn, Cohen, Karol, Masket, Noel and Zaller
2012; DeCanio 2005, 2006; Gilens 2012; Page, Bartels and Seawright 2013; Rogers 2014a,b).
Other perspectives on representation have taken a more optimistic but nuanced view of
the relationship between public opinion and policy outcomes. Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson
(1995) use aggregate measures to argue that elites are responsive to general public ideology
and sentiment. They operationalize public opinion as a measure of liberal mood, and they
find that policy is responsive to changes in this aggregated measure of mood. However, this
research does not clearly state a mechanism by which politicians would perceive changes in
mood. Wlezien (1995) and Soroka and Wlezien (2010) examine issue-specific responsiveness
in specific spending areas such as defense and social welfare in several advanced democracies.
They find strong evidence that spending and public opinion are related in a “thermostatic" way, as
increases in spending in a domain result in decreased public support for spending, and vice versa.
This domain-specific analysis provides important evidence of the form of the linkages between
policy and public opinion. In my dissertation studies, I provide an even more detailed approach,
examining perceptions of public attitudes toward fairly specific policy proposals. This approach
arises out of the Cooperative Congressional Election Study’s strategy of asking citizens for their
opinions on actual or likely congressional roll call votes. These questions facilitate joint scaling of
members of Congress and of the public. They also allow us to carefully examine how politicians
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perceive public opinion on the specific choices they may have to make.
A key piece is missing from some of these theories and empirical studies. Many of them assume
implicitly that politicians accurately perceive public opinion, either among the whole constituency
or among certain groups. When scholars measure both public opinion and politicians’ actions
and compare the two, they are making an implicit assumption that politicians accurately perceive
public opinion. Researchers measure public opinion among constituents or subconstituencies, then
compare it to what legislators do. But how do we know that legislators accurately perceive public
opinion? The assumption that they do should not be automatic. Classic theories of representation
argue that politicians’ information environments can leave them with biased perceptions of their
constituents’ opinions: “the constituency that a representative reacts to is the constituency that he or
she sees” (Fenno 1977, p. 883) but “The Representative knows his constituents mostly from dealing
with people who do write letters [and] who will attend meetings” (Miller and Stokes 1963, see also
Butler and Dynes (2016); Miler (2010)). In this project, I clarify the debate over representation
by studying how politicians form their perceptions of their constituents’ opinion and how accurate
those perceptions are. I then identify conditions under which we should expect to see various
patterns of perceptions of public opinion among politicians.
To introduce this analysis, I first present a theory of the role of perceptions of public
opinion in representation, the factors than influence politicians’ perceptions of public opinion,
and expectations about what politicians will believe about their constituents’ opinions. I describe
three possible patterns of politicians’ perceptions of public opinion. Each pattern reflects
the consequences of a different set of conditions that might exist in politicians’ information
environment—which constituents they meet and listen to. Each one also has different implications
for how politicians represent their districts and how voters are able to control politicians’ decisions.
In the rest of the project, I test what state- and local-level politicians and party leaders actually
believe about public opinion and find that they have asymmetrically biased perceptions of public
opinion. I then consider a number of possible explanations for these patterns of perceptions.
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PERCEPTIONS OF PUBLIC OPINION AND REPRESENTATION
Many political scientists have acknowledged and investigated the ways politicians perceive public
opinion, but for such an essential part of the process of representation, it has received considerably
less attention than other topics. Miller and Stokes (1963) propose a famous model of representation,
represented by a “diamond" that relates public opinion, politicians’ own opinions, politicians’
perceptions of opinion, and roll call votes. In this model, public opinion can take two paths to
influencing policy. Through electoral selection, the public can choose representatives whose own
positions are congruent with theirs. Through perceptual control, electorates can exert control of
representatives through the politicians’ perceptions of their opinions, which Miller and Stokes
acknowledge are likely to be shaped by the politician’s own preferences and biases. This model of
legislators’ decision-making became highly influential in subsequent political science research.
For a period in the 1960s and 1970s, political scientists paid considerable attention to
politicians’ perceptions of public opinion. Miller and Stokes’s (1963) seminal study was followed
by a handful of other studies that directly investigated politicians’ perceptions of public opinion
(e.g., Kuklinski and Elling 1977; Uslaner and Weber 1979; Hedlund and Friesema 1972). However,
investigations of politicians’ perceptions of public opinion largely faded from political science
research after the 1980s. Since Miller and Stokes (1963), scholars have recognized that politicians’
perceptions of public opinion must play a crucial role in generating responsiveness to public
opinion, to the extent that such responsiveness exists (e.g., Grose 2014; Kingdon 1967; Jacobs
and Shapiro 2000; Kousser, Lewis and Masket 2007). Yet, despite the central role of politicians’
perceptions in theories of democratic policymaking, we know remarkably little about what
politicians believe about their constituents’ opinions and how they form these perceptions.
The most definitive study on the subject remains Miller and Stokes’s (1963) study of Members
of Congress’ perceptions of public opinion in 1958. However, this landmark study left open
significant questions and had significant shortcomings. First, as Achen (1977, 1978) showed,
Miller and Stokes’s (1963) measure, the correlation coefficient, was flawed statistically and
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theoretically, leaving their findings ambiguous. Second, as Weissberg (1978) noted, collective
representation might be robust even if individual legislators tend to have flawed views of their
particular constituencies, raising questions about its limits. Finally, with public opinion polls now
widely available (Herbst 1993), and as politics has become more sorted along partisan lines (Koger,
Masket and Noel 2009; Nall 2014), one may well expect to find different results today than in 1958.
Thus, with Miller and Stokes’s (1963) data collected nearly sixty years ago, our understanding of
this central mechanism linking public opinion and public policy rests on surprisingly shaky ground.
The reason is quite simple—collecting data on political elites’ perceptions of public opinion
requires access to cooperative elites. Instead, many scholars have focused on evidence from roll
call votes and other publicly available sources to evaluate how closely politicians’ actions follow
public opinion.
Figure 2.1: Miller and Stokes (1963) model of the relationship between public opinion and
legislative outcomes.
Prominent models of elite decision-making thus emphasize the role of legislators’ attempts
to carefully monitor voters’ preferences in generating congruence (e.g., Miller and Stokes 1963;
Kingdon 1967; Fenno 1978; Arnold 1990). But do representatives perceive their constituents’
views accurately enough to adapt to them well? Miller and Stokes’s (1963) classic work concluded
otherwise, finding that “the conditions of influence that presuppose effective communication
between [Representative] and district” are not “well met” – after pairing a pioneering survey
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of political elites with data on mass opinion from the American National Election Studies,
they concluded that representatives typically have “very imperfect information about the issue
preferences of [their] constituenc[ies].”
Yet, despite Miller and Stokes’s (1963) sizable and still-growing influence, it remains unclear
whether one should accept their central empirical claim that politicians largely fail to accurately
perceive their constituents’ opinions. Achen (1977, 1978) showed that Miller and Stokes’s (1963)
standard for measuring accuracy – the correlation coefficient – had important flaws; Weissberg
(1978) noted that Miller and Stokes’s (1963) pessimistic findings about dyadic representation
might belie robust collective or aggregate representation. In short, politicians might be inaccurate
about public opinion, but if their errors were symmetric, they might cancel each other out. There
is also little available data that would allow us to re-examine their conclusions. Small elite and
mass sample sizes in Miller and Stokes (1963) make it difficult to re-evaluate their findings in
light of the critiques by Achen (1977, 1978) and Weissberg (1978), in addition to raising further
questions about the validity of their original estimates (e.g., Clausen 1977). Scholars also largely
ceased producing new work in this area decades ago (Jewell 1983), with only rare attempts to
appraise elites’ perceptions having been made since, and nearly always in contexts beyond the
United States (Belchior 2012; Converse and Pierce 1986; Holmberg 1989; Norris and Lovendusky
2004). Other scholars in the 1960s and 1970s did follow in Miller and Stokes’s (1963) footsteps, yet
none managed to overcome the issues their critics identified, as most of this work was completed
before the critics had articulated the deficiencies in Miller and Stokes’s (1963) methods (see, e.g.,
McCrone and Kuklinski 1979; Kuklinski and Elling 1977; Brand 1969; Uslaner and Weber 1979;
Erikson, Luttbeg and Holloway 1975; Hedlund and Friesema 1972). In addition to facing the same
challenges as Miller and Stokes (1963), these studies reached conflicting results. McCrone and
Kuklinski (1979), for example, described the accuracy of elites’ perceptions of their constituents
as “reasonable” while Brand (1969) judged it “scandalously low."
In recent years, several scholars have also carried on the Miller and Stokes (1963) tradition by
investigating how constituent communication might shape politicians’ perceptions (e.g., Bergan
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2009; Bergan and Cole 2015; Miler 2007, 2009), a significant and important question, albeit a
distinct one. Especially given the strong scholarly interest in potential sources of unequal influence
in representation, it seems essential to investigate how politicians’ perceptions of their constituents
are shaped by the world around them.
WHY POLITICIANS MIGHT MISPERCEIVE PUBLIC OPINION
Understanding how politicians perceive their constituents’ opinions requires paying attention to
how politicians relate to and learn about their districts. Political scientists have come to different
conclusions about how politicians prioritize being in touch with their constituents’ opinions. In one
view, politicians are highly attuned to their constituents’ preferences and priorities. Considerable
evidence shows that politicians expend costly effort to be visible in their districts and to at least
give the impression that they are connecting with voters (Fenno 1978; Grimmer 2013).
Another prominent view holds that politicians pay attention only to narrow subsets of their
constituents. In this view, politicians might only expend effort to learn about and respond to the
opinions of their copartisans (Kastellec, Lax and Phillips 2010), wealthy citizens (Bartels 2010;
Gilens 2012), people of certain racial/ethnic groups (Whitby 2000), or people who are likely to
vote. Such an approach might be strategic for some politicians. For example, a member of Congress
running in a district that heavily favors his or her party may face stronger challenges in the primary
election than in the general election, and such a member might feel added incentives to respond to
party activists. Such intra-party pressures, real or anticipated, might be responsible for a large part
of the increasingly asymmetric polarization in national politics (Hacker and Pierson 2005).
A strategic politician should not knowingly spurn the median voter or a large opinion majority.
Some people argue that politicians only pursue their own preferences, ignoring their constituents
when they disagree. Others argue that politicians are beholden to the preferences of donors, interest
groups, and lobbyists. Many scholars have found empirical support for these kinds of arguments.
However, these theories fail to account for the fact that most politicians have strong incentives not
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to deviate from the public’s preferences. If the public is paying attention to legislators’ actions on
controversial issues, legislators may be punished for taking counter-majoritarian action (Nyhan,
McGhee, Sides, Masket and Greene 2012).
This accountability mechanism is imperfect in practice. In most cases, voters only have the
choice between two candidates, both of whom may have majority support for their positions
on different issues. It is well known, too, that citizens pay limited attention to the workings of
government (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Lupia 2015). For these reasons, politicians may feel
that they have some leeway when it comes to following public opinion. It follows that a politician
with time and attention constraints might also not think much about public opinion on issues that
he sees as unlikely to affect people’s votes. But how much effort should we expect politicians to
expend to learn about public opinion?
Key (1961) articulates a simple theory of how politicians anticipate public opinion when they
make decisions.
“To know how the public will respond to a contemplated course of action, those in
positions of leadership and authority need only to relate that action to their estimate of
the pictures in people’s heads and adjust their strategy accordingly." (Key 1961, 264)
In arguing that politicians perceive a national mood, Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson (1995)
write,
“Turnover from elections works most transparently with politicians who are
neither well informed (until hit on the head by the club of election results) nor strategic.
But that does not look at all like the politicians we observe. The oft-painted picture of
members of Congress, for example, as people who read five or six daily newspapers,
work 18-hour days, and leave no stone unturned in anticipating the electoral problems
that might arise from policy choices does not suggest either limited information or
naïveté." (Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson 1995, 544)
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These quotations are typical of many classic theories of voter control of politicians. They
demonstrate the centrality of perceptions in representatives’ decision-making. Both rely on
assumptions about politicians’ ability and motivation to perceive public opinion that may not
always be true in practice. Where does that estimate of the pictures in people’s heads come from?
Key’s simple description of how legislators anticipate public opinion masks the complex process
that is actually happening, and Stimson et al. do not consider how their theory might generalize
to state-level politicians with fewer resources to commit to monitoring public opinion. The true
process involves politicians’ information sources, their personal psychological biases, and other
factors than can influence decision-making.
Politicians’ imperfect knowledge of public opinion could take several forms. Politicians might
not know which side of an issue has majority support. Even if they do know the median voter’s
preference, they may know little about the relative size of opinion majorities on either side of
an issue. They also might not know about the relationship between support for an issue and
demographics or partisanship. Each of these gaps in knowledge could be consequential for different
actions that politicians might take.
The ways in which legislators process information about their constituents’ opinions and
develop their perceptions of public opinion have been the subject of relatively little empirical
scrutiny. I examine this issue in depth for two major reasons. First, politicians’ perceptions of
public opinion can be highly consequential for how they behave in office. In most models of
legislative decision-making that include public opinion in the district, it is typical to assume that
true public opinion, as measured by surveys, translates into legislative outcomes.
Legislators and party leaders at both the state and national levels of government have both real
and perceived needs to be responsive to public opinion (Maestas 2000, 2003; Mann 1978; Mayhew
1974). Once legislators are elected, the mass public can only hold them accountable through the
prospect of future electoral sanctions. Although mass attention to the details of lawmaking is
limited, politicians have strong incentives to avoid taking positions that will put them at odds with
a majority of their constituents, especially if the policy area is highly salient and likely to mobilize
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opponents.
THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS FOR PERCEPTIONS OF PUBLIC OPINION
How do politicians form their perceptions of public opinion? How accurate should we expect
them to be? These questions are crucial to understanding representation. The answers depend in
large part about the assumptions that we make about how politicians collect, process and react
to information about their constituents. Politicians are likely to have well-developed prior views
about the political leanings of their districts. They typically have access to detailed information
on past electoral returns and the partisan makeup of their district, but issue-specific opinion may
not track well with these statistics. Two key inputs shape politicians’ perceptions of their districts:
information and perceptual biases. Politicians form their perceptions by combining information
from a variety of sources. As they process this information, they are subject to a range of
psychological biases that affect the accuracy of their perceptions. If these misperceptions become
systematic, they could have important implications for the actions and positions politicians take.
To illustrate the role that information about public opinion and perceptions of public opinion
play in shaping representation, I describe three potential patterns of perceptions and conditions that
would be likely to produce them. Each has roots in different assumptions about politicians’ ability
to collect information, and each has different implications for the accountability mechanisms on
which the democratic system relies. In later chapters, I test actual patterns of public opinion
perception among state legislative candidates and party leaders. I also present new evidence on
some of the informational and perceptual conditions that play a role in determining what politicians
believe about their constituents’ opinions.
The three potential patterns of opinion are accurate perceptions, symmetrically biased
perceptions, and asymmetrically biased perceptions. The next section introduces each pattern of
perceptions. I then identify conditions under which we should expect politicians’ perceptions to
fall into each of the patterns. Under different realistic conditions, we would expect the accuracy
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and bias of politicians’ perceptions of public opinion to vary considerably, with potential important
consequences for how public opinion is translated into public policy.
Information sources and and perceptual biases
Under different combinations of informational and psychological conditions, politicians’
perceptions of public opinion could fall into each of the three patterns. This section reviews some
of the information sources and the psychological processes that influence how politicians perceive
their districts. I identify a set of conditions under which politicians’ perceptions of public opinion
could fall into each of the three patterns. In Chapters 3 and 4, I present empirical evidence on some
of these information sources and psychological processes.
Polls
Quality polls or surveys would undoubtedly be the most accurate way for politicians to develop
their perceptions of their constituents’ opinions. Over decades, the polling industry has grown, and
new technologies have allowed for more frequent and numerous surveys. Nevertheless, as I show
in Chapter 4, at the state legislative level, polling is rare. Even those candidates who do conduct
polls are not always sure that they should trust the results, and they don’t always ask questions that
would give them a good sense of their constituents’ preferences on specific issues. A politician who
wants to know where her constituents stand on issues could get important information by polling
them, but many state-level politicians lack the resources to do so.
Contact with and from constituents
Even if politicians don’t scientifically poll their constituents, they still receive information
about what their constituents believe from their activities that bring them in contact with people
in their districts. Candidates meet constituents both because they seek them out, attending events
and meetings and knocking on doors, and because constituents seek them out, calling their offices
or scheduling meetings to express themselves. While the extent to which politicians engage in
their districts and communities obviously varies, most spend considerable effort to be visible in
their district by attending public events, meeting with community groups, and knocking on doors.
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In Chapter 5, I report more details on how state legislative candidates say they spend their time
in their districts. How candidates spend their time and who they meet provide opportunities for
misperceptions of public opinion to develop. Depending on how candidates spend their time,
these decisions about who to meet could lead to either symmetrically or asymmetrically biased
perceptions.
Consider a candidate who spends a lot of time knocking on doors in her district. The candidate
might start out her campaign knocking doors somewhat randomly, visiting different streets in
different neighborhoods. If she kept up this sort of random contact, she might encounter a
representative subset of her constituents. In the real world, though, a number of factors could
make the candidate unlikely to encounter a representative group of constituents. Candidates might
target their own copartisans in a get-out-the-vote strategy. In this case, a candidate, encountering
many people who agree with her, might overestimate support for her own positions, leading to the
symmetric misperceptions outcome. Modern campaign analytics tools (Hersh 2015) allow for these
kinds of targeted campaigns. Some citizens might simply be easier to meet than others, because
they live in more accessible places or are more engaged in the community. During the course of a
campaign, a candidate in a small state legislative district might personally meet a sizable portion
of their constituents. However, the candidate may meet an unrepresentative group of constituents,
distorting her view of constituency opinion. If a candidate mostly meets people who agree with
him or her, they may believe their position has more support than it actually does, leading to the
symmetric misperceptions outcome. If citizens with a particular set of opinions are easier to access,
candidates may find themselves in the asymmetric misperceptions outcome, overestimating support
for one side of the issue.
Politicians don’t always have a choice of which constituents they encounter. Some constituents
will seek them out in order to express their positions on issues. Often, this contact will take place
in the context of grassroots lobbying efforts conducted by interest groups (Kollman 1998). The rise
of the internet and email has reduced the costs of organizing large grassroots campaigns, possibly
at the cost of reducing their effectiveness in swaying legislators (Cluverius 2017). In surveys of
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Congressional staffers conducted by the Congressional Management Foundation, staffers report
that contact from constituents plays an important role in determining how congressional staffers
view public opinion on the issues. Contact is most persuasive if it is in person and includes a level
of policy detail. Several recent studies show that contact from constituents and other information
shocks affect the positions legislators take (Bergan 2009; Bergan and Cole 2015; Butler and
Nickerson 2011; Butler 2014; Henderson and Brooks 2016). These studies suggest that if one
side of an issue is more vocal in contacting legislators or otherwise expressing itself, it could seem
to have broader public support than it actually is. This condition would predict the asymmetric
misperceptions outcome.
Perceptual biases
Projection and false consensus biases
Well-known psychological theories suggest that people dealing with imperfect or incomplete
information might overestimate support for their own preferences or issue positions. Considerable
evidence shows that people, when asked to make judgments about attributes of social groups, tend
to overestimate the similarity of other group members to themselves. This is one of a broader
set of “wishful thinking" biases. In a variety of settings, psychologists have found that people
tend to overestimate the extent to which others are like them and share their views, sometimes
called “projection" and “false consensus bias" (Fields and Schuman 1976; Krosnick 1990; Maner,
Kenrick, Becker, Robertson, Hofer, Neuberg, Delton, Butner and Schaller 2005; Mullen, Dovidio,
Johnson and Copper 1992; Ross, Greene and House 1977; Sherwood 1981). This pattern has
been found for a variety of political and non-political issues and in evaluations of peers and
of politicians. If politicians engage in a straightforward false consensus bias, we might expect
them to symmetrically overestimate support for their own positions. These theories predict that
politicians making estimates of public opinion under uncertainty would end up in the symmetric
misperceptions outcome.
Heuristics
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People use heuristics, or information shortcuts, to make many kinds of decisions. Politicians
evaluating their constituents’ opinions are no different and will use easily obtained information to
stand in for information that is more difficult for them to acquire.
When estimating constituents’ opinions on particular issues, politicians could rely on simpler
heuristics that may be easier for them to process. Using a partisan heuristic, the politician might
assume that the partisan makeup of their district correlates well with issue-specific opinions. In
an era when people’s opinions are increasingly sorted based on partisanship, such an approach
might lead politicians to approximately accurate perceptions. However, if they misunderstand how
partisanship maps onto issue-specific positions, their perceptions could be biased. Politicians might
also assume that demographic factors give them insight into their constituents’ opinions.
Heuristic-based perceptions could lead politicians’ perceptions to fall into any of the three
categories. If the heuristics that politicians use are valid, meaning they map well onto their
constituents’ actual opinions, heuristic-based reasoning is sufficient for achieving the perfect
accuracy outcome. However, only slight biases in the heuristics that politicians use could lead
them to other outcomes. Even if a politician knows how many union members are in his district,
if he misperceives the share of union workers who support a policy, the heuristic will not help
him accurately estimate policy-specific opinion. In Chapter 4, I show qualitative evidence that
state legislative candidates often turn to these kinds of heuristics in estimating public opinion.
However, heuristics could lead politicians to any of the three perceptual outcomes, depending on
the relationship between the heuristic and true underlying public opinion.
In the next section, I define the predicted pattens of perceptions more precisely.
The first case: perfect information, accurate perceptions
In the first potential pattern of perceptions of public opinion, politicians accurately perceive their
constituents’ opinions on issues. They may make some errors, but they are small and random. In the
aggregate, these small errors cancel out. A graphical depiction of this kind of pattern is presented
in Figure 2.2, which plots “true" public opinion in a set of hypothetical districts on the x-axis. The
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y-axis represents politicians’ perceptions of public opinion.
Figure 2.2: The “accurate perceptions" outcome
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A hypothetical situation in which politicians can perceive issue-specific opinion in their constituency well, making
only small, random errors. The x-axis represents “true" support for an issue position in a set of districts, while the
y-axis represents politicians’ perceptions of support for the issue.
Downs (1957) proposes a theory of representation that predicts that parties will converge to
the preferences of the median voter. Key elements of Downs’ theory include a one-dimensional
issue space. The logic of the Downs model predicts that politicians have strong incentives to (1)
accurately perceive the position of the median voter on salient issues and (2) move to that position.
This logic predicts that (1) the candidate who knows where voters are is likely to win and (2) all
candidates’ perceptions should converge to the truth. Voters, on the other hand, have little incentive
to expend costly effort to learn about politics. They only need to know which party is closer to their
ideal point. This model has been highly influential in shaping scholars’ approaches to studying
representation. In many ways, it serves as a baseline to which other theories of representation are
compared.
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We might expect that some legislators aspire to behave this way, closely following constituent
opinion. Theoretical and empirical findings strongly suggest that politicians are especially
concerned with re-election (Mayhew 1974). A politician who is not re-elected will not be able
to achieve his goals in the future. While some politicians little weight on their future goals, most
who are eligible to run for re-election do so. It seems reasonable to predict that, if information
about public opinion were costless, most candidates would gladly accept it and integrate it into
their decision-making.
This logic underlies what Achen and Bartels (2016) call “the folk theory of democracy." Achen
and Bartels note that many people believe that democracy works through the strict control of
politicians by their constituents. They argue that, for a number of reasons, models of political
accountability that rely on complete information are insufficient for explaining the real world. This
pessimistic view is not new; Miller and Stokes (1963) expressed surprise at the low correlations
between members of Congress’ perceptions of public opinion and true opinion in their districts.
Unfortunately for politicians, information about public opinion is costly. They may aspire to
learn all they can about their districts, but limited resources in terms of time, money, and polling
capacity can all prevent them from collecting the kinds of reliable information that would allow
them to make judgments about their district’s preferences. A theory of responsiveness to the median
voter might suggest that a pattern of perceptions like the one in Figure 2.2 will take hold, but are
the assumptions behind it reasonable in practice? I argue in this project that, at least at the state
and local level of government, they are surely not.
In sum, prominent theories of representative government predict that politicians will accurately
perceive their constituents’ opinions. But what if the assumption that politicians can do so is not
met?
Imperfect information, symmetrically biased perceptions
What happens to prominent theories of representation if we relax the assumption that politicians
can easily and accurately perceive public opinion? As Miller and Stokes (1963) pointed out, a
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major pathway for public opinion to influence policymaking is through politicians’ perceptions of
constituency opinion. Models that suggest that politicians are responsive to actual public opinion
are oversimplified because politicians usually cannot directly observe opinion. Instead, they are
responsive to their perceptions of what their constituents think about issues.
Several attributes of politics make it unrealistic that politicians will have perfect information
about their districts’ preferences on every issue. To be sure, technological advances have greatly
reduced the cost of a reliable public opinion poll. However, the sheer volume of legislative activity
makes it unwieldy for politicians to poll their constituents on every issue they face. Many of the
issues that legislators confront are quite complex, and on many of them, we would not expect the
public to have well-developed preferences (Lupia 2015). The number of legislative districts in the
United States also makes it unwieldy for parties or candidates to conduct representative polls in
every district. Even quality state-level opinion polls remain relatively rare.
In the absence of an objective measure of public opinion, legislators must rely on more
subjective impressions. They may infer what their constituents believe about specific issues from
what they know and believe about the district’s partisanship. Their subjective impressions are
likely to be affected by the constituents with whom they have frequent contact. A joke holds
“that Republicans could never understand why they lost an election because all their friends at
the country club voted Republican"2. Politicians might misperceive public opinion because they
are more likely to encounter citizens who agree with them. This unrepresentative group of citizens
may shape the politicians’ perceptions of the district as a whole.3
In an optimistic case, legislators’ perceptions of public opinion might amount to a noisy
approximation of the truth, with basically random errors. In the aggregate, such misperceptions
should not substantially bias representation, as random errors would cancel out. Such a pattern
might be likely if, for example, easily identifiable demographics correlate closely with people’s
opinions in a way that allowed politicians to map from district characteristics to majority opinion.
2Paraphrased at http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/07/moderate-republi
cans-donald-trump-tea-party-conservative-fringe-2016-120675
3I investigate these processes further in Chapter 4.
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However, there is also reason to believe that legislators’ attempts to collect subjective
information on district opinion might give them a biased view of where their constituents stand.
The ways in which legislators connect to their districts are the subject of Fenno’s (1978) classic
work. Fenno shows that legislators attend to different subsets of their constituencies for different
reasons. In particular, legislators and candidates are likely to encounter citizens whose views are
close to their own. They must recruit campaign volunteers and donors, who usually come from a
pool of people with similar ideologies and and policy preferences to the candidates. Many of them
need to secure endorsements and support from party leaders. Many candidates also must run and
and win a partisan primary, meaning they will spend a considerable amount of the election season
focusing only on their copartisans, not on the district as a whole. Primaries also give politicians an
electoral incentive to follow the median voter of their party, not just the district.
Figure 2.3: The “symmetric errors" outcome.
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Hypothetical equilibrium: Symmetric errors
A possible pattern of perceptions of public opinion in which each side overestimates support for its positions, leading
to symmetric misperceptions.
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Figure 2.3 depicts a hypothetical situation in which politicians overestimate support for their
own issue positions among their constituents. Politicians in both groups are overconfident about
the level of support for their side of the issue, consistent with theories that predict false consensus
bias. In one empirical example, Enos and Hersh (2015) find that Democratic campaign volunteers
are over-optimistic about their candidate’s likelihood of winning. Politicians, in the absence of
reliable information about public opinion, could believe that more people agree with them than
actually do.
Biased information, asymmetrically biased perceptions
One key condition of the symmetric errors pattern is that politicians of both parties believe that
their own positions are more popular than they are. This pattern is consistent with many findings
about how people form perceptions with limited information. We might predict that politicians are
similar to most people and are subject to these biases in information processing, which would lead
to the symmetric errors equilibrium. This outcome could arise either because politicians collect
information about their districts in a way that is biased toward their own point of view.
However, the political information environment is rarely perfectly symmetric. Often, one side
advocates for itself in a way that disproportionately reflects its actual support in the public. If one
side of an issue mobilizes more than another, politicians may receive communication that does not
accurately reflect the underlying distribution of opinion. Many commentators have pointed to this
pattern as a feature of the contemporary debate over gun control. Although gun control policies
consistently command majority support in most states, politicians from both parties remain hesitant
to enact them. Some people argue that this is because pro-gun citizens are better organized and hold
their position more intensely than anti-gun activists (Goss 2008).
In this third possible pattern, politicians do not make symmetric errors. Instead, their
perceptions of the public skew in one direction. This pattern is depicted in Figure 2.4, which
shows a relationship between true public opinion and politicians’ perceptions that is biased in
one direction. In the version I have depicted, the red party supports the issue, but the blue party
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does not. However, aspects of the information environment drive politicians of both parties to
overestimate opposition to the policy. Because of motivated reasoning and wishful thinking biases,
the politicians assume, in the absence of information to the contrary, that the public supports their
preferred positions.
Asymmetries in perceptions of public opinion could arise from the many documented
partisan-ideological asymmetries in American politics. In Chapter 4, I consider asymmetries in
citizen activism that might explain why politicians would overestimate the conservatism of their
constituents. Grossmann and Hopkins (2015a) identify a variety of asymmetries in the way the two
major parties are organized in the electorate and at the elite level. They argue that the Republican
party coalition is organized most strongly around ideological commitments, while the Democratic
coalition is a loosely aligned set of group-based interests. They document a variety of ways in
which the two parties are fundamentally different, both at the elite and the mass levels. In addition
to these asymmetries, the parties have polarized asymmetrically (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal
2006), with Republicans growing more extreme at the elite level than Democrats. In short,
considerable partisan-ideological asymmetries exist in American politics that could contribute to
an information environment that is biased toward suggesting that one side of an issue is more
popular than it actually is.
Table 2.1: Conditions predicted to be associated with each of the three patterns of perceptions of
public opinion.
Accurate perceptions Symmetric bias Asymmetric bias
Accurate and frequent polls Few or no polls Few or no polls
Contact with a representative
group of constituents
Contact with mostly own
partisans
More contact with one side
False consensus Asymmetric false consensus
All citizens contact equally All citizens contact equally One side contacts more
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Figure 2.4: The “asymmetric misperceptions" outcome.
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Hypothetical equilibrium: Asymmetric errors
A possible pattern of perceptions of public opinion in which one side dominates the information environment, leading
to asymmetric misperceptions.
DATA: ELITE SURVEYS
To evaluate these questions of how politicians perceive their constituents, we need direct data from
politicians themselves. In this section, I introduce the original surveys of American political elites
I have collected with David E. Broockman, Nicholas Carnes, and Melody Crowder-Meyer.
Politicians create many publicly observable traces of their activities. They sponsor legislation,
cast roll call votes, send newsletters to constituents, make speeches, air television and radio ads, and
give media interviews and press conferences. From this trail of evidence, observers can reconstruct
a rich picture of how politicians present themselves to voters and the media (Grimmer, Messing
and Westwood 2012). Politicians’ public activities and statements can provide important insights
into their ideologies and other aspects of their representational styles.
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Although we can sometimes easily observe what politicians do and say, much of the important
activity in politics happens behind closed doors, out of the view of both the public and researchers.
When politicians make strategic choices to introduce certain legislation at certain times, when they
meet with interest groups and informal advisors to help set their priorities, and when they meet with
donors, no one can observe what they say. Many people point to these behind-the-scenes activities
as a possible pathway for corruption, or at least as possible ways that representatives could become
out of touch with their constituents. Whatever their intentions, politicians’ private actions play a
central role in shaping important political outcomes.
In addition to what politicians do, what they think shapes important political outcomes.
Perceptions of public opinion are one such area in which it’s impossible to learn what politicians
think without asking them directly. This can be a difficult task. Sitting and even retired officeholders
are often reticent to consent to surveys or interviews. Politicians are not always willing to talk
honestly with researchers about their activities and perceptions.
Working with a team of colleagues, I have collected thousands of survey responses from
political elites across the country. By focusing on candidates for state legislature and local party
leaders, we have identified a group of politicians who make consequential decisions but are still
relatively willing to participate in academic surveys. In the studies that follow, I use data from these
surveys of American political elites. We gather information on what politicians do and think that
isn’t obvious from their publicly observable activities. Our main approach is to ask politicians and
political elites directly in surveys about their beliefs and activities. I also rely on survey experiments
to uncover politicians’ motivations, beliefs, and prejudices. By providing politicians a strong
promise of confidentiality, I hope they will provide insight into some of the behind-the-scenes
aspects of their representational styles and their campaigns. By surveying candidates during the
height of the campaign season, I connect with them at one of the times they will be most engaged
in their districts.
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ELITE SURVEYS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
Many political scientists have conducted original data collection through interviews or surveys with
political elites. These studies have had a variety of goals. Among the most common are studies
evaluating similarities and differences between elites’ and the public’s ideologies and political
sophistication.
In one of the most prominent and groundbreaking studies of representation, Miller and Stokes
(1963) paired an American National Election Studies survey of the mass public with a survey
of sitting members of Congress. A number of subsequent studies used surveys of various elite
populations to evaluate representation (e.g., Kuklinski and Elling 1977; Uslaner and Weber 1979;
Hedlund and Friesema 1972), but surveys of officeholders largely faded from the agenda in political
science research.
Surveys of convention delegates have also been common in political science research. The
conventions provide a convenient way to access many activists and elites at one time and place. One
major project, the Convention Delegate Study, surveyed delegates to the major party conventions
during most election years between 1972 and 2000. Insights from this study have been used in a
number of studies to characterize the beliefs, activities, and attributes of party activists (Carmines
and Woods 2002; Jennings 1992; Stone and Abramowitz 1983). Convention delegates provide a
useful sample of highly engaged and politically sophisticated activists.
For several decades, systematic studies of elites became less common in political science
research. While some scholars used interviews with small numbers of elites in their research,
few turned to large-scale surveys of elites. However, interest in studying politicians through
direct interaction has grown in recent years. Daniel M. Butler has conducted a series of survey
experiments and audit studies on municipal officials and on state legislators (Butler 2014). Enos
and Hersh (2015) used a survey of campaign volunteers embedded in the Democratic party’s
data tools to identify how activists evaluate the closeness of the races they are working on. This
ingenious design shows the potential for using new technologies to access political elites more
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often and more easily.
We can learn much from studying partisan activists. They provide important insights into how
engaged citizens view the issues animating politics at any given moment. We can gain insight into
how influential people are likely to attempt to move public opinion. Activists are also easier to
access and sample than officeholders—they are more numerous and not subject to the pressures
of political office. Despite the highly influential nature of some of this research, these direct
survey-based studies of politicians and other elites remain somewhat rare. Researchers need to
convince political elites to take time from their busy schedules to respond to surveys, and achieving
large enough samples to make valid statistical inferences can be difficult. To address these
concerns, my team and I turned to the state level and specifically to state legislative candidates,
a large and diverse group of politicians. Our surveys focus on these state-level politicians, as well
as party leaders. Our main population of interest is candidates running for state legislative offices.
Many political scientists focus their research on the federal government,. Data about the
activities of federal officeholders is relatively easy to access, and almost everyone agrees that
the actions of Congress and the federal government are very consequential. At the same time,
politicians at the state and local level make many consequential decisions. State legislatures pass
laws that have the same force as federal laws, but members of state legislatures face unique
informational and resource constraints that are relevant for the development of their perceptions of
public opinion. Despite the fact that these politicians have important lawmaking responsibilities,
they work with much more limited resources than members of Congress do.
Typically, state legislators, even in states with professionalized legislatures, have little access
to reliable polling data on their districts. In the 2014 National Candidate Study, I asked candidates
about their campaigns’ use of polling. A large majority of candidates in the survey reported that
their campaign would not use any polls at all. Many state legislators also have minimal electoral
competition. The exact figure varies across years and states, but in some years more than half
of incumbents do not have a challenger (Rogers 2014a). The population of people running for
state legislature clearly varies in important ways, ranging from long-time incumbents and future
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members of Congress to political amateurs. In sum, the population of state legislative candidates
has several attractive features. It is possible to access a large enough number of respondents that
meaningful statistical inferences can be drawn.
THE NATIONAL CANDIDATE STUDY
David E. Broockman, Nicholas Carnes, Melody Crowder-Meyer and I collaborated to conduct a
large-scale study of candidates running for office in 2012 and 2014. We call our survey the National
Candidate Study (NCS).
The 2014 National Candidate Study
The National Candidate Study was an original survey of candidates who ran for state legislature
in 2014, including many sitting legislators running for re-election. The NCS was a combined
online and mail survey fielded in October 2014. To build the sampling frame, we obtained contact
information for as many candidates for state legislature as possible from Project Vote Smart,
which maintains a comprehensive database of candidates for office nationwide.4 1,803 candidates
responded5 for an overall response rate of 20.8%. At least 793 of the respondents won their general
election and served in state legislatures.
Importantly, the NCS was designed to minimize the chance of staff responding to the survey
instead of candidates. The online version of the survey had a screener question that shut down the
survey if the respondent did not report personally being a candidate. Also, where multiple email or
4We collected mailing addresses and email addresses for each candidate from Vote Smart, restricting our sample
to major party candidates. Many candidates had both forms of contact information available and almost all had at
least one form. Of the 8,965 candidates listed as running, 8,858 candidates had a mailing address available and 4,775
candidates had an email address available. In early October, all candidates for whom we had a mailing address on
file received a postcard announcing the survey. Candidates with email addresses on file then received three email
invitations over the course of about three weeks. In mid-October, all candidates with mailing addresses on file who
had not already taken the online version of the survey received a paper copy of the survey that they had the opportunity
to mail back to us. The paper copy of the survey also included a code that allowed candidates to go online to take the
survey if they had missed our email invitation or we did not have an email address on file for them.
51,175 candidates responded to the email solicitation, 84 responded online after receiving the mail version, and
610 candidates returned the paper version of the survey, for a total sample size of 1,803 candidates
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mailing addresses were available in the Project Vote Smart database, we chose the ones most likely
to be the candidate’s home address or personal email as opposed to campaign office addresses.
More information on the design and representativeness of the 2014 NCS is in Chapter 3 and its
appendix.
The 2012 National Candidate Study
Most of the analysis in this project relies on the 2014 NCS, but I also draw on items from the first
year of the NCS, conducted during the 2012 election. The design of the surveys in the two years
was nearly identical.
In early August 2012 we gathered data on contact information for every candidate for state
legislative office. Many legislators only had email addresses, many more had only physical
street addresses, and the preponderance of candidates had both. We attempted to gather contact
information for all 10,131 state legislative candidates though were unable to gather contact
information for 306 (3%). This left a total of 9,825 in the sampling frame. In mid-August we sent
three waves of email solicitations to all 7,444 candidates for whom we had e-mail addresses. After
1,318 responses from this email solicitation, we then attempted to secure cooperation in a mail
version of the survey among a randomly selected6 5,000 candidates who had not yet responded.
These candidates were sent a postcard informing them that the survey would be arriving in the mail,
followed by a paper version of the survey one week later. An additional 589 candidates returned
this paper survey.
Two aspects of the sampling frame are worthy of special comment. First, our sampling frame
includes both sitting legislators and candidates for office. Second, it includes legislators from states
across the spectrum of professionalism, including highly professionalized legislature and part-time
legislatures where individual legislators represent only very small constituencies.
1,907 candidates responded to the 2012 NCS in total, for a response rate of 19.5%. There is no
6We conducted blocked sampling on state and incumbency, retaining the probability that each individual candidate
was selected but ensuring greater balance in the resulting sample on these variables.
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meaningful relationship between response rate and party of the candidate, whether the candidate
won or lost, or the candidates’ margin of victory. About half the sample won their November
general elections, and about half the sample comes from each party.
A follow-up online-only survey conducted in mid-November yielded 514 responses among the
1,907 respondents to the first wave of the study. The post-election survey was conducted among
all candidates who responded to the pre-election survey and had an email address on file.
More information on the design and representativeness of the 2012 NCS is in Chapter 3 and its
appendix.
THE 2013 NATIONAL SURVEY OF PARTY LEADERS
In 2013, Broockman, Carnes, Crowder-Meyer and I conducted a survey of the leaders of county
political parties. We call our survey the National Survey of Party Leaders (NSPL). In most states,
county party organizations make up an important part of the parties’ structure. Typically, each
county’s branch of the political party is active in recruiting and endorsing candidates. The NSPL
was designed to give insights into the ways that parties are structured and how party leaders make
strategic decisions when they recruit candidates and set the priorities of their local parties.
The structure of parties varies somewhat by states, but in the vast majority of states, each county
has a distinct party organization. The extent to which these county parties are closely aligned with
the state party also varies, as do their procedures for selecting leadership. Moreover, the distribution
of county populations is extremely skewed. Most counties are very low in population and rural,
while a handful of urban counties contain a large proportion of the US population.
In November 2013, we fielded the NSPL, a survey of the chairs of the roughly 6,000
county-level (or equivalent) branches of the Republican and Democratic parties. We began by
collecting party chairs’ email and/or physical mailing addresses from publicly available sources,
usually state party organizations.7 Much like the NCS, we sent postcards and pre-survey emails
7Some states do not have county parties but instead have parties at the parish (LA), borough (AK), district (ND),
city (CT), multi-county (MN), or sub-city (MA Democrats) level. In 9 states, neither party posts contact information
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to each respondent (if we had both a mailing address and an email address, we sent both), then
followed up a week later with a full letter and/or email inviting the chair to complete the survey.
To administer the survey, we first manually compiled contact information for 6,219 county
party chairs. We gathered this information by searching the internet for the name of every county
in the US together with the name of each of the two major parties. In some states, we found
directories. In many states, we made inquiries to individual parties to gather contact information
for each chair where it was missing. We chose county-level parties as the sampling frame for
several reasons. First, they and their local equivalents are often the most active organizations in
primary elections at the state and federal levels (Crowder-Meyer 2011). They also recruit a large
share of candidates for local and state office and, in turn, many of the candidates who later run for
higher offices (Crowder-Meyer 2013; Lawless 2012). Consistent with their importance in primary
elections, over 78% of the party chairs in our sample indicated that people in their county party
organization have helped support a particular candidate in an open primary. In a separate survey
of candidates for state legislative office, we also found over 57% indicated that people in their
local party organization were important in encouraging them to run for office. In November 2013,
we sent each chair a pre-notification and then a survey invitation at his or her email and/or postal
addresses. (If both were available, we attempted contact at both.) We received responses from
1,118 (18%), a response rate comparable to the NCS.
More information on the design and representativeness of the NSPL is in Chapter 5 and its
appendix.
Representativeness and limitations of survey studies
Survey studies have important limitations. Unlike some observational studies, where administrative
records or other comprehensive data sources allow researchers to collect data on entire populations
of interest, surveys rely on assumptions that the group of respondents who complete the survey
are representative of the broader population being studied. Differential response rates are a serious
for county-level party officials online: Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, and Wisconsin. We excluded those states from our analysis.
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concern for survey research and have the potential to introduce bias into analyses based on surveys
(Groves 2006; Groves and Peytcheva 2008). A number of approaches to mitigate total survey error
exist, but none can overcome the limitation that surveys rely on a sample of the population of
interest that is subject to respondents’ decisions to participate. Some of these concerns can be
particularly severe for opt-in online panels such as the CCES, on which my analysis of public
opinion relies. Our elite surveys have some advantages compared to typical surveys of the mass
public. For a survey of the public, researchers are only able to contact a subset of the potentially
eligible citizens; they then typically only secure cooperation from a small percentage of the public.
In our surveys, we attempt to recruit the entire population of major-party state legislative candidates
and county party chairs. We cannot secure cooperation from more than 80% of these populations,
so our results should be seen as representative only of those elites who responded.
Weighting is one way to address potential bias, but it is far from a panacea. Weighting can
only correct for differences in responsiveness that are attributable to observed variables (typically
measurable demographics such as age, race, gender, education, and geographic location). If
unobserved variables affect response rates, weighting will not account for the biases. Rather than
construct a weighting scheme for the elite data, I rely on split-sample approaches, subsetting the
data based on observables that I hypothesize may correlate with my outcomes of interest, such
as incumbency, party, and professionalization. Still, this approach cannot account for all possible
sources of bias in the surveys.
PROJECT SUMMARY
How do politicians perceive their constituents’ opinions, and what are the consequences for
representation? In the rest of this project, I explore this topic using a variety of strategies and
original data. Some of the project draws on coauthored research that I have conducted with David
Broockman, Nicholas Carnes, and Melody Crowder-Meyer.
My findings suggest that the conditions that underlie many prominent theories of representation
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are not met in contemporary American politics. Politicians’ beliefs about public opinion are neither
accurate nor unbiased enough to facilitate the direct, dyadic representation of public opinion on
even the most salient issues in American politics. The findings are united by two themes. First,
most people, regardless of whether they are political elites or ordinary citizens, know relatively
little about where the median voter stands on major issues or about the size and direction of opinion
majorities. Second, perceptions of public opinion tend to be biased in a conservative direction.
First, I show that candidates for state legislature systematically misperceive their constituents’
positions on major issues of contemporary American politics. Across a variety of the most
prominent issues, politicians overestimate support for conservative issue positions. Conservatives
are especially prone to this perceptual bias, but even liberal and Democratic candidates sometimes
overestimate support for conservative positions while rarely overestimating support for liberal
positions. These patterns of misperceptions could help to explain patterns of asymmetric
polarization that have been observed in American politics.
Second, I show that party leaders — the people who recruit these candidates to run — have
similar misperceptions of public opinion in their states. These party leaders believe that their
states and counties have more conservative preferences than they actually do. These misperceptions
play out in their candidate recruitment activities, as party leaders of both parties strongly enforce
ideological discipline. However, Republican party leaders prefer more polarized candidates than
Democratic party leaders do. It seems that Republican party leaders respond to their perceived
constituents’ conservatism by working to move their parties to the right.
Third, I show that ordinary citizens’ beliefs about public opinion are quite similar to elites’.
Citizens’ perceptions of opinion in their states are very inaccurate. On average, though, ordinary
Americans show a very similar bias to that of elites. Both conservatives and liberals in the mass
public believe that conservative issue positions are more popular than they actually are.
Miller and Stokes’s (1963) insight holds up after fifty years—representation is a function of
the preferences and biases that politicians bring to their activities. Because both electoral and
perceptual control operate imperfectly, important asymmetries and information gaps can persist
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even among professional sitting legislators. The multidimensional nature of politics, as well as
the limited attention that most citizens give to politics, means that politicians’ misperceptions can
persist.
Political elites’ perceptions of public opinion are strongly moderated by partisanship, but only
Republicans behave in a way consistent with a motivated reasoning or wishful thinking bias.
Among the mass public, party and ideology do not moderate perceptions, but the overall patterns
of perceptions remain the same, because people who identify with both parties overestimate their
state’s conservatism on average. Conservatives are behaving as if they have a wishful thinking bias,
but liberals believe their side is not doing nearly as well as it is with the public.
My findings have implications for how we understand what elected officials do and don’t do
in office and why they are not always in line with public opinion. More broadly, my findings also
suggest that assuming that politicians have accurate or complete information about voters is unwise
for both scholars and activists. Instead, future work should consider how the information available
to political elites shapes their views of what the public believes.
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Chapter 3
What Political Elites Believe About Public Opinion, coauthored with David E.
Broockman
The sharp increase in elite polarization has been called “the central puzzle of modern American
politics” (Poole 2004).1 Increasingly, scholars hold that polarization is asymmetric, with “the
movement of the Republican Party to the right account[ing] for most” of polarization (McCarty
2015a).2 For example, Ahler and Broockman (2017) find that in the years 2008-2016, Democratic
Members of the US House voted with the majority of their constituents 69% of the time on roll calls
the CCES asked about, whereas Republican Members did so only 52% of the time, barely more
often than would be expected by chance. Similarly, Hall (2015, Table A.4) finds that Republican
candidates often take positions more extreme than would be electorally optimal, while Democrats
do so far less. Scholars have worked to understand how politicians’ congruence with public opinion
can break down from many perspectives (Achen and Bartels 2016; Bawn et al. 2012; Gilens 2012),
but existing theories still struggle to explain such one-sided biases.
In this paper, we argue that politicians can misperceive constituency opinion dramatically
and systematically enough to contribute to significant, one-sided biases in representation such as
asymmetric polarization. Existing evidence establishes that politicians want to be congruent with
constituency opinion, as they change their behavior when they learn more about it (Bergan 2009;
Butler and Nickerson 2011). This evidence is consistent with canonical theories that politicians
1Quoted in Fiorina and Levendusky (2006).
2See also, among others, Grossmann and Hopkins (2015b, 2016); Hacker and Pierson (2005, 2015); Mann and
Ornstein (2013); McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006); Theriault (2013). This view is by no means universal, but is
currently accepted as conventional wisdom among many scholars. See Online Appendix ?? for review.
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seek to represent the median voter (e.g., Downs 1957) and empirical findings demonstrating
politicians’ strong responsiveness to public opinion (e.g., Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002;
Erikson 2013). However, classic theories of representation argue that politicians’ information
environments can leave them imperfectly informed about the median voter’s preferences: “the
constituency that a representative reacts to is the constituency that he or she sees” (Fenno 1977,
p. 883) but “The Representative knows his constituents mostly from dealing with people who do
write letters [and] who will attend meetings” (Miller and Stokes 1963, see also Butler and Dynes
(2016); Miler (2010)). Extending these theories, we argue that biases in politicians’ information
environments common across politicians can lead politicians as a whole to systematically
misperceive constituency opinion and, in turn, to contribute to systemic breakdowns in dyadic
representation like asymmetric polarization.
We demonstrate our argument in the context of the contemporary United States, where
conditions for bias in politicians’ perceptions of constituency opinion appear ripe. Over the last
few decades, and especially during the last decade, actors on the political right built the capacity
to “rapidly mobilize large numbers” of conservative citizens to participate in the public spheres
representatives monitor (Blee and Creasap 2010) by organizing intense conservative issue publics,
coordinating with talk radio programs, and more (Goss 2008; Fang 2013). During the Obama
presidency, these forces and “thermostatic” (Wlezien 1995) reactions pushed right-wing activism
to new heights (Skocpol and Williamson 2011; Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez 2016). For example,
while voter turnout for conservatives and liberals differs only slightly,3 conservatives have recently
been significantly more likely to participate in the public sphere in other ways, such as by
contacting their legislators or attending town hall meetings. These differences are not small: for
example, in the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study Republican citizens were 39%
more likely than Democrats to indicate they had contacted their US House Member’s office to
express their opinion, differences that persisted in 2012 but were not evident in previous decades
(see Table A.1). The explicit goal of much of conservatives’ participation in the public sphere is to
3Later in the paper, we show that voters and non-voters have nearly identical average opinions on the issues we
study.
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shape how politicians perceive the public’s demands (e.g., MacGuffie 2009).
In contexts like these, can politicians indeed systematically misperceive constituency opinion
on salient issues? To shed light on this question, we gathered one of the most extensive
documentations of elite perceptions of constituency opinion ever compiled. This original survey
evidence spans two years and 3,765 surveys of American politicians, across which we collected
11,803 elite perceptions of constituency opinion in total. Our main evidence comes from a survey
we conducted in 2014 of 1,858 state politicians, motivated by evidence that the same dynamics
persist at the state level and by the variation available there. Further, motivated by evidence that
polarization is partly a function of newly elected candidates taking more extreme positions than
their predecessors (Theriault 2006), we surveyed both incumbents and candidates. We measured
these officeholders’ and candidates’ perceptions of public opinion in their districts across seven
issues in total. We then compared these politicians’ perceptions of opinion in their constituencies
to estimates of actual opinion there, which we computed using Cooperative Congressional Election
Study data, to examine whether their politicians’ perceptions were significantly or systematically
distorted. We also present data from a pilot study we conducted in 2012.
Our evidence reveals that, on average, candidates for state legislature from both parties in 2012
and 2014 believed that support for conservative positions on these issues in their constituencies
was much higher than it actually was. These misperceptions are large, pervasive, and robust:
politicians’ right-skewed misperceptions exceed 20 percentage points on issues such as gun control
and persist in states at every level of legislative professionalism, among both candidates and sitting
officeholders, among politicians in very competitive districts, and when we compare politicians’
perceptions to voters’ opinions only. That Democratic politicians also overestimate constituency
conservatism suggests these misperceptions cannot be attributed to motivated reasoning or social
desirability bias alone.
Why are US politicians’ perceptions of constituency opinion systematically skewed to the
right? We present additional evidence that suggests a potential mechanism consistent with
politicians’ information environments playing a role (Miller and Stokes 1963). Not only are
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Republican citizens more likely to voice their views to politicians in general, but we show that
Republican citizens are especially likely to express their views to politicians who are fellow
Republicans. This means that whereas Democratic politicians hear from Republican constituents
somewhat disproportionately, Republican politicians appear to hear from Republican constituents
very disproportionately. Consistent with this mechanism, we show that much (although not all) of
the conservative misperceptions we found are driven by Republican politicians. Appendix Section
A finds suggestive evidence that the strength of the partisan imbalance in contact from constituents
also correlates with the extent to which politicians overestimate conservatism. Although direct
contact with legislators is just one of many asymmetries in citizens’ public engagement that could
skew politicians’ perceptions of constituency opinion, these patterns suggest that direct contact and
the other participatory behaviors it proxies for may play an important role.
Consistent with our theoretical argument, these biases in politicians’ perceptions of
constituency opinion are pervasive enough and considerable enough in magnitude to plausibly
contribute to a phenomena like asymmetric polarization. For example, we find that even in
districts where majorities of constituents favor same-sex marriage, Republican politicians in these
districts perceive their constituents as opposed to same-sex marriage by 3-to-1 on average. Such
misperceptions may help explain the puzzle of why so many politicians remain opposed to
same-sex marriage even when their constituents favor it (Krimmel, Lax and Phillips 2016).
In concluding we discuss several additional empirical predictions of our theory that are
confirmed in other evidence. However, our argument readily allows that US politicians’
misperceptions of constituency opinion could change in magnitude or even in direction—such
as in response to protest in the wake of the Trump presidency—and that such changes would
have important implications. We also discuss several broader implications of our argument and
directions for future research. In terms of immediate implications for theories of democratic
responsiveness, our findings present a mixed verdict. On the one hand, we find very strong
responsiveness of politicians’ perceptions of constituents’ opinions to that opinion (Erikson,
MacKuen and Stimson 2002). The correlations between public opinion and politicians’ perceptions
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of it we find are strong. However, this robust responsiveness belies often large gaps in congruence
between opinion and perceptions (Achen 1978): politicians’ perceptions are offset by an “intercept
shift” that leads them to often misperceive majority will.4 This is consistent with a more nuanced
understanding of the relationship between public opinion and public policy (Lax and Phillips
2012). Future research can and should further explore what gives rise to politicians’ misperceptions
of public opinion, what determines variation in them, and what consequences they have.
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
Politicians’ positions and the policies they make are clearly responsive to public opinion (e.g.,
Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002; Erikson 2013; Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014), but
they are not perfectly congruent with it (e.g., Lax and Phillips 2012). For example, the United
States has recently witnessed a sharp increase in asymemtric polarization, wherein Republican
politicians take positions that are more extreme than their Democratic counterparts on many issues.
What contributes to major biases in democratic representation like this? Existing explanations
for phenomena such as asymmetric polarization largely focus on reasons why politicians might
have electoral incentives to diverge from the preferences of the median voter (McCarty, Poole
and Rosenthal 2006; Hacker and Pierson 2005). These explanations are compelling, but may offer
incomplete explanations in some cases. For example, evidence indicates that Republican politicians
are even more polarized than would be electorally optimal (Hall 2015; Hall and Snyder 2015;
Jacobson 2013).
Classic theories of representation suggest another hypothesis: that politicians may not
accurately perceive what their constituents want. These theories argue that although politicians
prefer to remain in step with prevailing constituency opinion, they have incomplete information
about it and so must rely on imperfect cues (Arnold 1990; Fenno 1977; Kingdon 1967; Miller
and Stokes 1963), which they cognitively process with classic behavioral biases (Butler and
Dynes 2016; Miler 2010). Consistent with these theories, field experiments show that even a few
4Achen (1978) terms this concept “centrism.”
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dozen calls from constituents or one poll about constituency opinion can change how legislators
vote (Bergan 2009; Bergan and Cole 2015; Butler and Nickerson 2011). Evidence from natural
experiments, elite survey experiments, elite interviews, and descriptive data support these same
conclusions.5
In this paper, we extend these theories to consider their potential consequences for
aggregate representation. In particular, we argue that systematic biases in politicians’ information
environments common across politicians could generate significant, widespread biases in their
perceptions of their geographic constituencies.6
Influential arguments hold that even if politicians do misperceive constituency opinion, such
errors will be generally random and cancel out among the collective (Weissberg 1978). However,
we argue that forces that bias politicians’ perceptions of public opinion can be common across
many politicians, leading politicians as a whole to hold systematic misperceptions of their
constituents. For example, if certain kinds of individuals are more likely to express their views in
the public spheres politicians monitor, these individuals’ viewpoints may loom disproportionately
large in many politicians’ minds as they think about what their geographic constituency wants.7
If the same kinds of individuals are more active, vocal, and intense across districts, political elites
may systematically misperceive public opinion in similar ways, leading to significant biases in
aggregate representation like asymmetric polarization.
Over the last several decades, and in the last decade in particular, the conditions for just
this kind of systematic bias in politicians’ perceptions have been ripe in American politics.
During this time, conservative actors have focused on cultivating active issue publics on the
right and building the infrastructure to mobilize them to participate in the public sphere (Blee
5See Berinsky and Lenz (2014); Druckman and Jacobs (2006); Enos and Hersh (2015); Henderson and Brooks
(2016); Jacobs and Shapiro (1995). For example, Druckman and Jacobs (2006) and Jacobs and Shapiro (1995) find
that politicians are highly attuned to public opinion data when they do have access to it, although are constrained in
the amount of public opinion data to which they do have access.
6Fenno (1977) defines the geographic constituency as those residing in politicians’ legal district boundaries: “[the
geographic constituency] includes the entire population within those boundaries” (p. 884).
7For example, when politicians think about what their constituents as a whole want, copartisans, primary voters,
and the constituents and groups who are more active, vocal, and intense may be more likely to come to mind (Miler
2010), classic examples of the availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman 1973a).
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and Creasap 2010). A number of scholars have noted that this organized base of conservative
groups and voters have tailored their strategies to influence how politicians perceive their
constituents’ demands (Goss 2008; Hacker and Pierson 2005, 2015; Skocpol and Williamson
2011; Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez 2016). For example, intending to create the impression
that legislators’ constituencies were strongly opposed to Barack Obama’s legislative proposals in
2009, organizations affiliated with the Tea Party famously surrounded politicians with conservative
constituents voicing strenuous opposition at town halls.8
The famous ‘Tea Party Town Hall Strategy’ is just one manifestation of a broader strategy
conservative groups and voters have pursued to convince politicians that their constituencies favor
conservative policies. For example, journalistic accounts detail how conservative advocacy groups,
talk radio hosts, and donors have developed networks and organizations that ensure conservative
citizens regularly make politicians hear their voices at town halls, by phone, and otherwise (Fang
2013). Such activity has been in a renaissance on the political right, buoyed in part by a backlash
to waves of left-leaning policymaking (such as during the Obama era) and conservative national
donors’ rising incomes (Blee and Creasap 2010). Meanwhile, its left-wing equivalents have
atrophied, with unions in decline (Goss 2008; Hacker and Pierson 2005; Skocpol and Williamson
2011).
Theoretically, our argument predicts that these nationwide efforts to make politicians ‘feel
the heat’ from conservative constituents during the last decade could have pushed politicians’
collective perceptions of their geographic constituencies to the right, and their positions to the right
in turn. This would likely exacerbate asymmetric polarization by slowing Democrats’ leftward
moves and hastening Republicans’ rightward trajectory.
With this said, it is by no means obvious that such activity would actually bias politicians’
perceptions of public opinion pervasively and dramatically enough to contribute to these significant
8A strategy memo from one such group recounted that their “objective was to ‘pack the hall”’ at their
member’s town hall event and recommended that similar groups be sure their representatives “be made to feel
that a majority...opposes” Obama’s agenda. Consistent with these efforts to shape politicians’ perceptions of their
constituency, this group also released a press release claiming that “there are tens of thousands” of other constituents
“who agree with us” (MacGuffie 2009).
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biases in representation. Politicians may well appreciate that the people who call their offices,
attend town hall meetings, write letters to the editor, etc. are unrepresentative.
Unfortunately, despite the central role of politicians’ perceptions of public opinion in canonical
and contemporary theories, little data on them exists today. Querying politicians’ perceptions of
opinion was an active area of empirical research in American politics in the 1960s and 1970s,9
but these classic studies had very small sample sizes and few recent studies have engaged these
questions.10 Much has changed since the 1960s and 1970s, however, including dramatic changes
to how politicians communicate with and hear from their constituencies.
In this paper, motivated by the theoretical puzzle of why representation can sometimes break
down, we present the results of an extensive data collection effort we undertook to shed new light
on what contemporary American politicians believe about public opinion among their constituents.
To do so, we leverage technological changes since studies like Miller and Stokes (1963) to examine
how politicians perceive their constituents with greater precision and across more issues than
was previously possible. We measure these perceptions in the context of state politics, where
asymmetric polarization generally persists (Shor 2015) but where variation gives us leverage to
test alternative explanations and secondary hypotheses.
DATA: THE 2014 NATIONAL CANDIDATE STUDY
To measure state politicians’ perceptions of public opinion, we conducted the 2014 National
Candidate Study (NCS), an original combined online and mail survey of sitting state legislators
and candidates running for state legislature in the 2014 fielded in October of that year.
To build the sampling frame of candidates running for state legislature and sitting state
legislators running for re-election, we obtained their names and contact information from Project
9Miller and Stokes (1963) conducted one of the first systematic investigations of how politicians see their
constituents, and other scholars in the 1960s and 1970s followed in Miller and Stokes’s (1963) footsteps (e.g.,
Kuklinski and Elling 1977; Uslaner and Weber 1979; Hedlund and Friesema 1972).
10One prominent example is the structured interviews conducted by Miler (2010), who finds that legislators and
their staff generally think of their constituencies in a fragmented and inaccurate way, recalling only a small subset of
relevant constituencies on any given topic.
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Vote Smart, which maintains a comprehensive database of candidates for office nationwide, and
invited all candidates by both mail and email if possible.11 1,803 candidates responded12 for an
overall response rate of 20.8%, substantially higher than most elite surveys and surveys of the
general public. 950 of the respondents won their general election and took seats in state legislatures
in 2015. 685 already held office. Importantly, the NCS was designed to minimize the chance of staff
responding to the survey instead of politicians themselves.13
We also conducted a similar survey in 2012, described in Appendix Section A, which we
discuss later in the paper to establish the generalizability of our results across election types and
issue areas.
Representativeness
The politicians who responded to the 2014 NCS were broadly representative of the overall
population of general election candidates for state legislative offices. Figure 3.1 plots the
distributions of Obama’s share of the 2012 two-party vote in each politician’s district and Squire’s
(2007) measure of state legislative professionalism, with separate density plots for the entire
sampling frame of candidates for office and for just the politicians who responded to the NCS. The
left column displays the distributions of districts with and without a Democratic respondent, while
the right column displays the same for Republican respondents. There are no major differences
11We selected legislators in states that had elections in 2014 (all states except Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey,
and Virginia). Our analysis excludes respondents from New Hampshire’s House floterial districts, who cannot be easily
matched to Census geographies. We collected mailing addresses and email addresses for each candidate from Project
Vote Smart, restricting our sample to major party candidates. Many candidates had both forms of contact information
available and almost all had at least one form. Of the 8,965 candidates listed as running, 8,858 candidates had a mailing
address available and 4,775 candidates had an email address available. In early October, all candidates for whom we
had a mailing address on file received a postcard announcing the survey. Candidates with email addresses on file then
received three email invitations over the course of about three weeks. In mid-October, all candidates with mailing
addresses on file who had not already taken the online version of the survey received a paper copy of the survey that
they had the opportunity to mail back to us.
121,175 responded to the email solicitation, 84 responded online after receiving the mail version, and 610 returned
the paper version of the survey, for a total sample size of 1,803 politicians.
13In particular, the online version of the survey had a screener question that shut down the survey if the respondent
did not report personally being a candidate. The paper version of the survey also included this screener question, with
bold text that said that the survey was only for candidates. Also, where multiple email or mailing addresses were
available in the Project Vote Smart database, we chose the ones most likely to be the candidate’s home address or
personal email as opposed to campaign office addresses.
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that would suggest that our respondents from either party are unrepresentative of the broader
population of state legislative districts. Online Appendix A provides additional representativeness
assessments. There we find that Democrats and non-incumbents were slightly more likely to
respond, and so later in the paper we show the results separated by party and incumbency status.
We do not find any differences between response rates for those who were running for upper or
lower legislative chambers. There we also give the question wording for the questions we asked
about candidates’ ideology and the number of polls they took.
Figure 3.1: Representativeness of politicians who responded, by party, presidential vote share in
the district, and state legislative professionalization.
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Issues and Instrumentation
In order to compare elites’ perceptions to reasonably precise estimates of true public opinion, we
asked them to estimate constituency opinion on items that were being contemporaneously asked
in the 2014 CCES, a large sample survey (N = 56, 200) (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2015). We
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were therefore constrained in the kinds of issues we could ask about, as the CCES only asked the
full public sample about their opinions on a limited set of issues. However, the CCES had several
issue items that corresponded well to debates that were highly publicly salient in states during this
period, including debates over same-sex marriage, gun control, immigration,14 and abortion. Most
of these are relatively salient, “easy” issues where public opinion has remained relatively stable,
so we expected politicians to be especially likely to have accurate estimates of them. (Later we
present data from a study in 2012 that has two economic issues.)
In Table 3.1 we report the specific CCES items we asked politicians to estimate. We also
report the national level of support among opinion holders from the 2014 CCES, using the weights
provided by the CCES, and among voters the CCES validated to have ultimately voted in 2014.
We also report whether a response of “Yes" to the issue question reflects a conservative or liberal
preference, and whether the issue question would reflect a change in the status quo at the national
level. As Table 3.1 indicates, the issue questions we chose vary along these dimensions. This was
a deliberate choice: we wanted a mix of popular, unpopular, and controversial policy statements
to avoid ceiling or floor effects in politicians’ estimates of opinion. We did not always want a
“Yes" response to the survey question to represent a particular ideological direction, nor did we
want all of the questions to represent a status quo change. We were, however, constrained to
issues covered in the common content of the CCES, the only publicly available survey with a
sample size large enough for our purpose.Appendix Section A shows that the national means on
the CCES to these items are similar to the national means for similar items on other surveys,
suggesting representativeness issues with the CCES are unlikely to have spuriously generated our
main findings.15
Following Warshaw and Rodden (2012), CCES respondents are matched to state legislative
districts using their ZIP code and their race. Nearly all respondents are matched to districts with
14Even though much immigration policy is inherently a federal issue, states faced numerous questions during this
period about whether to extend ‘sanctuary’ status to undocumented immigrants, whether to allow immigrants to get
driver’s licenses, etc. One of our immigration items closely aligns with the hotly contested debate over Arizona’s
SB1070.
15Our findings that many liberal policies are popular in many districts is broadly consistent with Ellis and Stimson
(2012a), who find that Americans tend to have liberal views on specific policies.
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Table 3.1: Issue questions from the 2014 National Candidate Study, with weighted national levels
of support from the CCES.
National Mean Among ‘Yes’ Status quo
Issue Item Wording Mean 2014 Voters direction change?
“Allow gays and lesbians to marry
legally.”
56% 54% Liberal Some states
“Let employers and insurers refuse
to cover birth control and other
health services that violate their
religious beliefs.”
43% 47% Conservative No
“Require background checks for all
gun sales, including at gun shows
and over the Internet.”
87% 86% Liberal Yes
“Ban assault rifles.” 61% 60% Liberal Yes
“Allow police to question anyone
they think may be in the country
illegally.”
37% 41% Conservative Yes
“Grant legal status to all illegal
immigrants who have held jobs and
paid taxes for at least 3 years, and
not been convicted of any felony
crimes.”
47% 46% Liberal Yes
“Always allow a woman to obtain
an abortion as a matter of choice.”
57% 54% Liberal Yes
certainty, although to avoid biases from dropping respondents, we conduct a full join and weight
observations based on the certainty with which they are matched.16
To examine politicians’ beliefs about the districts in which they were running, the NCS asked
each politician to estimate, “What percent of the people living in your district would agree with
the following statements?” before providing a subsample of the items in Table 3.1 with essentially
16We use the Missouri Census Data Center’s MABLE/Geocorr tool to match zip codes to state legislative districts.
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the exact same wordings that appeared on the 2014 CCES.17 We chose this question wording to
measure political elites’ perceptions of their geographic constituency’s opinion because it most
closely maps to the theoretical puzzle that motivated our study, asymmetric polarization, which
makes important observations about median constituency opinion. In addition, it is possible to
objectively measure the correct answer to this question.18
POLITICIANS’ PERCEPTIONS OF CONSTITUENCY OPINION
We use two empirical strategies to examine the accuracy of politicians’ perceptions of their
districts. Our first strategy is to estimate a grand (weighted) mean of opinion across all districts
where politicians responded and compare this to the mean of their perceptions. Our second strategy
is to compute estimates of opinion in each district using MRP. Neither of these approaches rely on
us having completely accurate estimates of of public opinion in any particular district; rather, we
rely on average differences across districts. Moreover, although each of these approaches entails
differing assumptions, they ultimately yield highly similar conclusions.
Empirical Strategy 1: Raw Data
For our first approach, we compare the average of politicians’ perceptions across all the districts
where politicians responded to the CCES estimate of public opinion across all the districts
where politicians responded. Our estimation strategy is as follows. Let C represent the set of
all CCES respondents who live in districts where a politician responded to our survey, with
CCES respondents indexed by c and issues by i. Denote opinions expressed on issue i by CCES
17Table A.4 shows the wording of the NCS items we used to query politicians’ perceptions, as also shown in Table
3.1, alongside the wording for the original items on the CCES. As can be seen, we constructed the item wordings to be
essentially identical. All elite respondents were shown the first two items, about same-sex marriage and birth control
exemptions. Respondents were randomly assigned one of the two items about gun control, one of the two items about
immigration, and one of two items about abortion, such that each respondent made five total estimates. One of the
abortion items was dropped from our analysis, as described in the Online Appendix.
18We also could have also asked politicians to estimate opinion among ‘subconstituencies’ beyond their geographic
constituency, such as among those who care most about an issue, among fellow partisans, or among other groups
(Fenno 1977). We would encourage further research to add to our findings by doing so. We believe politicians’
perceptions of public opinion within such subconstituencies are also important; focusing on overall opinion in
politicians’ geographic constituencies simply represents a starting point given our particular theory and motivation.
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respondent c as oc,i. All the CCES questions we use are binary choice, such that oc,i ∈ {0, 1}.
Let pc,i represent the perception of the politician in c’s district of average support for issue i; that
is, pc,i is a politician’s estimate of E(oc,i) for their district. The average of pc,i − oc,i within each
district thus represents an estimate of politicians’ average overestimation of support for policy
i. For example, suppose a politician perceives support for a policy in their district at 80% but
true support is only 60%. In this example, E(pc,i − oc,i) = 0.8 − E(oc,i) = 0.8 − 0.6 = 0.2.
To estimate politicians’ average overestimation of support for issue i, we estimate the mean of
pc,i − oc,i across all the CCES respondents.19 To incorporate the CCES sampling weights, we take
the weighted mean of this quantity, multiplying by the CCES weights wc, which have mean 1. In
addition, because the CCES has many more respondents from larger districts than smaller districts,
we weight these estimates inversely to district size so that politicians from large districts and small
districts matter equally. In particular, we weight each CCES observation by s¯c
sc
, where sc is the size
of each CCES respondents’ district in 2014 according to the US Census. This makes politicians the
effective unit of analysis and counts politicians from small and large districts equally. Our results
are similar regardless of the weighting approach we use, however.
Given this setup, politicians’ mean perception can be estimated with:
̂¯pi =
∑
c∈C
[
pc,iwc ∗ s¯c
sc
]
n(C)
≈ p¯i, (3.1)
where n(C) is the number of CCES respondents. We can estimate public opinion in the
average district – what politicians’ average perceptions would be if their perceptions were perfectly
accurate – using:
̂¯oc,i =
∑
c∈C
[
oc,iwc ∗ s¯c
sc
]
n(C)
. (3.2)
19We acknowledge Doug Rivers for this suggestion.
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This quantity can be interpreted as ‘the expectation of district opinion in the district of a
politician who responded chosen at random.’
Ultimately, we seek to estimate y¯i, politicians’ average overestimation of district support for
issue i:
̂¯yi =
∑
c∈C
[
(pc,i − oc,i)wc ∗ s¯c
sc
]
n(C)
. (3.3)
The standard errors of our estimates of each of these quantities are cluster bootstrapped, with
clustering at the district level for politicians and misperceptions and at the respondent level for
public opinion.
Figure 3.2: Politicians’ perceptions of district opinion and true district opinion
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Figure 3.2 and Table 3.2 show the results of this approach. For example, when it comes to
the issue of same-sex marriage, we estimate that 56.6% of residents of the ‘average district’
supported same-sex marriage, whereas NCS respondents on average perceived their districts
as 49.6% supportive, meaning they on average overestimated opposition to same-sex marriage
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Table 3.2: Raw data estimates of politicians’ perceptions, true district opinion, and politicians’
misperceptions
Actual Public Elite Average
Issue Opinion Perception Misperception
2014 Politicians - Liberal Policies
Same-sex marriage 56.63 49.60 -7.03***
(0.89) (0.63) (0.91)
Ban assault rifles 57.47 38.95 -18.46***
(1.14) (0.93) (1.32)
Background checks for guns 84.30 48.48 -35.79***
(1.08) (1.00) (1.34)
Amnesty for undocumented immigrants 45.85 37.16 -8.69***
(1.13) (0.76) (1.14)
Abortion always legal 55.31 46.04 -9.28***
(1.26) (0.90) (1.29)
2014 Politicians - Conservative Policies
Question suspected undoc. immig. 38.16 50.13 11.97***
(1.15) (0.89) (1.31)
Birth control religious exemptions 43.55 47.07 3.57***
(0.92) (0.65) (0.95)
*** = p < 0.001. ** = p < 0.01. * = p < 0.05. Notes: Standard errors are cluster bootstrapped
at the CCES respondent level for public opinion and at the district level for elite perceptions and
for misperceptions.
by about 7 percentage points. Elites likewise overestimate the percentage of the public that
supports conservative policy positions across all the other policies. Politicians’ overestimation of
conservatism is even larger on other issues, with a maximum of about 36 percentage points for
the issue of background checks for guns — one of the issues where previous research indicates
conservative constituents are the most well-organized and likely to participate in the public sphere
(Goss 2008).
Later in the paper we also conduct this analysis for only incumbents, for only candidates who
won their elections, for only candidates in very close and competitive districts, and for only those
who ran in states with professionalized legislatures. The results are unchanged, suggesting that
these results are not an artifact of responses from unserious candidates who went on to lose.
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Empirical Strategy 2: MRP
We gain additional inferential leverage on the relationship between politicians’ perceptions and
true geographic constituency opinion by estimating support for each issue in all of the nation’s
state legislative districts using multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP) (Eggers and
Lauderdale 2016; Hanretty, Lauderdale and Vivyan 2016; Lax and Phillips 2009a,b, 2012; Park,
Gelman and Bafumi 2004; Warshaw and Rodden 2012). This facilitates more nuanced dyadic
comparisons of politicians’ perceptions and estimates of opinion in their specific districts, in
addition to illustrating the robustness of our results to any concerns with the raw data analysis.
More details on our MRP procedure are in Appendix Section C. There we also present robustness
checks and estimates of uncertainty. MRP uses individual-level survey data and demographic
information about the districts from the US Census to construct district-level estimates of support
for each issue. Our MRP procedure first fits multilevel choice models to the responses to each
issue question from the 2014 CCES. Each model returns estimated effects for demographic and
geographic predictors. We then use the estimates from the multilevel model to estimate support
for various demographic cells, identified by age, race, education, gender and district. Finally, using
data from the US Census’ American Community Survey, we weight those cells by their frequency
in each district. The result is an estimate of the percent of each district supporting each issue. We
then matched these estimates for each district with politicians’ perceptions of that district.
Figure 3.3 shows the result. Each panel of Figure 3.3 shows the results for one issue. In
each panel, we show how politicians’ perceptions of public opinion on that issue vary as a
function of the MRP estimate of true public opinion on that issue in their district. The y-axis
in each panel represents politicians’ estimates of support in their districts and the x-axis shows
the MRP estimates of public opinion in these same districts. Each point on the graph represents
one politician’s response. The striated bands of responses reflect that politicians usually answered
in increments of 5 percentage points. Loess smoothers summarize the average of politicians’
perceptions in each district as a function of the MRP estimate of district support. The straight
black line represents the function y = x, where politicians would have answered on average were
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Figure 3.3: Politicians’ perceptions of district opinion as a function of MRP estimates of district
opinion.
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accurate.
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they perfectly accurate.20 For simplicity, we organize the figures by first presenting questions where
higher values of support reflect a liberal position, then questions where higher values of support
reflect a conservative position.
Figure 3.3 vividly illustrates the nuanced nature of our findings for democratic responsiveness.
On the one hand, politicians are strongly responsive to public opinion, in the sense that there is a
strong and strikingly linear relationship between our estimates of reality and their perceptions.21
Yet, there is a substantial “intercept shift” in every panel in Figure 3.3, such that politicians
substantially overestimate support for conservative positions and underestimate support for liberal
ones. Such misperceptions are unlikely to disappear in aggregate, unlike simple random errors in
individual politicians’ perceptions would (Weissberg 1978).
The magnitude of these shifts corresponds well with the point estimates from the raw data
approach. As before, these elites are especially inaccurate on the gun control policies, which
command broad support across districts. Indeed, we estimate that banning assault rifles has
majority support in almost all districts and that support for background checks is over 70 percent
in all districts, despite the fact that most politicians perceive the public as fairly evenly divided
or even opposed to these measures. Appendix A also presents 95% confidence intervals for the
size of politicians’ errors and their overestimation of conservatism as calculated on the basis of the
MRP estimates; these intervals are similar in width to the 95% confidence intervals of the raw data
estimates.
Robustness Across Election Types and Issues: Pilot Study in 2012
We next present data from a study we conducted in 2012 that speaks to the robustness of our
findings in two ways: it included data on two additional economic issues and was conducted in a
20Given sampling variability in the MRP estimate we would not expect politicians’ responses to match the MRP
estimates exactly, but we would expect the averages to align.
21The correlations between our perception estimates and the MRP estimates are also strong, although these
correlations are not straightforward to interpret for several reasons, including that they are likely to be biased downward
by sampling error in our public opinion estimates (Achen 1977).
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presidential election year. Further information on this sample is in Online Appendix A.22
In this 2012 study we asked candidates running for state legislature to estimate district support
for three issues in their districts: same-sex marriage, universal healthcare, and abolishing all federal
welfare programs. Table A.3 presents question wording and weighted national support for these
three issues.
Our measures of public opinion on these issues come from different years of the CCES,
determined by question availability. This introduces two main weaknesses we hasten to note. First,
the closest healthcare question on the CCES was four years old and not an exact wording match,
a question on the 2008 CCES which also included the phrase “even if it means raising taxes.”23
Second, the question about all federal welfare programs only appeared on a (random) subsample
of the CCES and only two years prior, in 2010.
We see similar patterns in the 2012 data. In particular, Figure A.1 and Table 3.3 show
candidates’ average perceptions of public opinion on these three issues and the CCES estimates
of public support in the ‘average district.’ We consistently find that they overestimate support for
conservative positions by between 11 and 22 percentage points. For example, on the question of
whether to abolish all federal welfare programs—an extreme conservative policy that very few
Americans favor—support in the average district is approximately 9%, but politicians perceive it
to be many times that, at almost 32%.24
Robustness Across Legislators, States, and Voters
The conservative biases we uncovered in politicians’ perceptions of public opinion are robust
across statistical methods, weighting approaches, states, districts, years, issues, and reference
22In general, the 2012 NCS was quite similar in design to the 2014 NCS and achieved a similarly high response
rate and fairly representative sample. We received 1,606 responses in total in 2012, with 655 of these coming from
incumbents, 270 from non-incumbents who won and served in 2013, and 681 from non-incumbents who lost.
23This wording change should bias against our findings, however, as mentioning taxes in a question about universal
healthcare should make our estimate of public support for this policy more conservative. Consistent with this, other
national surveys with the question wording we presented on the NCS yield means that are even more supportive.
24A post-election survey in 2012 also found that these same misperceptions persisted after the election, suggesting
they are also not an artifact of the time of the electoral cycle at which we asked them.
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Table 3.3: Raw data estimates of politicians’ perceptions, true district opinion, and politicians’
misperceptions, 2012 Pilot Study
Actual Public Elite Average
Issue Opinion Perception Misperception
2012 Politicians - Liberal Policies
Universal healthcare 57.29 43.45 -13.48***
(1.06) (0.57) (1.12)
Same-sex marriage 54.47 43.21 -11.26***
(1.15) (0.85) (1.15)
2012 Politicians - Conservative Policy
Abolish all fed. 9.44 31.90 22.04***
welfare programs (2.04) (0.63) (2.24)
*** = p < 0.001. ** = p < 0.01. * = p < 0.05. Notes: Standard errors are cluster bootstrapped
at the CCES respondent level for public opinion and at the district level for elite perceptions and
for misperceptions.
populations.
First, the results we presented above effectively used politicians as the unit of analysis,
weighting the misperceptions of those in small districts with few constituents just as much as
those with hundreds of thousands of constituents, like California State Senators. This raises the
possibility that our findings are driven by politicians who represent small districts. Column 1 of
Table 3.4 shows the main misperception results remain the same when the data is reweighted in
the opposite manner, such that all CCES respondents are weighted equally but politicians who
represent larger districts are weighted higher.
Other robustness checks are similarly encouraging. The next column of Table 3.4 shows the
results when we subset to states with highly professionalized legislatures only, as measured by
the Squire (2007) index of state legislative professionalism.25 The results look similar for the state
politicians whose campaigns and offices look much more similar to highly professionalized bodies.
Although whether our findings would generalize to Members of Congress is an open question, this
finding is provisionally encouraging. The next two columns of Table 3.4 show that the results also
remain unchanged when we examine only politicians who won (e.g., for the 2014 data, those who
25We examine states where the Squire (2007) index is greater than 0.2. These are AK, AZ, CA, CO, FL, HI, IL,
MA, MI, NY, OH, PA, and WI.
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were in office as of 2015) and when we examine incumbents only (e.g., for the 2014 data, those
who were in office in 2014 and seeking re-election).
The next to last column of Table 3.4 shows that the results also hold when we subset to only the
very most competitive districts in the sample using a stringent inclusion criteria: where Obama vote
share was between 45% and 55% in 2012. The standard errors increase because this is a smaller
subsample, but the point estimates remain similar.
In the last column of Table 3.4, we show that the results also hold when we compute public
opinion among CCES respondents who administrative records show voted in the 2014 election
and compare politicians’ perceptions of their districts to these voters’ opinion. We still find similar
overall results.
Table 3.4: Robustness of misperceptions across subsamples and approaches
Average Misperceptions
Professionalized Competitive 2014 Voter
Weighting to Legislatures Winners Incumbents Districts Opinion
Issue Constituents Only Only Only Only Only
2014 Politicians - Liberal Policies
Abortion always -10.0*** -11.6*** -9.3*** -9.5*** -8.5* -8.5***
legal (1.2) (1.8) (1.6) (1.8) (3.4) (1.5)
Ban assault -18.2*** -20.8*** -15.9*** -14.8*** -22.2*** -19.6***
rifles (1.3) (1.9) (1.6) (2.0) (2.7) (1.6)
Background checks -36.1*** -35.2*** -35.3*** -32.0*** -31.9*** -37.3***
for guns (1.5) (2.1) (1.7) (2.2) (3.8) (1.4)
Amnesty for -7.7*** -5.9** -8.2*** -5.4** -12.9*** -8.0***
undoc. immigrants (1.1) (2.1) (1.5) (1.7) (2.6) (1.4)
Same-sex -7.9*** -7.8*** -6.5*** -5.9*** -4.7 -6.1***
marriage (0.9) (1.4) (1.2) (1.4) (2.5) (1.1)
2012 Politicians - Liberal Policies
Universal -14.9*** -12.9*** -15.1*** -13.5*** -13.7*** -
healthcare (0.9) (1.3) (1.5) (1.6) (2.0)
Same-sex -12.3*** -11.4*** -9.7*** -9.2*** -10.7*** -
marriage (0.9) (1.4) (1.5) (1.7) (2.1)
2014 Politicians - Conservative Policies
Question suspected 11.7*** 11.4*** 12.4*** 11.3*** 13.7*** 9.5***
undoc. immig. (1.2) (2.0) (1.8) (2.3) (2.5) (1.6)
Birth control 1.5 1.2 4.8*** 3.2* 2.2 -0.3
religious exemptions (1.0) (1.6) (1.3) (1.5) (2.2) (1.2)
2012 Politicians - Conservative Policy
Abolish fed. 20.5*** 18.8*** 23.2*** 26.4*** 14.9*** -
welfare programs (2.0) (3.3) (2.8) (3.1) (4.4)
*** = p < 0.001. ** = p < 0.01. * = p < 0.05.
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PARTISAN ASYMMETRIES IN ELITE MISPERCEPTIONS AND MASS ACTIVISM
When we examine the patterns of misperceptions by politicians’ party, it is clear that Republican
politicians drive the bulk of the conservative-leaning misperceptions we found. Figure 3.4 and
Table 3.5 show that Republican politicians and Democratic politicians both overestimate their
constituents’ conservatism, but that Republican politicians do so to a much greater extent.
Democrats and Republicans both overestimate their constituents’ conservatism on every single
issue, with the one exception that Democrats very slightly underestimate support for the
conservative birth control religious exemptions policy. Republicans overestimate support for the
conservative position on every issue by over 10 percentage points, and often by over 20 percentage
points. Republicans also overestimate conservatism more than Democrats every issue, often by
over 10 percentage points more.
These differences are especially stark when examining the relationship between district opinion
and politicians’ perceptions visually with the aid of MRP. Figure 3.7 shows a version of Figure
3.3 with the results split by politicians’ party. For example, on the issue of same-sex marriage,
constituency support must be at roughly 55% before the majority of Democratic candidates believe
their constituencies barely favor same-sex marriage. Republicans, on the other hand, almost never
believe their constituents favor same-sex marriage; district support must be above 70% before they
think their constituents are barely in favor. Likewise, in districts where the public is evenly split on
same-sex marriage, the average Republican believes the public is opposed by nearly 3-to-1. Such
patterns seem likely to help explain the puzzle of why so many Republican politicians remain
opposed to same-sex marriage even though their constituents favor it (e.g., Krimmel, Lax and
Phillips 2016); Republicans do not appear to realize this is the case. Intriguingly, even though the
correlation between public opinion and perception of this opinion is similar for Republicans and
Democrats, Republicans’ greater “intercept shift” means that they misperceive public opinion far
more.
With this said, Figure 3.7 also rules two simple alternative explanations for our findings. First,
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Figure 3.6: 2012 Study
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we can rule out the possibility that politicians simply will not admit to us that they are on the
wrong side of the median voter. In fact, on essentially every issue, we see that substantial numbers
of politicians indicated to us that they believed their party’s position (which is nearly always
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Table 3.5: Partisan differences in misperceptions: raw data
Democratic Elites Republican Elites
Issue
Actual
Public
Opinion
Elite
Perception
Average
Misperception
Actual
Public
Opinion
Elite
Perception
Average
Misperception
2014 Politicians - Liberal Policies
Abortion always legal 56.29 50.66 -5.65*** 53.89 39.29 -14.56***
(1.39) (1.15) (1.55) (1.72) (1.24) (1.78)
Ban assault rifles 57.82 44.36 -13.36*** 56.97 30.71 -26.23***
(1.22) (1.27) (1.58) (1.67) (1.36) (1.95)
Background checks 84.71 52.67 -32.04*** 83.66 42.05 -41.58***
for guns (1.06) (1.32) (1.50) (1.60) (1.48) (2.04)
Amnesty for undoc. 46.85 40.95 -5.90*** 44.35 31.42 -12.93***
immigrants (1.28) (0.95) (1.23) (1.68) (1.24) (1.86)
Same-sex marriage 57.40 55.32 -2.09* 55.47 40.91 -14.54***
(0.93) (0.78) (0.98) (1.27) (0.89) (1.36)
2012 Politicians - Liberal Policies
Universal healthcare 59.60 52.24 -7.35*** 54.39 33.20 -21.19***
(1.38) (0.79) (1.47) (1.35) (0.88) (1.47)
Same-sex marriage 56.87 51.05 -5.82*** 51.31 32.89 -18.43***
(1.52) (0.99) (1.58) (1.38) (1.04) (1.51)
2014 Politicians - Conservative Policies
Question suspected 39.15 47.08 7.93*** 36.64 54.85 18.22***
undoc. immig. (1.43) (1.17) (1.59) (1.42) (1.55) (1.84)
Birth control 42.86 40.25 -2.53* 44.59 57.53 12.89***
religious exemptions (0.99) (0.72) (1.13) (1.28) (0.98) (1.57)
2012 Politicians - Conservative Policy
Abolish fed. 10.69 26.44 15.76*** 7.92 37.64 29.72***
welfare programs (2.43) (1.85) (2.28) (2.55) (2.48) (3.61)
*** = p < 0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05.
their own) is the minority position in the district — even in many cases where we are confident
the majority of voters actually do share their party’s view! Second, Democratic politicians also
overestimate constituency conservatism, which suggests these misperceptions cannot be attributed
to motivated reasoning or social desirability bias alone.
As with our previous results, these partisan differences in misperceptions are robust when we
examine incumbents only, winners only, and weight to voters. The first two columns of Table 3.6
show that they are also robust in professionalized legislatures only. The next two columns show
that they also remain similar in the subset of very competitive districts where Obama received
between 45% and 55% of the two-party vote in 2012. This is a smaller subset of districts, and so
the standard errors increase, but the point estimates remain similar.
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Figure 3.7: Partisan differences in misperceptions: MRP
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The final two columns of Table 3.6 present a result that bears special note: that the same
partisan difference in misperceptions also holds in just the subset of districts where we received
responses from both the Democratic and Republican candidate in a district. The standard errors are
much larger because this was a rare occurrence, but this allows us to hold constant public opinion
and show that Democrats and Republicans see the same constituents differently. This means we
can confidently reject the alternative explanation that politicians perceive opinion accurately but
that our estimates or inherent flaws in public opinion data in general (or the CCES in particular)
are responsible for introducing bias; if two politicians perceive the same district differently, they
cannot both be right. Moreover, given the similar marginal distributions on the same issues on
national polls as on the CCES presented in Online Appendix A, it is highly likely that Democrats’
perceptions are more accurate.
Table 3.6: Robustness of partisan difference in misperceptions
Average Misperception
Professionalized Legislatures Competitive Districts Both Parties Responded
Issue Democrats Republicans Democrats Republicans Democrats Republicans
2014 Politicians - Liberal Policies
Abortion always -7.19** -17.36*** -3.18 -15.94** 1.12 -6.89
legal (2.21) (2.69) (3.68) (4.86) (5.81) (7.00)
Ban assault -16.77*** -26.50*** -19.99*** -25.06*** -10.54 -23.37***
rifles (2.40) (3.02) (3.46) (3.71) (6.62) (4.97)
Background checks -30.48*** -45.13*** -27.34*** -40.73*** -27.81** -39.39***
for guns (2.35) (3.34) (4.28) (4.73) (9.36) (7.58)
Amnesty for -2.79 -11.65* -9.80** -16.94*** -13.43*** -16.38**
undoc. immigrants (1.89) (4.58) (3.41) (3.88) (3.76) (5.21)
Same-sex -2.39 -17.00*** -0.20 -11.88** 2.96 -9.78**
marriage (1.48) (2.48) (2.24) (3.75) (3.04) (3.23)
2012 Politicians - Liberal Policies
Universal -7.20*** -22.12*** -20.23*** -7.20*** -5.52 -16.24***
healthcare (1.44) (2.07) (2.89) (1.44) (3.90) (3.62)
Same-sex -5.14*** -21.32*** -17.59*** -5.14*** -1.90 -17.56***
marriage (1.45) (1.92) (3.27) (1.45) (2.82) (3.88)
2014 Politicians - Conservative Policies
Question suspected 9.84*** 14.07*** 9.87*** 21.04*** 13.11 23.59***
undoc. immig. (2.72) (2.85) (2.71) (4.45) (7.17) (5.77)
Birth control -3.23 8.87** -3.51 11.25** -4.49 14.42***
religious exemptions (1.86) (2.72) (2.29) (3.57) (3.08) (3.14)
2012 Politicians - Conservative Policy
Abolish fed. 14.47*** 25.37*** 16.80* 14.47*** 24.28*** 31.78***
welfare programs (3.12) (5.99) (8.18) (3.12) (5.36) (6.06)
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Do Omitted Variables Drive Partisan Differences in Perceptions of Public Opinion?
Are the partisan differences in the magnitude of politicians’ misperceptions driven by omitted
variables that correlate with party, rather than representing true partisan differences in how
Democrats and Republcians see their districts? As a reminder, the last columns of Table 3.6 showed
that our findings held when we compared pairs of politicians providing their perceptions of the
same districts, holding constant any confounders related to districts. With that said, there may
be other confoudners related to individuals. To examine these possibilities, we use a multivariate
regression to estimate the relationship between the accuracy of politicians’ perceptions of public
opinion using party and several covariates based on other survey items from the NCS that
might be related to the accuracy of their perceptions. The outcome variable is specified as the
politicians’ mean absolute error, or the mean of the difference between their perceptions and the
MRP estimates. The results are summarized in Figure 3.8, in which all variables are scaled to
standard deviation one for comparability and higher values for the coefficients reflect more error
in perceptions.
We find that errors in perceptions differ in predictable ways, but that by far the largest
determinant of misperceptions is that Republicans make much larger errors than Democrats
do. Other patterns include that politicians who already held office in 2014 and politicians in
competitive elections both have slightly more accurate perceptions.26 Somewhat surprisingly,
politicians who report taking more polls were not significantly less error-prone.27 The partisan
difference remains robust in the presence of these covariates and remains clearly the largest
estimate. For example, Republicans’ greater inaccuracy is ten times larger than the average effect
of being in a district one full standard deviation more competitive.
26That politicians who already hold office are more accurate may well be due to selection: presumably individuals
who are higher quality and more accurately perceive the public are more likely to win office in the first place. That
politicians are more accurate when they are running in competitive elections could reflect their greater incentives to
perceive the median voter, or that those in uncompetitive districts may spend comparatively more time with copartisans
and primary voters. Politicians running in states where the government was under unified Republican control at the
time of the 2014 election were also somewhat less accurate than politicians running in states with split control or
unified Democratic control. We find no significant differences between candidates who were running for upper or
lower houses of legislatures.
27The majority of politicians in the sample reported taking no polls.
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Figure 3.8: Predictors of Errors in Perceptions
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Online Appendix A also presents 95% simulation intervals for the size of politicians’ errors
and their overestimation of conservatism by party; these intervals are similar in width to the 95%
confidence intervals of the raw data estimates above.
Potential Mechanism: Partisan Asymmetries in Contact and Activism
What accounts for this partisan asymmetry in misperceptions? As we have discussed, one potential
explanation for both parties’ misperceptions is that politicians’ information environments are not
representative of their districts (Fenno 1977; Miller and Stokes 1963). The citizens that legislators
and candidates meet are clearly not a representative sample: politicians may more frequently come
in contact with constituents who seek out contact with them, those constituents who are identified
as persuadable voters, and citizens who are more engaged in their communities.
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What kind of citizens do politicians tend to come into contact with? As a proxy for the variety
of experiences politicians have where they may ascertain public opinion from who participates
in the public sphere, we examine who reaches out to politicians to express their views. Data on
contacting state-level politicians are rare, but some surveys have asked citizens about their patterns
of contacting Members of Congress. Consistent with other recent work on activism over the last
decade (Goss 2008; Schlozman, Verba and Brady 2012; Skocpol and Williamson 2011), these
surveys reveal an important asymmetry: Republican citizens are more likely to indicate they have
contacted their representatives than Democratic citizens are. In the 2012 ANES, Republicans were
28% more likely to say they had contacted their representatives than Democrats, and in the 2008
CCES Republicans were 39% more likely to have said they contacted their representatives than
Democrats.28 Taking these results at face value, even politicians in districts evenly divided across
partisan lines would hear disproportionately often from Republican constituents.29 For example,
contacting behavior among gun owners could help explain why politicians’ perceptions on that
issue are especially skewed: gun owners are nearly twice as likely to contact elected officials than
the general public, whereas gun owners who are members of the NRA are nearly four times as
likely to do so.30
Not only are Republican citizens more likely to contact their representatives in general, but, as
a descriptive matter, Republican citizens reach out to Republican politicians especially often. Table
3.8 shows that, in districts represented by a Democratic Member of Congress (MC), Republicans
in the 2008 CCES were about 9% more likely to contact their MC than Democrats. However, in
districts with a Republican MC, Republicans were a full 41% more likely to contact their MC than
Democrats.31 Together, Republican citizens’ higher probability of contacting politicians in general
28Table A.1 reports the point estimates for 2008 and 2012. It also shows that these same divergences did not exist
in the Presidential election year ANES surveys taken from 1980 to 1992.
29Unfortunately neither the CCES nor ANES asked about how many times an individual contacted their legislators’
office.
30Pew finds that “Gun owners are more likely than non-gun owners to have ever contacted a public official to
express their opinion on gun policy. About one-in-five gun owners (21%) say they have done this, compared with 12%
of non-gun owners.” See Pew, “America’s Complex Relationship With Guns.” Pew also finds that “46% of gun owners
in the NRA say they have contacted a public official to express their opinion on gun policy.” See Pew, “Among gun
owners, NRA members have a unique set of views and experiences.”
31 36.4%−33.3%
33.3% ≈ 9%, 42.9%−30.4%30.4% ≈ 41%. Our claim here does not depend upon a causal interpretation of
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and their especially high likelihood of contacting fellow Republicans suggest two consequences:
Democratic politicians should hear from Republican constituents slightly disproportionately and
Republican politicians should hear from Republican constituents highly disproportionately. Table
3.9 illustrates this idea. The first row shows that if every citizen had contacted their US House
member, the CCES indicates Democratic US House members would receive 36% of their contacts
from Republicans while Republican US House members would receive 50% of their contacts
from Republicans; 36% of individuals who live in districts a Democrat represents are Republicans
and 50% of individuals who live in districts a Republican represents are Republicans. However,
the contacting behavior we actually observe is skewed towards Republican constituents. A full
40% of the CCES respondents in Democratic districts who said they contacted their legislator
were Republicans, versus 36% in the district at large, indicating a 12% over-representation of
Republicans among those who contact Democratic legislators. This disparity is even larger for
Republican legislators; 62% of the CCES respondents who said they contacted their legislators
were Republicans, even though only 50% of these legislators’ districts are Republicans on average,
a 22% over-representation.
These patterns suggest a potential mechanism for the partisan asymmetry in conservative
misperceptions of public opinion we found in 2012 and 2014: the partisan asymmetry during
these years in who reaches out to which politicians. If these patterns were to generalize and
politicians were to heavily rely on who contacts them when forming their perceptions of public
opinion (Miller and Stokes 1963), then the patterns in Table 3.7 alone would generate the exact
patterns of perceptions and misperceptions we found.
this descriptive difference between how Republicans behave in Democratic- and Republican-leaning districts; it may
simply be the case that Republicans are especially active in the kinds of districts where Republicans are elected for
some other reason than the party of their MC. This would still result in the consequence that Republican legislators
hear from Republican citizens especially often. With this said, Broockman and Ryan (2016) find that citizens tend to
prefer contacting legislators who share their partisanship and demonstrate this pattern with other forms of evidence
as well. It may be that there is a partisan asymmetry in the effects they documented, perhaps because of the greater
salience of partisanship as a social identity for Republican citizens. Consistent with a potential causal interpretation of
this difference, Online Appendix A conducts a formal regression discontinuity test that suggests at least some of this
pattern may be causal. Figure A.4 shows a regression discontinuity plot with the outcome variable as the percent of
contacts that come from Republican citizens, and shows that there appears to be a discontinuous jump in this quantity
when a Republican just wins office.
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Table 3.9: Aggregate consequences of descriptive differences for who Members of Congress hear
from.
1
% of Democrats
who contacted MC
% of Republicans
who contacted MC
Districts with Democratic MCs 33.3% 36.4%
Districts with Republican MCs 30.4% 42.9%
1
Democratic US
House Members
Republican US
House Members
2*
Percent of citizens
contacting who are
Republicans
Null: if every citizen
contacted their legislator 36% 50%
Observed: among citizens
who did contact their legislator 40% 62%
2*
Over-representation of Republicans among citizens
who contact legislators 2*12% 2*22%
Source: Author’s analysis, 2008 CCES.
The Online Appendix presents additional tests of empirical implications of this mechanism
that provide further suggestive support for it. In Table A.1 we find that this partisan difference in
contacting did not appear in comparable surveys in previous decades, and Online Appendix ??
shows that the patterns of misperceptions we found do not appear in data on elites’ perceptions
of public opinion other gathered in 1958, 1992, and 2000—although these earlier studies have
significant limitations. Although this historical data is more difficult to interpret, it is reassuring
that in historical periods when this mechanism did not appear to operate, its potential consequences
do not appear present.32 In addition, Online Appendix A shows suggestive evidence that in districts
and in states where we estimate that the Republican-leaning partisan imbalance in self-reported
contacting of legislators is greater, we find that politicians’ overestimation of conservatism is also
greater.33
32However, it does appear that there are several “intercept shifts” in how elites perceive opinion during these
surveys, consistent with our broader theoretical argument that systematic misperceptions are possible.
33Another potential empirical implication of this mechanism is that elected officials, who are receive more contact
from the public, would overestimate conservatism especially. Although we see contact as a proxy for a broader
suite of participatory behavior in the public sphere that could affect perceptions held by both elected officials and
candidates alike, we find some support for this hypothesis. It is the case that politicians are more accurate in general
than candidates, although we are not sure how to interpret this difference because politicians and candidates differ
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With this said, as with all studies of causal mechanisms, this evidence must be regarded
as tentative. First, to be clear, our claim is not that contacts to legislative or campaign offices
alone likely explain all of politicians’ biased perceptions of public opinion. Rather, we see these
questions about contacting behavior as diagnostic of the broader set of activities intended to
shape politicians’ information environments. Unfortunately, we are not aware of any data on who
contacts or otherwise interacts with state legislative politicians, and so we cannot test this argument
at the individual level for our elite respondents to examine whether those respondents whose
constituencies display this tendency to a greater extent also have the greatest misperceptions.
This would represent an ambitious data gathering exercise, and we would urge future research
to conduct it. At the very least our research suggests the discipline’s surveys should include these
questions more regularly. With that said, these patterns are consistent with our broader theory that
contemporary American politicians—especially Republicans—work in information environments
where conservative views are overrepresented.
DISCUSSION
On a broad set of controversial issues in contemporary American politics, US state political
elites in 2012 and 2014 believed that much more of the public in their constituencies preferred
conservative policies than actually did. This pattern was present in two surveys of state
legislators and candidates. Elites’ partisanship was by far the most important determinant for
the (in)accuracy of their perceptions: Republicans were prone to severely overestimating support
for conservative positions. Democrats’ perceptions also typically overestimated the public’s
in a host of pre-existing ways, including that they have been selected to some extent on the basis of their ability to
perceive what a constituency wants and are likely quality. With this said, we exploit the fact that our data on how
patterns of contacting politicians show an interaction of mass and elite party (i.e., that Republican citizens contact
Republican politicians especially often). As a result, we would predict a difference in the difference between the
accuracy of candidates and officeholders for Republicans and for Democrats. When we tested this prediction, we
found evidence for it. Specifically, running a regression of how much each respondent overestimates conservatism on
an indicator for holding office, an indicator for party, their interaction, and the same controls as in Figure 3.8 reveals a
significant interaction, such that Republicans who hold office on average overestimate conservatism by 2.8 percentage
points more than one would expect (t = 2.02, p < 0.05). That is, Republicans who hold office actually overestimate
conservatism by more than one would expect, which would be consistent with Republicans who hold office being
subject to particularly strong asymmetric contact from conservative constituents.
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support for conservative positions, although by less, suggesting our findings cannot be attributed
to motivated reasoning by Republicans alone. These findings suggest that misperceptions of
public opinion may be an important dynamic that contributes to dynamics such as asymmetric
polarization, pushing Republicans to the right and discouraging Democrats from making a
similarly strong move leftward.
Theoretically, we argued that the presence of such large, systematic biases in politicians’
perceptions of their geographic constituencies were possible and could contribute to significant
biases in democratic representation. Several further testable implications of our argument also
find support in our data and others’. First, one implication of our argument is that relatively
simple informational interventions would lead to legislative outcomes that are more congruent
with public opinion. Indeed, in an ingenious experiment, Butler and Nickerson (2011) find that
providing legislators with information about public opinion in their districts causes them to cast
more votes that are congruent with their district’s median voter. Further field experiments of this
type are a natural next step for testing our theory. Our distinctive claim that politicians’ errors need
not be symmetric and random would predict, at least in 2012 and 2014, that treatment effects in
such experiments among Republicans in the US should be especially large—exactly as Butler and
Nickerson (2011) find. Further consistent with this expectation, although the observational nature
of our data prohibits us from drawing firm causal conclusions, we also find that the politicians
with the most severe overestimation of conservatism told us they took the most extremely
conservative positions (see Table A.2). A final testable implication of our empirical findings
about the contemporary US are that Republican politicians should be more likely to ideologically
“overreach,” facing larger penalties in general elections for being more extreme, as we expect they
are more likely to misperceive the median voter’s preferences and thus be more distant from the
median to begin with.34 In a recent article, Hall (2015) finds exactly this heterogeneity in the effects
of additional ideological extremism by party (see Hall 2015, Table A.4).
Hall’s (2015) result also suggests our findings about partisan differences are unlikely to be
34This logic follows from the typical assumption of quadratic utility loss in spatial voting models.
72
driven entirely by Republican politicians having private information about ‘real’ opinion not
reflected in public opinion surveys, as it appears Republicans are losing votes for taking the
increasingly conservative positions they are. Our finding that Democrats and Republicans perceive
the same districts differently further reinforces this point; if two politicians perceive the same
district differently, they cannot both be right. With this said, electoral incentives are clearly more
complex than the simple median voter theorem would imply. More generally, as with any single
study, we do not pretend that ours can definitively explain a complex phenomenon like asymmetric
polarization in its totality. Rather, our evidence joins other work that tests predictions of significant
theories of polarization (e.g., Grossmann and Hopkins 2016; Noel 2012; Thomsen 2014), which
can comfortably coexist with and complement our own.
Our findings should open up new research agendas with the potential to deepen our
understanding of democratic representation and competition in a variety of ways. For example,
our findings that politicians misperceive public opinion could also prove relevant to understanding
why politicians appear differentially responsive to different groups within the public. Considerable
evidence suggests that American lawmakers are differentially responsive to different groups in
the population, including to those high in income (Bartels 2008; Gilens 2012; Gilens and Page
2014; Lax, Phillips and Zelizer 2017), co-partisans, and primary voters (Hill 2017; Kastellec,
Lax, Malecki and Phillips 2015). Politicians behave as if these subconstituencies and other issue
publics exist (Fenno 1977), and a natural next step for future research would be to measure
how politicians perceive the size and composition of such groups. To what extent do legislators
consciously respond only to certain parts of their constituencies, or to what extent do they try
to represent everyone equally but perceive their district in a biased way?35 Future work can and
should build on ours to answer these questions, which recent advances in estimation of public
opinion among subconstituencies should facilitate (Caughey and Warshaw 2016; Kastellec et al.
2015; Lax, Phillips and Zelizer 2017). Future work should also expand the number and type of
issues examined, especially to consider more economic issues. It should also seek to query these
35For example, one pattern that could drive our findings is if politicians are more likely to bring copartisans to mind
when they think about their district as a whole (Miler 2010).
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perceptions at the Congressional level, if possible. Members of Congress may well be different due
to their differing resources and incentives. Although the presence of asymmetric misperceptions
in state legislatures with high professionalism is encouraging, data on Congresspeople themselves
would clearly be welcome.
More broadly, reviving a once-widespread interest in how politicians perceive public opinion,
our results should also open up a research agenda into better understanding what gives rise
to these misperceptions. One possibility our data suggest is that these misperceptions originate
from patterns of mass participation in the public sphere; consistent with this, Online Appendix
A shows suggestive evidence that politicians overestimated conservatism the most in districts
where Republicans were especially likely to contact legislators. However, other dynamics may
reinforce these misperceptions as well. For example, party activists are not equally polarized
in both parties: Republican party activists harbor more consistently conservative views than do
Democratic activists harbor consistently liberal views (Grossmann and Hopkins 2015b, 2016;
Layman, Carsey, Green, Herrera and Cooperman 2010; Lelkes and Sniderman 2016). If politicians
look to copartisans to form their perceptions of their districts, Republican politicians are thus likely
to come in contact with an especially polarized group of voters relative to Democrats, potentially
distorting Republicans’ views of public opinion more generally. Another possibility future research
could address is whether politicians more accurately perceive the public at the level of symbolic
instead of operational ideology (Grossmann and Hopkins 2016). It also remains to be seen whether
‘thermostatic’ (Wlezien 1995) responses to unified Republican government under Donald Trump
will shift patterns in public participation in a manner that might shift politicians’ perceptions of
the public, especially on issues where liberals are most vocal—a possibility we readily allow and
that could provide additional tests of our theory that mass participation influences politicians’
perceptions. We do not expect that the conservative bias we observed in 2012 and 2014 to be
a permanent feature of politics (and indeed we show in Online Appendix ?? that these same
misperceptions do not appear to have been present in earlier eras, when, potentially relatedly,
Democratic and Republican citizens contacted politicians at similar rates; see Table A.1).
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Another research agenda our work should open up is understanding the consequences of these
misperceptions. Table A.2 finds, unsurprisingly, that even within party politicians who misperceive
the public as more conservative by a greater amount are also more conservative in their positions.
However, the direction of causality here is obviously unclear. With this said, it is clear how
our findings may contribute to a phenomena like asymmetric polarization, which has produced
patterns like one Ahler and Broockman (2017) document: on average, Democratic politicians
are much more likely to vote congruently with constituent opinion than are Republicans. How
these misperceptions will influence policy outcomes is less clear, as politicians are embedded in
institutions that constrain their behavior. For example, Hall (2015) finds that when Republican
candidates for office take positions farther to the right, policy actually moves left as a consequence,
because Democrats become so much more likely to win office instead. In some cases, it could
even be that elites’ conservative misperceptions actually undermine conservative policy goals.
Of course, these misperceptions may also contribute to the conservative bias that exists in state
policymaking in some domains.36
In terms of immediate implications for theories of democratic representation, our findings
present a mixed verdict. On the one hand, we found very strong responsiveness of politicians’
perceptions of public opinion to the reality of that opinion (e.g., Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson
2002)—much stronger than Miller and Stokes (1963). When comparing two districts with differing
levels of support for a policy, it is usually the case that the politicians in the more supportive district
perceive higher levels of district support than do politicians in the less supportive district.
At the same time, our findings vividly illustrate how this strong responsiveness to public
opinion can belie imperfect congruence with it (Achen 1978; Lax and Phillips 2012). Although the
correlation between opinion and perception of opinion is strong, we found that it is frequently offset
36On issues of gay rights, for example, when it comes to state policies, “most noncongruence is in the conservative
direction” (Lax and Phillips 2009a, p., 383). The same conservative bias operates on votes on gay rights legislation in
Congress, where “74 percent of votes are incongruent in a conservative direction” (Krimmel, Lax and Phillips 2016).
Whether these conservative biases are typically present in other domains is less clear. On the issues they examine,
Lax and Phillips (2012) find that policies are somewhat more likely to be incongruent in a conservative than a liberal
direction on average, but that the best characterization of the evidence is that liberal states are more likely to be
incongruent in a liberal direction and conservative states incongruent in a conservative direction.
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by an “intercept shift” that leads politicians to misperceive opinion across the board, sometimes
dramatically. The result is that policies with majority support in a majority of districts are often
seen as having that majority support by only a minority of legislators. These patterns of strong
responsiveness yet imperfect congruence are consistent with a more nuanced understanding of
how opinion translates into policy than the simple extremes that politicians care only about public
opinion or care about it not at all (Lax and Phillips 2012).
With this said, to the extent our findings are relevant to understanding why politicians do not
always represent their constituents perfectly, a degree of optimism seems warranted. Politicians’
incentives are difficult to change, but their information environments are demonstrably malleable
(Bendor and Bullock 2008; Butler and Nickerson 2011). For example, field experiments find that
even a few phone calls or emails from constituents can change legislators’ votes (Bergan 2009;
Bergan and Cole 2015). This suggests that any biases in representation that may result from
misperceptions of public opinion could be feasible to correct. Further observation of what happens
when politicians are confronted with more reliable information on public opinion (e.g., Butler and
Nickerson 2011) could thus prove both substantively impactful and theoretically illuminating.
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Chapter 4
How Politicians Connect With, Evaluate and Learn About Their Constituents
In Chapter 3, David Broockman and I showed that state legislative candidates’ perceptions of
public opinion in their districts show a consistent bias—on average, Republican politicians and
party leaders strongly overestimate support for conservative issue positions, while Democrats do
not tend to overestimate public support for liberal policies. What accounts for this asymmetric
pattern of perceptions? There is no single cause for such a widespread misperception of the political
world, but focusing on a variety of aspects of the political system can help clarify why state-level
politicians have such biased perceptions of their constituents’ opinions.
This chapter examines some possible explanations related to how politicians gather and
evaluate information that they use in forming perceptions of their constituents’ preferences. It is
unreasonable to assume that politicians will have perfect information about where their constituents
stand on the issues. Despite their best efforts to learn about their constituents’ preferences,
politicians still will be subject to the limitations of the information available to them and their
own cognitive biases. For a variety of reasons, they may encounter unrepresentative subsets of
their constituents, who could shape their perceptions of public opinion. They may consciously
or unconsciously follow some constituents more closely than others. Politicians’ information
processing is subject to the same kinds of biases as many kinds of social perceptions that people
from incomplete information. Especially for state and local politicians, accurate and complete
information about public opinion in their districts may be hard to acquire. Instead, politicians must
use a number of different sources of information, often relying on their impressions of the district
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rather than hard data.
Politicians’ perceptions are subject to more strategic considerations as well. Politicians may
feel that some constituents are less likely to vote or to have stable opinions than others, meaning
they are less likely to hold them accountable and jeopardize their re-election chances. State-level
politicians face limitations in their ability to conduct high-quality surveys in their districts on
specific issues. However, little direct evidence exists on how they do form their judgements of
what their constituents want. Fortunately, our surveys provide an opportunity to investigate how
politicians collect information by directly asking them about their behavior. Can the activities that
politicians undertake lead to the kind of consistent ideological bias in perceptions of public opinion
that we find among candidates for state legislative office?
What information do politicians receive about their constituents?
State-level politicians face large information gaps as they seek to learn about their districts. Despite
the falling cost of polls over recent decades, state legislators have little access to representative polls
of their districts.1 Instead, politicians must form their perceptions of their constituents’ opinions
from the evidence they do have, from meeting and talking to constituents, to demographics, to the
activities of grassroots groups.
One possible reason why politicians’ perceptions do not match true opinion could be that
their activities bring them into contact with unrepresentative cross-sections of their districts.
Whether they are sitting officeholders or campaigning for the first time, candidates make strategic
choices about how they spend their time in the district. These activities and interactions with
constituents could fundamentally shape how they think about their constituents and their priorities
and preferences. Another possible pathway for politicians to develop a biased perception of their
constituents’ preferences is if the people who contact them and attempt to influence them are not
representative of the district as a whole.
1Later in the chapter, I show evidence that the vast majority of state legislative candidates do not conduct polls,
and that the ones who do are not always asking questions that would help them understand their constituents’ positions
on issues, but rather use polls to test messages and conduct horse-race evaluations of their races.
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Finally, politicians might feel different incentives to pay attention to or follow the opinions
of different people. If they perceive certain groups of citizens as unlikely to vote, they may leave
them out of their thinking about what their constituents want. In some cases, I find evidence that
politicians’ information environments are biased in ways that may lead them to overestimate the
conservatism of their districts. However, the evidence is mixed, and it is not clear that all aspects
of politicians’ information environments about public opinion are biased rightward.
First, I present evidence from candidates’ open ended comments on the NCS about the factors
that they think affect their perceptions of public opinion. These responses show that the candidates
recognize that they have imperfect information about their constituents’ opinions. Many of them
report that they wish they had access to polls or other more reliable measures of opinion. Others
suggest that the constituents they meet or otherwise hear from influence their perceptions of what
the whole district thinks. Others try to make sense of public opinion by thinking about various
ideological or demographic groups in the electorate. The cognitive schemes they use to overcome
this information deficit rely heavily on their perceptions of the district’s general ideology and on
citizen activism and contact.
Second, I present evidence on how politicians connect with voters during campaigns. Based
on closed ended responses from our survey respondents, I show how candidates divide their time
during campaigns. Candidates are frequently engaged in activities that might bring them in contact
with community activists, who might not be representative of the district as a whole. Candidates’
self-reported activities during campaigns are likely to bring them in contact with unrepresentative
groups of their constituents, especially those who are most active in organizations. However,
there are few significant partisan differences on these measures, suggesting that candidates’
activities during campaigns cannot explain the asymmetric misperceptions I find among state-level
politicians.
Third, I consider how candidates evaluate their constituents’ sophistication and likelihood to
participate in politics. In a conjoint experiment, I present candidates with profiles of hypothetical
constituents and ask them to evaluate the constituents along several dimensions including their
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likelihood to vote and pay attention to a legislator’s actions in office. Candidates evaluate
Republican citizens and citizens with conservative issue positions as more likely to participate in
ways that would suggest that the mechanisms of electoral accountability will make officeholders
pay attention to and try to learn about those constituents’ opinions.
Fourth, I investigate how candidates perceive the partisan and ideological makeup of
their districts. In the open-ended comments, some candidates mentioned that they infer their
constituents’ opinions on specific issues from their perceptions of district ideology. Here, I find
slight partisan differences in the extent to which candidates believe voters of each party are
likely to vote, possibly explaining some of Republican candidates’ overestimation of support for
conservative issue positions.
In sum, the evidence from the NCS suggests that state-level politicians form impressionistic
evaluations of their constituents’ opinions by collecting information through personal contact
and heuristic-based perceptions. The candidates show some asymmetric biases in how citizens’
ideology influences their assessments of them. Combined with the evidence on contacting in
Chapter 4, these results suggest that citizens’ participation in the public sphere profoundly shapes
what politicians believe about public opinion.
THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT FOR STATE-LEVEL POLITICIANS
Many political scientists focus their research on the U.S. Congress and on the presidency. Data
about the activities of federal officeholders is relatively easy to access, and almost everyone agrees
that the actions of Congress and the federal government are very consequential. In addition, though,
many important decisions are made by politicians at the state and local level. Despite the fact that
these politicians have similar responsibilities to members of Congress, they work with much more
limited resources. They represent many fewer constituents than members of Congress, and for
most state legislators, legislating isn’t their full-time job. Nevertheless, the state legislatures pass
thousands of laws each year that affect the lives of ordinary Americans just as much as federal
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laws.
State legislatures vary considerably in their professionalization (Squire 2007).
Professionalization encompasses several attributes that determine the resources and responsibilities
of state legislators. The states vary considerably in the population of state legislative districts, the
length of time that sessions of the legislature typically meet, the amount of staff assigned to each
legislator, legislative pay, and other factors. In most states, being a legislator is not a full-time
job. Nevertheless, the variation is considerable, from California where highly professionalized
legislators represent districts larger than congressional districts, to New Hampshire, where a
legislature as large as Congress earns $100 per year for serving tiny districts. Thus, the population
of state legislatures offers an opportunity to study a wide variety of American politicians.
Typically, state legislators, even in states with professionalized legislatures, have little access
to reliable polling data on their districts. In the 2014 National Candidate Study, I asked candidates
about their campaigns’ use of polling. A large majority of candidates in the survey reported that
their campaign would not use any polls at all. Many state legislators also have minimal electoral
competition. The exact figure varies considerably across years and states, but in some years more
than half of incumbents do not have a challenger (Rogers 2014b). State legislative candidates differ
in important ways from congressional candidates, so generalizing from these findings to members
of Congress may not be appropriate. Our surveys provide an opportunity to learn about the kinds
of information about public opinion that state-level politicians use as they form their perceptions
of what their constituents believe about the issues.
WHAT DO THE CANDIDATES SAY SHAPES THEIR PERCEPTIONS?
To begin to examine the processes by which politicians learn about public opinion in their districts,
I directly asked the candidates about factors that they feel might influence their perceptions. On the
2016 NCS, I asked candidates an open ended item after asking them to estimate district opinion on
a variety of issues. The item asked, “What came to mind as you were answering our questions about
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what percent of your district supports various policies?" Of course, this approach has limitations.
Self-reports like these are imperfect, as candidates might not answer sincerely or might have
incomplete or inaccurate views of their own thought processes. Nevertheless, they offer a starting
point for an investigation of how politicians process information about public opinion.
Several themes emerged from responses to this item. First, most candidates stated that their
responses were approximations, guesses, or otherwise imprecise. Several of them expressed
frustration that they do not have access to more precise polling information.
“I haven’t polled - I do know voter registration and turnout numbers, but I answered based on
how many constituents have contacted me on this issues."
“I really could not say for sure. It was simply a wild guess."
“I would prefer quantitative surveys - not just guesses."
Other candidates talked about their perceptions of the district’s general ideological orientation.
“My district is one of the most liberal in my state, and still has plenty of people that don’t
support some of the more liberal policies asked about (which I generally support)."
“[State] is a lot more conservative than would be willing to consider the policies that were
described."
“This district is a mix of liberal, conservative, and libertarian."
“I was trying to think about what percentage of the district would likely be very
conservative...and then subtracting that from 100."
“My district is sharply divided conservative and liberal."
Some candidates mentioned various social or identity groups in their districts, inferring the
prevalence of issue preferences from their perceptions of the size of these groups.
“District is about 40-45% Democrat, about 25-30% union affiliated households"
“Very diverse voter base in my district - half are minority communities and the other half are
non-minority communities. Generally my district is fairly conservative - more than my personal
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beliefs and more than the general population - though largely in line with my state’s general
worldview."
“The types of policies my district has supported. For instance, many in my district are
religious and identify as Christians, however; 71% voted no to the amendment which would have
Constitutionally made marriage only between a man and woman. Many of the conservatives are
libertarians...they are slightly liberal on social issues, but are conservative socially. The district is
evenly split between liberals and conservatives."
“Knowing the make up of the District helps to guess what the percent would probably be. Also
living/working/attending church in the same area and in the same state for many years helps know
how my district may feel about issues."
“That my constituents are generally more affluent, progressive and want their government to
work on those types of issues."
These open ended responses expose the impact of state legislative candidates’ limited resources
on their ability to accurately perceive their constituents’ opinions. No candidate in our sample
responded to this item by saying “I take a lot of polls." Instead, candidates talked about their
personal observations, about the constituents who seek them out, and about their stereotypes and
perceptions of the district along other dimensions. There are three major themes. First, candidates
are aware that they have limited information. Second, candidates often use groups to construct
their estimates of public opinion, considering how ideological, demographic, or economic groups
respond to various policies, then making an estimate of how many people in their districts belong
to each of those groups. Third, candidates are subject to pressure from vocal groups or citizens who
advocate on issues. The responses show that, at the state legislative level, politicians use heuristics
to form their perceptions. They also suggest that contact and interactions with constituents are an
important factor in candidate’s perceptions.
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HOW DO CANDIDATES CONNECT WITH VOTERS?
Politicians, even at local levels of government, maintain intensive schedules of interacting with
constituents in their districts. Fenno’s (1978) Home Style remains the definitive treatment of the
subject. Of course, these patterns vary with the level of office. Many state legislators and local
officeholders have other jobs that take much of their time. Nevertheless, they still make efforts
to appear in their districts and to cultivate a personal vote. These interactions with constituents
may play an important role in shaping politicians’ perceptions of their constituents’ opinions.
These decisions about expenditures of time may have consequences for how politicians perform in
elections; Miller (2016) finds that challengers who report spending more time on their campaigns
fare better in general elections than challengers who spend less time campaigning. This finding,
however, does not generalize to incumbents and may reflect the fact that candidates who spend less
time are less prepared to win in other ways.
Might candidates have asymmetric misperceptions because Republicans and Democrats are
doing different things and meeting different people during their campaigns? On the 2014 National
Candidate Study,2 I asked candidates to report on the activities they do in their campaigns that
would bring them into contact with constituents in their districts. I created a list of common
activities that candidates might do during the campaign or while in office. Candidates responded to
questions about the following list of activities, which I designed to capture a broad set of activities
in which candidates might engage and which might bring them into contact with different segments
of their constituents. The activities included:
• Take professional polls of the district
• Knock on voters’ doors
• Go to community groups like the Rotary Club or Parent-Teacher Groups
• Engage with people on social media like Facebook or Twitter
2See Chapter 3 for a discussion of this survey’s design and methodology.
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• Have campaign or legislative staff talk to constituents
• Read emails and listen to calls from constituents
• Talk to campaign donors
For each activity, candidates were asked the frequency with which they engaged in the activity
during their campaign. The frequency measures were:
• Almost every day
• About once a week
• About once a month
• A few times a year
• Never
Figure 4.1 plots candidates’ responses to each of these items, broken down by percent of each
party reporting each frequency category.
Candidates report engaging in direct contact with voters frequently, especially by knocking on
doors and talking on the phone. In contrast, candidates spend less time talking to donors. Where
staff is available, staff also talk to voters frequently, although more Democrats than Republicans
report having staff. The picture that emerges is one in which many candidates are doing their own
campaign work personally, and they are encountering constituents in face-to-face settings, often at
their doors.
There were no significant partisan differences on any of these items, suggesting that candidates
of both parties engage in similar activities during their campaigns. Of course, the candidates surely
meet different kinds of people when they engage in the common activities like knocking doors,
but different campaign strategies do not seem to be a factor in shaping asymmetric misperceptions,
because candidates of both parties are engaging in similar activities.
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Figure 4.1: Candidates’ responses to questions about the frequency of certain campaign activities.
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What kind of evidence about public opinion do candidates believe?
I also asked half of the sample (randomly assigned) to evaluate the extent to which each way they
come in contact with their constituents gives them a good sense of public opinion in the district.
For these accuracy measures, I asked the candidates, “Please rate how much you think each activity
would give you a good sense of public opinion in your district:" The response options were:
• Very accurate
• Somewhat accurate
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Figure 4.2: Candidates’ responses to questions about the frequency of certain campaign activities.
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• Not very accurate
Candidates evaluated the accuracy of all of the activities presented above, even the ones
in which they said they did not engage. Again, relatively few partisan differences emerge in
candidates’ responses to these items. The results do not suggest that differences in the kind
of evidence that politicians believe about public opinion drive the asymmetric misperceptions
that I find. In general, candidates seem to evaluate activities that give them direct contact to
voters—knocking on doors and answering emails and calls from constituents—as the best ways
to get a sense of public opinion in their districts. For other activities, such as engaging on
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Figure 4.3: Candidates’ responses to questions about the frequency of certain campaign activities.
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social media or talking to donors, many candidates feel they do not get a good sense of public
opinion. Candidates are not especially convinced that polling would give them an accurate sense of
their constituents’ preferences, as the modal response is only “somewhat accurate." These results
suggest that candidates are sometimes, but not always, aware that their information sources are
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imperfect. However, again there are no significant partisan differences, indicating that differences
in beliefs about information sources are not a likely contributor to asymmetric misperceptions.
Figure 4.4: Candidates’ responses to questions about the accuracy of certain campaign activities.
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Candidates’ Use of Polls
Of course, the most accurate method for a politician to learn about public opinion is to take a
scientific survey. However, for the state-level politicians that I study, such surveys are a luxury that
they do not typically use. I asked candidates about their campaigns’ use of polls and found that
very few do. A large majority of candidates in the sample reported that they or their campaigns
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Figure 4.5: Candidates’ responses to questions about the accuracy of certain campaign activities.
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would not take any polls during the election cycle. 80% of the sample either said they would take
no polls during the election cycle or left the item blank. (64% explicitly stated they would take
zero polls). Simply put, candidates at the state legislative level are not frequently conducting the
kinds of surveys that would give them a good sense of where their constituents stand on the issues.
Little evidence is available on whether the same is true for members of Congress, although in
extensive work done by the Congressional Management Foundation on how congressional staffers
make sense of their districts and connect with constituents, issue-specific polls are rarely if ever
mentioned.
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Figure 4.6: Candidates’ responses to questions about the accuracy of certain campaign activities.
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EXPERIMENT: HOW DO CANDIDATES EVALUATE THEIR CONSTITUENTS?
Just as voters evaluate their representatives’ performance, so too do officeholders evaluate their
constituents. Politicians’ evaluations of their constituents may center on their likelihood to vote.
Because the mechanisms of democratic accountability rely on voters to pay attention to politicians’
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activities and to vote accordingly, strategic politicians should pay the most attention to learning
the preferences of likely voters and have lesser incentives to respond to the preferences of voters
unlikely to hold them accountable in elections.
The idea that politicians might pay closer attention to and better represent the preferences of
some subsets of their constituents than to others is not new, but recent work, especially by Butler
(2014), has clarified how politicians might respond differently to different kinds of constituents.
Butler (2014) shows that politicians react differently to contact from constituents based on the
constituents’ demographics, their partisanship, and their issue positions. Politicians tend to be more
responsive to requests for constituent service when they come from the politician’s in-group, as
well as when they come from people who are from traditionally privileged groups. If officeholders
believe only certain kinds of people are likely to vote or to hold them accountable for their actions
in office, their incentives to respond to those people’s opinions will be stronger. These re-election
incentives are a major part of prominent theories of representation.
To investigate how politicians evaluate their constituents, I included a conjoint experiment
in the online version of the 2014 National Candidate Study. Conjoint analysis (Hainmueller,
Hopkins and Yamamoto 2014) identifies the average marginal component effects (AMCE) of
various attributes of multi-attribute objects. In a typical conjoint design, respondents see two
multi-attribute profiles and are asked to select one of them in response to an evaluative task. In
the marketing context, respondents often make choices between many such pairs of hypothetical
products. On the NCS, I asked candidates to evaluate only one pair of profiles of constituents.
The conjoint experiment was included only on the online version of the NCS, for a sample size
of 1,259. 1,175 of these candidates responded to our email solicitations, while 84 went online to
take the survey after receiving a mailer. An additional 610 candidates returned paper copies of the
survey, which did not include this experiment.
Candidates were asked to evaluate two profiles of hypothetical constituents. The question
stem prompted candidates to “imagine that these two people live in your district." Candidates
then were shown the profiles of the two constituents. The constituents each had seven attributes,
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as summarized in Table 4.1. The constituent’s name implied his or her gender. The first profile,
“Person A," was always 43 years old, and the second profile, “Person B," was always 47 years old.
Each constituent had an occupation, reflecting a mix of white-collar and working class occupations.
In the analyses that follow, I combine the occupations into three categories: working-class includes
construction workers, receptionists, and restaurant servers, service-oriented white-collar includes
social workers and teachers, and white-collar professionals include lawyers and small business
owners. Each constituent was labeled as either a Democrat or a Republican, and each had two issue
positions, on same-sex marriage and the size of government. This design allows me to capture
the independent effects of citizens’ partisanship and their issue preferences, which are highly
correlated in practice but might play different roles in politicians’ evaluations of citizens. Finally,
each profile had a community involvement, although “none" was one of the four possible options.
This attribute was partially included to round out the profiles for realism, but also to determine how
evidence of the citizen’s social capital and civic skills impacted candidates’ evaluations of them.
The attributes were fully randomized within profiles, with the exception that the two profiles had
different sets of names to ensure that no pair of constituents had the same name.
The candidates made four selections from the same set of two profiles. They were asked to
choose which of the two constituents they thought would be more likely to “turn out to vote in
November," which would be more likely to “support you," which would be more likely to “have
well reasoned positions on the issues," and which would be more likely to “pay attention to how
you vote in the legislature." These questions were designed to elicit several possible mechanisms
that could influence the candidates’ evaluations of the profiles.
Results: Conjoint experiment
Candidates show a bias toward constituents who share their partisanship and issue positions.
Candidates are more likely to report that a constituent seems attentive and politically sophisticated
if he or she agrees with them. This finding echoes Butler and Dynes’s (2016) findings on
“disagreement discounting," the idea that politicians discount the opinion of those with whom they
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Table 4.1: Attributes of the constituent profiles presented in the conjoint experiment. Attributes
other than age were fully randomized, although no pair of constituents had the same name.
Name (implies gender) Profile 1: Alexander, Alexandra, Donald,
Donna, Nathan, Natalie. Profile 2:
Daniel, Danielle, Nicholas, Nicole,
Samuel, Samantha
Age Profile 1: 43, Profile 2: 47
Occupation Construction worker, Lawyer,
Receptionist, Restaurant sever, Small
business owner, Social worker, Teacher
Party Democrat, Republican
Issue position 1 Opposes cutting taxes and government
services, Supports cutting taxes and
government services
Issue position 2 Supports same-sex marriage, Opposes
same-sex marriage
Community involvement Active with a church, Active with a
Parent-Teacher Organization, Active with
a Rotary Club, None
disagree, justifying that disagreement by perceiving constituents who disagree as less informed.
The first outcome, asking which person would be more likely to support the candidate, captures
the attributes of constituents that candidates think will lead them to support them. The results are
summarized by Figure 4.7. The top panel reflects responses from Republican candidates, while the
bottom panel reflects responses from Democratic candidates.
Unsurprisingly, candidates view constituents who share their partisanship as much more likely
to support them. In addition, holding issue positions that reflect the party’s preferences have large,
positive effects on the likelihood that a candidate will perceive a voter as supporting him or
her. Despite the traditional association of working-class occupations with the Democratic party,
Democrats did not perceive people with working-class occupations as more likely to support them.
The second outcome asked which constituent would be more likely to turn out in the general
election. While politicians may feel a duty to represent all citizens regardless of their propensity to
vote, a re-election-minded politician should strategically focus his appeals to those citizens most
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Figure 4.7: “Which person is more likely to support you?
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likely to vote. The results for this outcome are summarized in Figure 4.8.
The most striking finding of this outcome is that candidates from both parties believe that
Republicans are more likely to turn out than Democrats are. Republicans believe that, independent
of issue positions, Republicans are 20 percentage points more likely to turn out than Democrats
are. Democrats share this belief, although at a smaller magnitude.
Independent of citizens’ party, Republican candidates believe that citizens who hold liberal
positions on size of government and same-sex marriage are less likely to turn out to vote.
Democrats’ evaluations of the likelihood of someone voting does not seem to be associated strongly
with that person’s issue positions. As we might expect, all forms of civic involvement make
candidates evaluate citizens as more likely to turn out than a baseline of no civic involvement.
The third outcome captures candidates’ perceptions of constituents’ political sophistication,
asking which of the two constituents would be more likely “to have well-reasoned positions on
the issues." By asking politicians to evaluate hypothetical emails from constituents, Butler and
Dynes (2016) finds that politicians tend to discount the sophistication of citizens who disagree
with them on policies. They may be prone to ignoring these citizens’ opinions, believing them to
be inconsequential or ill-advised.
In this case, I find a more symmetric partisan bias in how candidates evaluate their constituents.
Candidates believe that their copartisans have more reasoned opinions than people from the other
party. The effect of having the issue positions typically associated with the party seems similar
and strong. Politicians from both parties are strongly biased against citizens with working class
occupations.
The final outcome addresses candidates’ perceptions of the constituents’ attentiveness to their
actions in office, asking which constituent would be more likely “to pay attention to how you vote
in the legislature." This captures an important part of the mechanism of responsiveness, whereby
voters’ ability to hold politicians electorally accountable rests on whether they pay attention to
or learn about legislators’ actions. A strategic politician should be most responsive to voters he
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Figure 4.8: “Which person is more likely to turn out to vote in November?"
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Figure 4.9: “Which person is more likely to have reasoned positions on the issues?"
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believes are paying attention to his actions in office; conversely, if he perceives that a group of
voters is not paying attention to his actions, he may feel more free to pursue his personal goals at
the expense of those constituents’ preferences (to the extent that they diverge).
Again, there is an asymmetric bias in candidates’ evaluations of their constituents’
attentiveness—Republicans believe that their copartisans are more likely to pay attention to their
actions in office. Democrats also agree that Republicans are more likely to pay attention, although
this effect is not statistically significant. The asymmetry of these perceptions track the asymmetry
of the candidates’ perceptions of public opinion well, as Republicans show a favorable bias
toward Republican and conservative citizens that Democrats do not. This evidence is by no means
definitive, but it is suggestive that Republican state legislative candidates evaluate conservatives as
more likely to participate in politics and to hold them accountable in office. Democratic leaders
do not show a similar bias, failing to evaluate Democratic and liberal citizens as more attentive or
participatory. Taken together with the findings on citizens’ contacting behavior and politicians’
perceptions of public opinion, these results suggest that conservatives’ efforts to mobilize the
grassroots have had important consequences for how political elites understand the balance of
support in their districts.
COMMON HEURISTICS: PERCEPTIONS OF IDEOLOGY AND PARTISANSHIP
Candidates’ perceptions of the partisan makeup of their districts
Some candidates mentioned in their open ended comments that their perceptions of public opinion
are sometimes shaped by their perceptions of the partisan makeup of their districts, implying
that they map from partisanship to opinions. If the candidates do map from their perceptions
of partisanship to perceptions of issue positions, one of two possible mechanisms could explain
their misperceptions of public opinion. First, candidates could accurately perceive the partisan
makeup of their districts, but they could inaccurately map from partisanship to issue position by
under- or over-estimating agreement with certain policies among each party. Alternatively, they
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Figure 4.10: “Which person is most likely to pay attention to how you vote in the legislature?"
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could misperceive their district’s partisan makeup but accurately map from partisanship to issue
positions. Of course, some combination of the the two could also take place.
There are several reasons to expect candidates to be more accurate about these totals than
about issue-specific public opinion in their districts. They can look up (or receive from their
party) information on past election results that allow them to judge the expected partisanship of
their districts. In many states, candidates can use party registration in the voter file to estimate
the partisan makeup of their constituents. Some states, however, do not have partisan-identified
registration, making it trickier for politicians to evaluate district partisanship. Candidates may
frequently use perceived district partisanship as a heuristic that helps them estimate public opinion
on specific issues. However, this heuristic-based reasoning provides two major pathways by which
candidates could develop biased perceptions of public opinion. First, their heuristics could be
flawed, and they could misunderstand the partisan balance of their constituents. Second, they could
misperceive how partisanship predicts opinion on specific issues.
To measure candidates’ perceptions of their districts’ partisanship, I asked candidates on the
2014 NCS a randomly assigned two of these four items:
• What percent of the people who live in your district would you guess consider themselves
Democrats?
• What percent of the people who live in your district would you guess consider themselves
Republicans?
• What percent of the people who will vote in your race would you guess consider themselves
Democrats?
• What percent of the people who will vote in your race would you guess consider themselves
Republicans?
Because of the randomization, sample sizes for each pairwise comparison are somewhat small.
However, we can still use these subsamples to make some inferences about state legislative
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candidates’ beliefs about their districts and about likely voters.
What do candidates believe about the partisan make up of their districts? Accurately estimating
partisanship at the state legislative district level is difficult. However, Figure 4.11 plots the
candidates’ estimates of their perceptions of what percent of the electorate belongs to each party. As
shown in Figure 3.1, districts represented by NCS respondents are approximately representative of
the broader population of districts, even when broken down by partisanship. However, Figure 4.11
shows that, while Democrats do not seem to be biased in their perceptions of district partisanship,
Republicans show a bias toward overestimating Republican share and underestimating Democratic
share. This asymmetry could drive some of the candidates’ asymmetric misperceptions of
issue-specific public opinion. Republican candidates perceive a more Republican electorate than
Democratic candidates do.
Figure 4.11: Candidates’ perceptions of the percent of likely voters in their race that identify with
each party.
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Left panel: Democratic candidates’ perceptions of percent Republican (red) and Democratic (blue). Right panel:
Republican candidates’ perceptions.
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Do politicians believe the population of voters differs considerably from the population of
adults living in the district? If politicians believe that voters are more liberal or conservative than
the rest of the population, they may pay closer attention to these perceived likely voters, potentially
influencing their perceptions of public opinion.
Figure 4.12: Candidates’ perceptions of the percent of district population and district voters that
identify with each party.
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Left panel: perception of Democratic share of district population and voters. Right panel: perception of Republican
share of district population and voters. Colors reflect partisanship of candidates responding.
The left panel of Figure 4.12 plots the relationship between candidates’ perceptions of the
percentage of Democrats in the population and in the electorate. The right panel does the same for
perceptions of Republicans. The points and trend lines are colored by the party of the candidates
responding to the survey item. All four loess smoothers are close to the 45-degree trend line,
indicating that, on average, candidates do not perceive large differences in the composition of
the electorate and the general population. However, Democratic candidates are much more likely
than Republicans to say that more of their voters are Democrats than the people living in their
districts. the results for Republicans are more mixed, but it seems that Republicans are more likely
to estimate that Republicans vote at high rates, while Democrats perceive Republicans as voting at
lower rates. This pattern is suggestive of some false consensus bias in politicians’ thinking about
who votes, but it is far from definitive.
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DISCUSSION
How do American politicians come to understand their constituents’ preferences and translate them
into actions in office? The ways politicians collect information about their constituents and form
their perceptions of the district are central to their representational role, but these patterns are
poorly understood because of limited opportunities to conduct research on politicians’ activities
and beliefs. In this chapter, I clarified how state-level politicians form their perceptions of public
opinion. During their campaigns, state-level candidates engage most frequently in activities like
knocking doors, which will bring them in contact with potentially unrepresentative groups of their
constituents. However, there are not significant partisan differences on these items, indicating that
it is unlikely that asymmetric misperceptions in perceptions of public opinion are the result of
simply how candidates spend their time. However, I did find evidence that the resource limitations
of state legislative candidates gives them the potential to come into contact with unrepresentative
groups of their constituents. In addition to these potentially biased information sources, there is
some evidence that candidates asymmetrically evaluate their constituents’ political sophistication
and likelihood of holding them accountable in office, with Republican candidates viewing their
copartisans more favorably than Democrats do theirs.
In sum, the evidence from these studies does not identify a definitive cause for state legislative
candidates’ asymmetric misperceptions of public opinion, but It begins to illuminate the role of
information and perceptual biases in shaping what politicians believe about their constituents.
These results also begin to point toward more productive areas for further inquiry into the
mechanisms behind elite’s asymmetric misperceptions of public opinion. The results on contacting
in Chapter 3 suggest that further analysis of inequities in grassroots organization and participation
merit further inquiry, and the results from the conjoint experiment in this chapter suggest that
candidate’s evaluations of their constituents’ sophistication may be asymmetric.
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Chapter 5
How Party Leaders Perceive Public Opinion and the Connection to Candidate
Recruitment, Coauthored with David E. Broockman, Nicholas Carnes, and
Melody Crowder-Meyer.
Candidates running for state legislative office have important strategic concerns regarding the
positions they take. So too do other kinds of politicians, like the leaders of political parties, who
must recruit candidates who will win elections and carry out the party’s goals in office. Parties
are organized to get their preferred candidates elected, so their goals and incentives are not so
different from the candidates who are actually running. Party leadership shapes the party’s goals
and sets strategies to achieve them. Because winning elections is often a central goal for party
leaders, they have incentives to pay attention to and accurately perceive public opinion. In this
chapter, drawing on collaborative work with David E. Broockman, Melody Crowder-Meyer, and
Nicholas Carnes, I investigate county party leaders’ perceptions of public opinion. I find that
they share the pattern of asymmetric misperceptions that characterizes state legislative candidates’
perceptions of public opinion. We connect these patterns to another asymmetry: Republican party
leaders prefer to nominate ideologically extreme candidates and believe they are more likely to win
elections than moderates. Democratic county party chairs, on the other hand, prefer to nominate
centrists. We connect these perceptions to our findings about candidate recruitment preferences
and to asymmetric polarization.
Over the last fifty years, centrist candidates and officeholders have virtually disappeared
from American politics. Nearly all the candidates parties nominate for office today are more
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extreme than their predecessors were, producing polarization, generating gridlock, and dismaying
voters (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006; Lee 2009; Theriault 2006). Over the same period,
the influence formal political party leaders wield over who their parties nominate has declined;
outside groups like the Koch network now dominate many primary elections (Skocpol and
Hertel-Fernandez 2016).
Recently, a number of scholars have suspected that these two trends are related, with the
disappearance of centrist candidates stemming in part from the declining influence party leaders1
have on who their parties nominate (e.g., Persily 2014, 2015; McCarty 2015a). This suspicion
arises from the observation that political parties are “the sole political organizations whose primary
goal is to win [general] elections” (La Raja and Schaffner 2015; Hassell 2016a). Because evidence
from political science finds that parties are significantly more likely to win general elections when
they nominate centrists (e.g., Hall 2015; Jacobson 2011), many expect party leaders to be especially
strong advocates for nominating centrists. This line of reasoning suggests a rare policy remedy
that could decrease elite polarization: “perhaps...we should be enhancing the role of parties” and
their leaders in primary elections through a variety of reforms to elections and campaign finance
(McCarty 2015a, p. 143) – a line of reasoning influencing public debate and the direction of
electoral reform (Edsall 2014). However, this is by no means a consensus: others depict political
party leaders as proponents of extremist candidates and would caution against further empowering
them (e.g., Hacker and Pierson 2005).
In this paper we make two contributions to this debate. First, empirically, we provide some
of the first data about how local party leaders seek to influence primaries. Many of the policies
to empower national and state party leaders reformers have considered would also increase the
already-considerable influence local political party leaders wield in primaries, but existing data
largely focuses on national and state party leaders alone. Second, theoretically, we open the
black box of party leaders’ judgments in primary elections, considering how local party leaders
1For the sake of concision, throughout the paper we use “party leaders" to refer to people who have formal elected
or appointed positions in the parties’ organizational structures. Other work persuasively argues informal party leaders
are significant for a variety of outcomes, but they are outside of our focus.
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subjectively perceive their incentives to nominate centrists and how such perceptions might differ
by party. Party leaders’ belief that nominating centrists will help their parties win general elections
is the key mechanism expected to lead them to favor nominating centrists. Existing literature
often takes it for granted that national and state party leaders hold this belief, perhaps because
it is conventional wisdom among political scientists (e.g., Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan 2002;
Downs 1957; Hall 2015). However, we argue that there are good theoretical reasons to expect many
local party leaders to believe extremist candidates are more appealing to the general electorate
than political scientists do. For example, over the last several decades, local party elites in both
parties – and especially Republicans – have been surrounded by ideological activists who have
sought to alter local elites’ perceptions of what the general public wants and to convince elites
that pursuing extreme policies will ‘fire up the base’ of polarized activists to turn out in general
elections (e.g., Grossmann and Hopkins 2016; Hacker and Pierson 2015; Skocpol and Williamson
2011). In some cases, these activists have even worked to install themselves as local party leaders
(Fiorina, Abrams and Pope 2005); Persily (2014) thus notes reason to “fear...political capture [of
parties] by the extremes” (see also La Raja and Schaffner 2015, p. 22). As a result of these efforts
and other changes, local party leaders may not perceive large incentives to nominate centrists or
might even see extremists’ positions as more popular, undermining the theoretical logic that would
lead them to prefer nominating centrists in the same manner their state and national counterparts
appear to.
This paper presents several studies consistent with this theory, supported by original data we
collected that provides an unusual glimpse at how local political party leaders navigate the strategic
calculus of who to back for their party’s nomination. In particular, we compiled contact information
for and conducted a survey of county party leaders, who we believe represented a reasonable
proving ground for our ideas: they are extremely active in primary elections at the local, county,
state, and federal levels (Crowder-Meyer 2011; La Raja and Schaffner 2015).2 Our survey of this
2For example, 78% of these leaders indicate supporting candidates in contested open primaries and 57% of
candidates for state legislative office (the level of office most empirical work in this literature considers, e.g., La
Raja and Schaffner 2015; Masket 2007) indicate such leaders were important in encouraging their candidacy.
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group achieved an 18% response rate and a representative sample.
We find that many local party leaders believe the general electorate prefers extremist candidates
and their party’s positions to a much greater extent than political science evidence suggests,
undermining the key mechanism that would lead them to favor nominating centrists. As a result,
they tend to favor nominating extremists over centrists, sometimes overwhelmingly. We show this
pattern in three methodologically distinct studies.
In our first study, we presented these local party leaders with conjoint experiments
(Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2014) that showed them potential candidates for their
party’s nomination whose traits, including ideology, we experimentally varied. We then asked party
leaders which candidates they would encourage to run for their party’s nomination (their strategic
choices), which candidates they thought would be more likely to win if nominated (measuring
perceived electoral incentives), and which candidates would be more likely to remain loyal to
the party’s policies (measuring perceived ideological incentives). Local leaders in both parties
preferred nominating candidates who are even more extreme and polarized than their party is today.
Intriguingly, and consistent with our theory, party leaders appear to favor nominating extremists
because they do not believe their party will face a significant electoral penalty for nominating an
extremist.
This first study also uncovered a stark partisan difference: Republican local party leaders
in particular preferred extremist nominees over centrists overwhelmingly. When faced with a
choice between a candidate more extreme than their party or less extreme, Republicans preferred
nominating the extreme candidate overwhelmingly, by a 10 to 1 margin. This strong preference for
extremists appears to arise from Republican leaders’ belief that extremists are actually much more
electable than centrists in general elections. We call this phenomenon among Republican leaders
the belief that they “can have their cake and eat it, too”: nominating extremists, they believe,
provides both ideological and electoral rewards. Democrats, by contrast, do perceive the tradeoff
political scientists have identified between party loyalty and electability, believing that extremist
nominees are slightly less likely to win general elections. But because they believe the penalty for
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extremism is only slight, Democrats still prefer nominating extremists on average, although not
nearly as overwhelmingly as Republicans. These results are robust: they hold even for the party
leaders in our sample who regularly face close general elections and work in closely divided areas.
To corroborate our finding that local Republican party leaders believe the general electorate
is more conservative than many political scientists expect, we conducted a second study where
we elicited party leaders’ beliefs about public opinion on a number of issues. Consistent with our
findings and broader theory, we find that local Republican party leaders perceive public opinion on
a number of issues as significantly more conservative than public opinion data indicates that it is.
As a result, local Republican party leaders think nominating extreme candidates brings electoral
rewards. We show this result using two different methodological approaches and that it is robust to
whether we examine public opinion among voters only.
To check the external validity of our findings, our third study examines what party leaders
spontaneously say about the traits they look for in candidates for their party’s nomination. One
concern with our first two studies is that they prompt party leaders to think about policy and
ideology, which might lead them to place more weight on those concerns than they normally
would. However, we find that party leaders often mention candidate ideology spontaneously.
Moreover, local Republican party leaders are especially likely to say that they look for conservative
candidates: even when unprompted to consider ideology, Republican leaders mention it as an
ideal nominee trait twice as often as Democrats and over six times more often than they mention
ideological centrism.
These results suggest an important caution for recent efforts to reduce polarization. To the
extent potential reforms would empower local party leaders – who already wield important
influence today – they may further empower individuals who do not perceive the tradeoff between
extremity and electability that political scientists perceive. As a result, reformers may wish to take
a more surgical approach, empowering the national and state leaders who appear more supportive
of centrists (La Raja and Schaffner 2015) while avoiding empowering local party leaders to the
extent possible. At the same time, our data suggest intriguing potential strategies for reducing
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polarization, a point we return to later.
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND EXISTING EVIDENCE
The formal leaders of political party organizations are capable of influencing primary elections
in a number of ways: they can recruit new primary candidates with attributes they like (Lawless
2012), direct financial and human resources to potential nominees they favor (Cohen, Karol, Noel
and Zaller 2008; Masket 2016), boost the fortunes of potential nominees they endorse (Kousser,
Lucas, Masket and McGhee 2015), and “gatekeep” potential nominees they dislike by withholding
their support (Niven 2006; Sanbonmatsu 2006).
Over the last several decades, the influence formal leaders of local political party organizations
wield has generally decreased as elites in an “extended party network” have wielded more and
more (e.g., Masket 2009). For example, recent years have witnessed changes to party nomination
processes and campaign finance regulation (such as the Citizens United decision and state-based
equivalents) that have dramatically reduced the electoral influence of national, state, and local
political party organizations in primary elections. The share of campaign funds provided by formal
party committees today is just half what it was a decade ago, while outside groups’ influence in
primary elections has dramatically increased (Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez 2016).
One classic perspective on polarization would welcome political party leaders’ declining
influence in primary elections. This perspective depicts political party leaders as the principal
proponents of polarized candidates. For example, Hacker and Pierson (2005) blame national “party
leaders themselves” for the success of extremists in the Republican party (p. 9), documenting
instances when they coordinated with outside groups to champion hard-right officeholders and
priorities (p. 12).
However, a number of other scholars have argued that the declining influence of political
party leaders might actually exacerbate elite polarization (e.g., Persily 2015; McCarty 2015a).
A compelling theoretical logic supports this suspicion. Many of the interest group “policy
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demanders” (Bawn et al. 2012) and “purist” ideological activists (Fiorina, Abrams and Pope 2005)
who have gained influence over the last several decades are thought to be especially focused
on advancing extreme policy agendas and thus supporting extremists in primaries. In contrast,
party leaders oversee “the sole political organizations” – parties – “whose primary goal is to win
[general] elections” (La Raja and Schaffner 2015). Although party leaders have their own policy
demands, they are thought to have a stronger focus on winning general elections than others in
extended party networks. As a result, they are expected to be especially likely to support centrist
candidates for their party’s nomination: conventional wisdom in political science is that the median
general election voter prefers centrists (Carson, Koger, Lebo and Young 2010) and that centrists
perform better than extremists in general elections (Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan 2002; Hall
2015).
If true, this line of reasoning suggests a rare strategy to decrease polarization in Congress and
state legislatures: increase party leaders’ electoral influence in primaries. Empowered party leaders
might, this reasoning suggests, use their influence to “clamp down on candidates and incumbents
outside the mainstream" and throw their weight behind moderates (Persily 2015, p. 132), ultimately
“exercis[ing] a moderating effect on those who win office" (La Raja and Schaffner 2015; Hassell
2016b; Pildes 2015; McCarty and Shor 2015).
Relatively little existing data directly measures party leaders’ preferences, making it difficult
to distinguish between these perspectives, and the data that does exist is mixed; McCarty (2015a)
writes, “we still have a poor understanding of the role played by political party organizations
in producing more or less polarization” (p. 136). Existing data and theory also tends to focus
on parties at the highest levels, where preferences for moderates might be especially strong (La
Raja and Schaffner 2015, p. 23). Examining national parties, Hassell (2016b) finds “no systematic
ideological difference between party supported and non-party supported candidates in primary
elections” that lead to competitive general elections. However, national elites appear more likely
to support moderate candidates ahead of non-competitive general elections because they are more
closely aligned with moderate candidates on policy issues (Hassell 2016b). Anecdotally, some
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accounts indicate national party figures like Karl Rove have coordinated to support moderates;
other accounts of the same individuals suggest the opposite (Hacker and Pierson 2005). At the
state party level, where more systematic data is available, La Raja and Schaffner (2015) find that
parties tend to support moderate candidates for state legislature, but that this relationship might
be explained by the fact that candidates facing close general elections tend to be more moderate
anyway. Data is sparse about local parties, although scholars agree that they are extremely active in
primaries, too. La Raja and Schaffner (2015) conjecture that local parties may be more enthusiastic
about nominating extremists, as they “nurture some of the most ideological activists in the party”
(p. 22).
We make two contributions to this literature. First, we consider a central theoretical mechanism
that has received little attention in existing work: how party leaders perceive their party’s incentive
to nominate moderates. On a theoretical level, there is broad agreement on two principal goals
party leaders have when evaluating potential nominees: loyalty and electability. On the one hand,
party leaders want their nominees to remain loyal to the party if they are elected (Bawn et al. 2012;
Hacker and Pierson 2005). On the other hand, party leaders want their parties to win elections,
giving them an incentive to favor primary candidates who will be “most competitive in a general
election” (La Raja and Schaffner 2015, p. 23). These two goals are thought to be in tension,
however. Party elites care about victory in general elections and the party brand (Aldrich and
Rhode 2000) and political scientists have found that nominating extreme candidates imperils both
(Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan 2002; Hall 2015; Jacobson 2011). We theoretically consider
reasons why party leaders – especially Republicans – might estimate that their parties face lower
electoral incentives to nominate centrists than political scientists generally estimate.
Second, we collect some of the first data that speaks to how local party leaders navigate these
trade-offs. Existing data largely focuses on national and state parties, but many of the reforms
scholars have considered to empower party leaders would also give already-powerful local party
leaders additional influence in primaries. Indeed, many have noted concern that these local party
leaders might be systematically different than the state and national elites that have been the subject
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of greater study (La Raja and Schaffner 2015; Persily 2014). But little data has examined local
political parties directly.
Bringing these two areas of focus together, there are several reasons we expected local party
leaders – and especially Republicans – to estimate smaller electoral rewards for nominating
centrists than conventional wisdom in the political science literature expects. First, there is little
ex ante reason to believe party leaders have access to unbiased estimates of the electoral penalties
extreme candidates face in the first place. Elections are noisy, and it is difficult to estimate whether
any particular candidate would have done better or worse if they had a different ideological
position. This should be especially true for local party leaders, who do not closely observe as
many elections as national party leaders. Next, there is good reason to think local party leaders
might overestimate the general electorate’s support for extremist candidates and policies. In recent
years, polarized ideological activists have focused on barraging political elites with expressions
of support for extreme agendas in direct communication, at town halls, with protests, and other
tactics (Hacker and Pierson 2015; Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez 2016; Skocpol and Williamson
2011). A principal aim of these tactics is to alter elites’ perceptions of their incentives and of the
public (see also Kollman 1998). To the extent that activists successfully cause local party leaders
to overestimate popular support for extreme policies, the theoretical mechanism that might lead
leaders to nominate centrists is undermined. And as leaders reflect on what kind of nominees will
perform well with voters, they may think of the most vocal activists, not the typical voter (Miler
2009). In addition, party leaders of both parties may also be subject to false consensus effects and
the availability heuristic, whereby they overgeneralize from their own opinions and the opinions of
other partisans in their social networks about what the general electorate wants (Butler and Dynes
2016). Selection could also play a role: people who believe their polarized ideologies are favored
in general elections (versus those who do not) might be more likely to agree to serve as party chairs
in the first place (e.g., Thomsen 2014).
To the extent some local party leaders do not perceive extremism as bearing a large electoral
penalty, we expected this pattern to be stronger for Republicans. Locally rooted, genuinely
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grassroots organizations that represent liberal constituencies have atrophied in the last few decades,
while their conservative counterparts have focused on pressuring party elites and are experiencing
a renaissance (Blee and Creasap 2010; Hacker and Pierson 2005, 2015; Skocpol and Williamson
2011).3 To the extent the organizations engaged in such strategies are stronger on the right, we
expected Republican elites to be more likely to perceive extremists as more popular.
DATA
To examine how party leaders evaluate potential nominees, in 2013 we fielded a national survey of
the chairs of the county-level (or equivalent)4 branches of the Republican and Democratic parties.5
We chose county-level parties as the initial testing ground for our ideas for several reasons.
First, they and their local equivalents are often the most active organizations in primary elections
at the state and federal levels (Crowder-Meyer 2011). They also recruit a large share of candidates
for local and state office and, in turn, many of the candidates who later run for higher offices
(Crowder-Meyer 2013; Lawless 2012). Consistent with their importance in primary elections, over
78% of the party chairs in our sample indicated that people in their county party organization have
helped support a particular candidate in an open primary. In a separate survey of candidates for state
legislative office, we also found over 57% indicated that people in their local party organization
were important in encouraging them to run for office. This echoes recent research by Feinstein
and Schickler (2008) and Carr, Gamm and Phillips (2016), who find that political changes at the
national level are often preceded by changes that occur in state and local parties. In addition,
county parties are numerous enough to allow us to make statistically meaningful inferences while
still providing a theoretically well-defined sampling frame (both parties in each county in the US).
3For example, Fang (2013) discusses how conservative organizations buy advertising time during Rush
Limbaugh’s conservative talk radio show that encourages listeners to call political elites on the same theme that
Limbaugh had just been discussing, producing an avalanche of communication from conservative activists to political
elites.
4Some states do not have county parties but instead have parties at the parish (LA), borough (AK), district (ND),
city (CT), multi-county (MN), or sub-city (MA Dems) level.
5Nine states were excluded because neither party provided contact information for county-level officials: GA, IN,
IA, KY, MI, NH, NM, OK, and WI.
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We would of course welcome further research on whether our conclusions would hold for party
leaders at lower or higher levels, as such evidence would have important consequences for the
shape of reform efforts that would complement the data we gathered.
To administer the survey, we first manually compiled contact information for 6,219 county
party chairs. We gathered this information by searching the internet for the name of every county
in the US together with the name of each of the two major parties. In some states, we found
directories. In many states, we made inquiries to individual parties to gather contact information
for each chair where it was missing.
In November 2013, we sent each chair a pre-notification and then a survey invitation at his
or her email and/or postal addresses. (If both were available, we attempted contact at both.) We
received responses from 1,118 (18%), a response rate comparable to recent surveys of politicians
such as the NCS.
The respondents were broadly representative of the sampling frame. Response rates were nearly
identical by region; for Republican (18.0%) and Democratic party chairs (17.9%); and for party
leaders previously identified as men (18.2%) and women (18.5%). One potential concern with the
data is that only party chairs in uncompetitive areas would respond. However, Figure B.1 indicates
that the underlying partisan composition of the areas where our respondents are from is fairly
representative.
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Figure 5.1: Obama 2012 County Vote Share Among Survey Respondents and Non-Respondents
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Another possibility is that only county party chairs from very small counties would be willing
to respond to our survey, undermining the external validity of our inferences. Figure B.2 shows
that, if anything, the opposite is the case: we received a similar response rate in counties of all
sizes, and very slightly more responses from larger counties.
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Figure 5.2: County Population Among Respondents and Non-Respondents
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Table B.1 in the Appendix provides regression models predicting whether party leaders
responded to the survey as a function of covariates. The only significant coefficient is the finding
that party leaders in larger counties were slightly more likely to respond.
All three of our studies draw on data from this original sample.
STUDY 1: CANDIDATE CHOICE CONJOINT EXPERIMENT
Our first study consisted of a conjoint experiment within the survey (Hainmueller, Hopkins and
Yamamoto 2014). Conjoint experiments involve forcing respondents to make trade-offs between
two possible choices that differ along a variety of dimensions and estimating which dimensions
drive their choices. Providing respondents with a forced choice allows for a statistical estimation
of their revealed preferences over each dimension and places respondents’ preferences on common
scale. Providing multiple dimensions enhances the naturalism of the choices respondents face and
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allows direct comparisons of how important different dimensions are in driving their choices.
Design
In our experiment, we asked county party chairs to pick which of two possible candidates they
would prefer to run in their party’s primary for an open seat. Our experiments began, “Suppose
there is a primary for an open [county board / state legislative / US House]6 seat in your county
and the two individuals below are considering running. We’d like you to consider the following
two potential candidates for this office.” The survey then described “Candidate A” and “Candidate
B” by displaying two side-by-side lists of the candidates’ personal attributes. After the local party
leaders viewed the candidates, we then asked, “Which of the above candidates would you be more
likely to encourage to run for office?”
Unbeknownst to the party leader completing the survey, each aspect of each candidate’s
biography was independently generated at random: the survey supplied each candidate’s gender
(signaled by first name), age, occupation, experience in the party, life circumstances, personal
characteristics, and political ideology. For political ideology, we described some candidates as
more moderate than the typical voter in their party (for Democrats, more conservative; for
Republicans, more liberal); we described other candidates as similar in ideology to typical party
members; still others we described as more extreme than typical party members (for Democrats,
more liberal; for Republicans, more conservative). Providing several traits for each candidate
beyond ideology was intended to enhance the naturalism of the experiment and ensures party
leaders are not cued to focus on ideology when making their evaluations (Hainmueller, Hopkins
and Yamamoto 2014). However, all of the traits (ideology, gender, etc.) were independently
randomized, meaning that we can compare how party leaders reacted to candidates with each trait
to estimate the effects of each trait, as each trait is uncorrelated with the others by design.
Online Appendix Table B.2 gives the full language for each condition. Online Appendix Figure
6The level of government was randomized to assess the robustness of the results. County party leaders play a role
in recruiting and screening candidates at all these levels of government. The results do not meaningfully differ based
on the level of government displayed in the vignette.
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B.3 shows how the survey instrument appeared to respondents in the online version of the survey.
To match our theory, we focus on cases where party leaders were presented with a choice where
one candidate was more centrist than their party and where one was more extreme.
Results: Who Party Leaders Prefer To Run
When faced with a choice between a candidate more extreme than their party (increasing
polarization) or a candidate more centrist (reducing polarization), each of whom had many other
randomly assigned attributes, party leaders preferred that the more extreme candidate run 76% of
the time, or by a more than 3-to-1 margin. Disaggregating the data by party shows that this is
largely driven by Republican party chairs. Democratic party chairs preferred extremists 63% of the
time, but Republicans preferred extremists 91% of the time, or by about 10 to 1. Regardless of the
other traits each candidate had, Republican party chairs preferred the extremists almost every time.
Figure 5.3 communicates the magnitude and robustness of these results. Each panel shows the
‘win margin’ of the extremist candidate in these match-ups, subtracting the share of party leaders
who preferred the centrist nominee from the share who supported the extremist nominee. The error
bars show one standard error around our estimate of the mean. The first panel shows the results
just described, where a larger share of chairs in both parties prefer an extremist to a centrist.
The bottom two panels of Figure 5.3 help evaluate the robustness and generalizability of this
finding. First, one potential concern with these results is that many county party leaders work in
areas where their party is guaranteed to win or lose elections, reducing their incentive to nominate
more electable candidates. The bottom left panel of Figure 5.3 therefore shows the results just for
the subset of county party chairs in counties where Obama received between 40% and 60% of the
two-party vote in 2012, and therefore where general elections are likely to be competitive. Next,
the bottom right panel shows the subset of county party chairs who subjectively perceive general
elections in their area as competitive.7 As the figure illustrates, the results are largely robust when
we examine these especially relevant subgroups. Indeed, if anything, party chairs who perceive
7Specifically, we asked party leaders what share of offices in their county their party reliably won. We include in
this category party leaders who indicated that their party won between 26-50% or 51-75% of the time.
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Figure 5.5: Robustness checks
[b]
[b]
elections in their area as more likely to be up for grabs are more likely to prefer extremist nominees,
with Republican party chairs in such areas preferring extremists by 15 to 1.
Mechanisms: ‘Having Their Cake And Eating It, Too’
After party leaders selected which primary candidate they preferred, we also asked them
several follow-up questions to understand the mechanisms driving their choices, including their
perceptions about which of the two candidates would be more likely to win the general election and
which of the two candidates would be more likely to stay loyal to the party if elected. Party leaders
were significantly more likely to select as preferred candidates who they perceived as having these
qualities, by about a 4 to 1 margin for each.
Figure 5.6 plots the margin by which party leaders were more likely to say that extremists would
stay loyal to the party (relative to centrists). Party leaders on both sides recognize that extremists
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are more likely to toe the party line (Bawn et al. 2012).
Figure 5.6: Will the extremist or the centrist be more loyal if elected?
More surprising is how party leaders perceive extremists’ and centrists’ electability. Do
party chairs appreciate the trade-off between extremists’ greater loyalty and centrists’ greater
electability? For Democratic party chairs, the answer seems to be yes. The first panel of Figure
5.7 shows that Democratic chairs appear to see this trade-off to some extent; they are slightly
more likely to see centrist candidates as more electable, although this difference is not statistically
significant. At worst, Democratic party chairs see centrists and extremists as similarly electable,
making their judgments about electability based on the other traits in the candidate profiles.
The picture is quite different for Republican party chairs. Republican chairs overall – and in
both objectively and subjectively competitive counties – see extremist candidates as more likely
to win general elections. 75% of Republican party chairs indicated they thought the extremist
candidate they saw in the conjoint would be more likely to win the general election than the centrist
candidate they saw, a margin of 50% for the extremist candidates. This difference persists for
Republican party chairs who work in closely divided counties and is even larger for Republican
chairs who subjectively perceive elections in their areas as close.
Together, these results suggest an intriguing explanation for why Republican party chairs prefer
extreme candidates for their party’s nomination over centrists: unlike Democrats, most Republican
party chairs appear to believe they can ‘have their cake and eat it, too’ by nominating extremists,
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Figure 5.9: Robustness checks
[b]
[b]
reaping both electoral and ideological rewards. Ironically, political science evidence suggests the
exact opposite is more likely to be the case: Hall (2015) finds that the penalty for nominating
extreme candidates in general elections is especially large for Republicans.
This divergence between party leaders’ perceptions and political science evidence underscores
our point that political scientists cannot necessarily assume that local party elites perceive the
political world in the same way that they do. It may well be the case that party leaders understand
something political scientists do not – but regardless of who perceives political parties’ incentives
more accurately, Study 1 provides our first indication that political scientists’ and party leaders’
perceptions of the general electorate and their political incentives appear to diverge. Study 1’s
results are consistent with our argument that local party chairs – especially Republicans – might
not perceive nominating centrists as bearing electoral rewards.
122
STUDY 2: PARTY LEADERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF PUBLIC OPINION
Could it really be the case that local Republican party chairs perceive the general electorate in their
area as much more conservative than political scientists? The previous study assumes party leaders
can understand or are prone to think in terms of the ideological labels that political scientists do.
Therefore, our second study focuses on local party leaders’ perceptions of the general electorate
on individual issues. In particular, as a methodologically distinct test of our hypothesis, we also
queried party leaders’ beliefs about public opinion in their counties and their states. If Republican
party chairs in particular expected extremist nominees to perform better than centrists, we believed
this might be reflected in an overestimation of the conservatism of citizens in their areas.
Data
To query party leaders’ perceptions, we asked them to estimate public opinion in their county
and in their state on several issues. In particular, we asked them “What percent of people living
in your state would agree with the following statements?" and “What percent of people living
in your county would agree with the following statements?" followed by a series of statements.
Each party chair made estimates of public opinion for both their state and their county on three
issues that were randomly assigned (to prevent fatigue). We asked party leaders to estimate public
opinion in both their state and in their county because party leaders indicate they are active in
primaries for local, countywide, statewide, and Congressional office. Although not all offices line
up to county and state boundaries exactly, many elections do and we expected these two boundaries
to be well-known to county party leaders.
In order to be able compare party leaders’ perceptions to reasonably precise estimates of reality,
we asked party chairs to estimate county and state opinion on items that had been asked in the 2012
CCES, a large sample survey (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2013). We were therefore constrained
in the kinds of issues we could ask about, as the CCES only asked the full public sample about
their opinions on a limited set of issues. Table 5.1 reports the text of the issue items in the 2012
CCES that were available, as well as the ideological direction of the “Yes" side and whether the
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policy represented a status quo change in 2013. We also report weighted national mean support for
each issue in the CCES.
Table 5.1: Issue questions available in the 2012 CCES.
National Mean “Yes” Status quo
CCES Issue Item Wording Support in CCES direction change?
“Same-sex couples should be allowed to
marry.”
53% Liberal Some states
“Grant legal status to all illegal
immigrants who have held jobs and
paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not
been convicted of any felony crimes.”
48% Liberal Yes
“Laws governing the sale of firearms
should be made less strict than they are.”
13% Conservative Yes
“Let employers and insurers refuse to
cover birth control and other health
services that violate their religious
beliefs.”
37% Conservative Yes
“By law, abortion should never be
permitted.”
12% Conservative Yes
“Always allow a woman to obtain an
abortion as a matter of choice.”
49% Liberal Yes
The results are robust when we limit to voters only; voter mean opinion is typically within 1
percentage point of overall mean opinion reported in Table 5.1, with the largest difference being a
3 percentage point difference on the religious exemption issue. This difference is nearly an order
of magnitude smaller than the differences in perceptions between parties we discuss below and so
elites thinking about voters only instead of all residents is unlikely to drive the results.
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Empirical Strategy 1: Raw Data
Because each state and county has a relatively small number of CCES respondents, special care is
required to compare party leaders’ estimates of public opinion with the CCES’ estimates of true
public opinion. We use two approaches that both yield similar results.
We will begin by describing our first approach in the context of the county estimates. Our goal is
to compare the average of party leaders’ perceptions across all their counties to the CCES estimate
of public opinion across all the counties where chairs responded. Our estimation strategy is as
follows. Let C represent the set of all CCES respondents who live in counties where a party leader
responded to the survey, with respondents indexed by c and issues by i. Denote opinions expressed
on issue i by CCES respondent c as oc,i. All the CCES questions we use are binary choice, such that
oc,i ∈ {0, 1}. Let pc,i represent the perception of the party leader in c’s county of average support
for issue i; that is, pc,i is a party leader’s estimate ofE(oc,i) for their county. The average of pc,i−oc,i
within each county thus captures an estimate of party leaders’ average overestimation of support for
policy i. For example, suppose a party leader perceives support for a policy in their county at 80%
but true support is only 60%. In this example, E(pc,i− oc,i) = 0.8−E(oc,i) = 0.8− 0.6 = 0.2. To
estimate party leaders’ average overestimation of support for i, we estimate the mean of pc,i − oc,i
across all the CCES respondents.8 To incorporate the CCES weights, we take the weighted mean
of this quantity, multiplying by the CCES survey weights wc, which have mean 1. In addition,
because the CCES has many more respondents from larger counties than smaller counties, we
weight these estimates inversely to county size so that party leaders from large counties and small
counties matter equally. In particular, we weight each CCES observation by s¯c
sc
, where sc is the size
of each CCES respondents’ county in 2013 according to the US Census. This makes party leaders
the effective unit of analysis and counts party leaders from small and large counties equally. Our
results are similar regardless of the weighting approach we use, however. We seek to estimate yi,
party leaders’ average overestimation of county support for issue i. We therefore estimate yi with:
8We acknowledge Doug Rivers for this suggestion.
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ŷi =
∑
c∈C
[
(pc,i − oc,i)wc ∗ s¯c
sc
]
n(C)
, (5.1)
where n(C) is the number of CCES respondents.
We can also estimate public opinion in the average county – what party leaders’ average
perceptions would be if their perceptions were perfectly accurate – using:
̂¯oc,i =
∑
c∈C
[
oc,iwc ∗ s¯c
sc
]
n(C)
. (5.2)
This quantity can be interpreted as ‘the expectation of county opinion for a party chair
respondent chosen at random.’
Likewise, party leaders’ mean perception can be estimated with:
̂¯pi =
∑
c∈C
[
pc,iwc ∗ s¯c
sc
]
n(C)
≈ p¯i. (5.3)
Our analysis at the state level is identical, except with sc corresponding to the size of each
CCES respondents’ state. We cluster the standard errors at the county level for our county analysis
and at the state level for our state analysis. In addition, our county analysis excludes the states
where parties are not organized at the county level because the levels at which these parties are
organized (parish, etc.) are not available in the CCES data: LA, AK, ND, CT, and MA.
Results: Republican Party Leaders Overestimate Support for Conservative Positions
Consistent with the findings from Study 1, the data from Study 2 indicates that Republican county
party leaders perceive the general electorate as more conservative than political science evidence
depicts it.
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Figure 5.11 shows our estimates for party leaders’ perceptions of public opinion in their
counties and our estimates from the CCES of what their average perceptions would have been were
they forming their perceptions in the same manner as political scientists. Table 5.2 shows point
estimates. (Because smaller counties are more conservative but we weight all counties equally, the
mean county opinion is more conservative than mean national opinion reported in Table 5.1.)
On average, Republican leaders appear to underestimate public support for the liberal policies
on the CCES by about 10 percentage points and to overestimate public support for the conservative
policies on the CCES by almost 40 percentage points. For example, only 13% of CCES respondents
believe that “Laws governing the sale of firearms should be made less strict than they are,” but
Republican county party leaders perceive their counties as 67% supportive. On the other hand,
the CCES evidence indicates that about 37% of people in the typical county supported same-sex
marriage in 2013, but the typical Republican county party leader perceived county support at 27%.
Democrats do not consistently overestimate voter liberalism, and indeed if anything appear to
overestimate voter conservatism as well.
Figure 5.12 and Table 5.3 report the results for party leaders’ estimates of state opinion.
The results are similar: Republicans overestimate state support for conservative policies and
underestimate state support for liberal policies.
MRP
To gain a better appreciation of the nature and magnitude of these misperceptions, we also used
multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP) to estimate true public opinion in each state
and compared these state-level MRP estimates to party leaders’ perceptions their state.9 MRP
uses individual-level survey data and demographic information about the districts from the US
Census to construct state-level estimates of support for each issue (Lax and Phillips 2009a,b, 2012;
Park, Gelman and Bafumi 2004). Our MRP procedure first fits multilevel choice models to the
responses to each issue question from the 2012 CCES. Each model fit returns estimated effects
9MRP estimates at the county level would be extremely imprecise, so we focus on the state-level where our
estimates are more defensible.
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Figure 5.12: State opinion
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for demographic and geographic predictors. We then use the estimates from the multilevel model
to estimate support for various demographic cells, identified by age, race, education, gender and
state. Finally, using data from the US Census’ American Community Survey, we weight those cells
by their frequency in each state. The result is an estimate of the percent of each state supporting
each issue. We then compare these estimates to party leaders’ perceptions. Because of the large
sample size of the CCES, many states have relatively large samples. For states with sufficiently
large samples, MRP is designed so that the results approach disaggregation and rely very little on
MRP’s demographic weighting. Online Appendix C provides further details.
We present the MRP results graphically in Figure 5.13, with a loess smoother for each party.
The x-axis on each graph show the MRP estimate of state support and the y-axis shows party
leaders’ estimate of state support. If party leaders were perfectly accurate, we would expect their
responses to concentrate around the black line, which shows the line y = x. However, the results
from the MRP estimates match the raw data: it appears that Republican party leaders consistently
overestimate support for conservative policy positions, whereas Democrats do not do the same
with liberal policy positions.
Discussion of Study 2
The results of our second study represent methodologically distinct evidence for the same finding
as Study 1: whereas Democratic county party chairs perceive a general public that looks relatively
similar to what political science evidence suggests, Republican county party chairs perceive a
much more conservative general public.10 These are exactly the perceptions conservative grassroots
organizations have worked to give Republican leaders (Fang 2013; Skocpol and Williamson 2011).
Importantly, these differing perceptions suggest that on many issues where political scientists
would expect extremely conservative candidates to take positions out-of-step with public opinion,
Republican leaders appear more likely to expect such candidates would be in-step. Given these
differing perceptions, it is not surprising Republican local party leaders expect very conservative
10Broockman and Ryan (2016) queried sitting officeholders about their perceptions of public opinion in their
districts and found similar results.
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Figure 5.13: Party chairs’ perceptions of state opinion compared to MRP estimates of true state
opinion.
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candidates to perform better in general elections than political science conventional wisdom
predicts.
STUDY 3: IN DESCRIBING IDEAL CANDIDATES, REPUBLICAN CHAIRS
SPONTANEOUSLY MENTION IDEOLOGY MORE OFTEN THAN DEMOCRATS, AND
CONSERVATISM SIX TIMES MORE OFTEN THAN CENTRISM
Both of our first two studies relied on explicitly prompting party chairs for their beliefs about the
electorate’s ideological composition. However, it remains possible that ideological extremism is
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not a quality chairs proactively seek out in candidates and that other qualities we failed to ask
about overshadow this concern.
To measure whether ideological loyalty is a “top of mind” consideration for party leaders when
they think about potential candidates, prior to our conjoint experiment, we asked party leaders an
open-ended question (on the paper version of the survey only): “In an ideal world, what personal
qualities would you like all of your party’s political candidates to have? Please list as many as
you would like.” 84% of the 234 party leaders who answered the question listed at least one
characteristic. Coders who were blind to the hypotheses of the study grouped their responses into
36 categories.
The data reveal two patterns consistent with our other results.
First, local party leaders of both parties seek out ideological orthodoxy when thinking about
potential nominees. Figure 5.14 plots the frequency of each type of response across both parties.
Characteristics clearly related to ideological loyalty – conservative, liberal, loyal to the party, and
loyal to the Constitution – were mentioned by 28% of the sample, more than three times the number
who mentioned ideological moderation or centrism (difference in proportions p < 0.001).
Second, Republican elites prioritize ideological loyalty far more than Democratic elites. Figure
5.15 plots the percentage of leaders in each party who mentioned each of the five most common
traits as well as the percentage who mentioned any of the ideological responses we identified.
Republican party chairs were twice as likely as Democrats to mention ideology (p < 0.001) –
the starkest inter-party difference by far. These findings mirror other work finding that Republican
elites place a special premium on ideological loyalty (Grossmann and Hopkins 2016) – but are at
odds with hopes that Republican political party leaders might place more weight on centrism in
order to win elections. In addition, while chairs of both parties were more likely to spontaneously
mention extremism as a desirable quality than moderation or centrism, this differed by party –
Democrats were twice as likely to spontaneously mention extremism than centrism as desirable,
but Republicans were nearly six times as likely to do so.
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Figure 5.14: Share of Chairs’ Responses Mentioning Each Quality
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DISCUSSION: HAVING THEIR CAKE AND EATING IT, TOO
Recently, scholars and activists seeking to reduce polarization in American politics have considered
one counterintuitive possibility: that reforms empowering formal political party leaders might
actually reduce polarization, as party leaders might be more likely to favor nominating centrists
in hopes their parties will perform better in general elections. However, many of these potential
reforms would also further increase the power of local party leaders.
In this paper, we examined a novel reason why empowering these local party leaders might
actually exacerbate polarization. Even if local party leaders face a trade-off between nominating
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Figure 5.15: Share of Republican and Democratic Chairs’ Responses Mentioning Each Quality
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electable centrists and less-electable loyalists in reality, we theorized that they might discount the
probability that nominating centrists would aid their party electorally for a variety of reasons:
for example, not only are party leaders likely to be surrounded by likeminded and polarized
individuals, a bevy of grassroots organizations – especially on the political right – have focused
on distorting party elites’ perceptions of the general electorate’s demands (Fang 2013; Hacker
and Pierson 2015; Skocpol and Williamson 2011). Our findings are consistent with exactly that
expectation: most Republican county party leaders see extremists as more electable than centrists,
while their Democratic counterparts appear to see centrists as only slightly more electable. In this
way, Republican party leaders act as if nominating extremists allows them to ‘have their cake and
eat it, too’ – winning more votes in general elections while only offering voters the opportunity
to select extreme party loyalists. It may well be the case that the formal leaders of local parties
are less enthusiastic about extremists than other local party activists like donors and interest group
leaders. But many local party leaders appear not to believe nominating centrists would help their
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parties win, and, as a result, many appear plenty enthusiastic about extremists still.
Our data has several limitations, and we would welcome future research that addressed them.
First, this study uses survey data, not data on how local party leaders actually behave. Although this
allowed us to randomly assign candidate attributes and better capture key theoretical mechanisms,
observational data on how party leaders actually recruit candidates would complement this
data. Moreover, our analysis does not definitively establish why local party leaders seem to
underestimate the electoral rewards of nominating centrists; as with all studies that identify key
mechanisms, questions remain about what mechanisms underpin those mechanisms themselves.
We also focused on open seats in our conjoint experiment, since this is where polarization appears
to be more pronounced (Theriault 2006), but the dynamics when incumbents are running for
re-election would also be of interest. In addition, we look forward to seeing whether these patterns
persist over time; variation over time would be informative about mechanisms. Finally, it remains
possible that if political parties’ resources and incentives did change, chairs might have access to
different information or different people might become party leaders in equilibrium (Masket 2016;
McCarty 2015a). It would also be of interest for reform efforts to understand whether these same
patterns persist or are reversed at other levels of government. For example, the chairs of the RNC or
DNC might perceive the world differently precisely because they are less subject to the grassroots
pressures and other dynamics we identified.
Our findings that Democratic party leaders seem less sanguine about extremists’ electoral
prospects than Republicans also suggest a new mechanism that may underpin asymmetric
polarization. As McCarty (2015b) recently reviews the literature, there appears to be a “major
partisan asymmetry in polarization,” with “the movement of the Republican Party to the right
account[ing] for most of the divergence between the two parties.” The same pattern generally
holds at the state level (Shor 2015). Our results about how Republicans local party leaders believe
they can ‘have their cake and eat it, too’ when considering potential nominees raise the possibility
that other Republican elites misperceive how conservative it is in their electoral interest to be.
At the same time, our data suggest an intriguing potential strategy for reducing polarization:
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consistent with recent field experiments (e.g., Butler and Nickerson 2011), supplying local party
leaders with more reliable information about public opinion and their incentives might change
their perceptions and reduce their support for extremists. If local party leaders came to believe they
were undermining their party’s electoral prospects, they might be less likely to favor nominating
extremists than they appear today. This hypothesis is ripe for future research. More broadly, in an
era when an unprecedented crush of activists has sought to warp how elites and voters perceive
each other, our results underscore the importance of studying how political actors subjectively
perceive the political world (e.g., Broockman and Ryan 2016; Miler 2009).
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Chapter 6
How the Public Perceives Public Opinion and Why It Matters
We have seen that politicians’ perceptions of public opinion on many high-salience issues are
inaccurate and biased. This trend is present among candidates running for state legislative office
as well as among party leaders. The consistent bias in these elites’ perceptions of public opinion
suggests that aspects of the information environment in contemporary American politics amplify
the preferences of conservative citizens and make them seem more numerous. In Chapter 4, I
examined some of these potential information sources and how political elites process information
about public opinion in biased ways.
Legislators and party leaders have important representational roles in American politics, but
ordinary citizens ultimately hold power through their electoral control of representatives. Do
ordinary citizens share elites’ asymmetric misperceptions of where their fellow citizens stand
on the issues? Prominent theories of social influence suggest that people’s political participation
and attitudes interact with their perceptions of others’ opinions and that perceptions of public
opinion may affect people’s attitudes and behavior. Several theories and empirical studies consider
how people’s social perceptions shape their own preferences and their willingness to express
preferences or participate in politics in other ways. In this chapter, I investigate what the public
believes about public opinion on salient political issues. I find that, despite the salience of these
controversial issues, members of the public have very inaccurate beliefs about their fellow citizens’
opinions on these issues.
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PERCEPTIONS OF PUBLIC OPINION AND IMPERSONAL INFLUENCE ON
POLITICAL ISSUES
People’s social evaluations shape their decisions (e.g. Cialdini and Goldstein 2004; Deutsch and
Gerard 1955; Huckfeldt 1980, 1984; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). Few people want to be in the
minority, preferring to match their behavior and opinions to what they perceive to be the majority
position, and people’s confidence in their own opinions and actions is bolstered by the sense that
they are not alone. This social influence extends to political opinions, where evidence shows that it
shapes which views are expressed strongly in society. Noelle-Neumann’s (1974) theory describes
a self-reinforcing process—a “spiral of silence"—whereby people’s beliefs, true or false, that their
preferences are unpopular cause them to be less willing to express them. As the spiral continues,
minority positions are stifled. Mutz (1992, 1997, 1998) demonstrates that perceptions related to
social groups—including perceptions of others’ opinions and economic well-being—can shape
people’s policy preferences and their behavior. In a meta-analysis, Glynn, Hayes and Shanahan
(1997) find modest support for Noelle-Neumann’s theory in empirical data—perceiving that one’s
positions are more popular has a consistent but modest positive effect on attitude intensity and
willingness to express opinions.
In political science, research on social influence and opinion has often focused on “bandwagon"
effects, although competing “underdog" effects are often identified as well (e.g. Ansolabehere
and Iyengar 1994; Bartels 1985; Ceci and Kain 1982; Nadeau, Cloutier and Guay 1993; Simon
1954). However, the presence of bandwagon effects necessitates that people accurately perceive
the distribution of opinion—and in some theories its first derivative with respect to time. In
high-salience cases like presidential races, poll results are prominent enough that people can be
aware of the state of opinion. But can people make sense of their peers’ opinions on the policy
issues that make up much of the political fighting between elections?
It is important to take seriously the possibility that the public could have inaccurate and
biased views of public opinion. In the past, researchers have found that the public sometimes
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overestimates the conservatism of the electorate. Fields and Schuman (1976) identify two
competing trends in Metro Detroiters’ opinions — the “looking-glass perception," a general trend
in which people believe that others’ opinions are similar to their own, but also a conservative
bias, as people believe that others are more racially conservative than they actually are. Glynn
(1989) finds that respondents viewed their neighbors as being more conservative than themselves
but perceived residents of their city as more liberal than themselves.
In Chapter 3, David Broockman and I find that candidates for state legislative offices have
very inaccurate perceptions of public opinion in their districts and are usually biased, with
candidates believing that support for conservative positions is higher than it actually is. These
misperceptions are asymmetric; candidates do not uniformly overestimate support for their own
positions. Conservative candidates tend to overestimate support for conservative positions by 15-20
percentage points, but liberal candidates also believe their constituents are more conservative
than they actually are, erring in that direction by about five percentage points on average. The
causes of this bias are unclear and likely multifaceted, but it may stem from conservatives
simply being “louder" in support of their positions. For example, evidence from the Cooperative
Congressional Election Study suggests that Republicans are more likely than Democrats to
contact their representatives (Broockman and Skovron 2014). Other ideological asymmetries in
contemporary politics may exacerbate this bias. For example, liberals in the electorate may be less
visible because they do not ideologically self-identify as much as conservatives do, despite the fact
that liberal preferences about the size of government are widely popular and consistently outpoll
conservative positions (Ellis and Stimson 2012b).
There are several reasons to expect that candidates and other political elites would have
more accurate perceptions of public opinion than the public. First, re-election-focused politicians
have strong incentives to pay attention to their constituents’ preferences (Downs 1957; Mayhew
1974; Stimson 1995). Second, elites have much more access to polls than the public does (Geer
1996; Herbst 1993). Third, generally low levels of political sophistication and knowledge in the
electorate (Converse 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996) suggest that most citizens do not spend
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much time developing a rich picture of their political world. These conditions suggest that public
misperceptions of public opinion are likely to be widespread and consequential for public opinion
and political behavior.
Competing expectations for the development of misperceptions and their role in political behavior
At the elite level, I presented evidence that suggests that asymmetries in the political information
environment may lead to the pattern of asymmetric misperceptions that state legislative candidates
and county party leaders exhibit in their perceptions of public opinion. Much like for political
elites, different assumptions about the interaction of information and could lead to different
expectations for the pattern of their perceptions. Although ordinary citizens don’t observe
the results of grassroots campaigns to contact politicians’ offices, other aspects of grassroots
mobilization could generate media coverage or other forms of public attention. Asymmetries in
activism thus might filter down to ordinary citizens, even if the ultimate target is to influence
elected officials. However, many citizens are inattentive to politics because the need not know
detailed information about politics to fulfill the tasks required of them as citizens (Lupia 2015).
Citizens’ perceptions of public opinion reflect a different informational context than those of elites,
but they still tell us important information about the political information environment.
How would the public behave if its perceptions were similar to the asymmetric ones exhibited
by elites? Although empirical evidence on the spiral of silence is mixed, the theoretical implications
for a pattern of asymmetric misperceptions are clear: Noelle-Neumann’s theory would predict
that an asymmetric pattern of misperceptions would lead to a shift in attitudes and participation
in favor of the side that overestimates support for its position, with those who underestimate
support for their position becoming less willing to express their position. Such a pattern could
lead to asymmetric polarization among the public. Despite these opportunities for asymmetric
misperceptions to arise, many psychological theories would predict that citizens would exhibit
false consensus bias, leading them to overestimate support for their own positions (Fields and
Schuman 1976; Krosnick 1990; Maner et al. 2005; Mullen et al. 1992; Ross, Greene and House
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1977; Sherwood 1981). Wishful thinking bias, in which citizens perceive agreement between
themselves and other citizens and If this kind of motivated psychological processing takes over,
we might expect the symmetric errors pattern of misperceptions to arise. While both patterns
of misperceptions would be consequential for citizens’ participations, the differences between a
symmetric and asymmetric pattern are quite consequential.
In the next section, I show that, on average, ordinary citizens are not very different from
candidates and legislators in their perceptions of public opinion. Despite having less information
and paying less attention to politics than their elected officials do, they, too, misperceive public
opinion and believe that the public is more conservative than it actually is on some of the most
important issues in contemporary American politics. Across several prominent issues, I find that
Americans broadly do not know where their fellow citizens stand. The biases in their perceptions
go beyond simple motivated reasoning, suggesting a pervasive pro-conservative bias in people’s
perceptions, but one that is of secondary importance to the sheer magnitude of the error in their
perceptions.
WHAT PEOPLE BELIEVE ABOUT PUBLIC OPINION
What do Americans believe about public opinion? To begin to answer this question, I conducted a
survey asking people’s perceptions of public support for high-profile issues in American politics.
The data for this section come from a representative, non-probability sample of the American adult
public recruited by Survey Sampling International (SSI) in January 2014, n = 1240.1
I asked respondents, “What percent of people living in your state would you say agree with the
following statement?" and presented several statements about policy positions that were taken from
the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). As in previous studies, the wording
of the items matched the CCES wording exactly:
• Laws covering the sale of firearms should be made less strict than they are.
1In the analyses that follow, I use weights to match the sample to Census benchmarks.
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• Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3
years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes.
• Same-sex couples should be allowed to marry.
• Let employers and insurers refuse to cover birth control and other health services that violate
their religious beliefs.
• By law, abortion should never be permitted.
These issues were chosen to represent a variety of conflicts in American politics, as well as
to vary in whether the status quo is liberal or conservative and how popular the issue is. First, I
compare respondents’ guesses about public opinion in their states to estimates of the true values as
estimated by multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP)(Park, Gelman and Bafumi 2004;
Lax and Phillips 2009a). I present each issue as a chart, with the raw data plotted. The x-axis
of each figure is the statewide estimated support for each policy position from the 2012 CCES. I
use MRP to estimate state-level support, although the CCES’ large sample size means that MRP
approaches simple disaggregation in this case. Each y-axis represents the respondents’ estimates of
state-level support for the policies. Thus, each point in the figure compares a respondent’s estimate
of public support for the policy to the true support in his/her state. The black lines represent perfect
accuracy (a line with an intercept of zero and a slope of one), while the blue line is a loess fit to
the data. I visualize the data in order to show the dispersion in the data, and to avoid the problems
identified by Achen (1977, 1978) that arise from using summary statistics such as correlation
coefficients to describe relationships that might have biased intercepts.
In the caption to each figure, I report the correlation between respondents’ guesses and the
MRP estimate, as well as the mean absolute error that respondents made on that issue. Note that
the axes are scaled very differently, within as well as across charts. This reflects the much wider
variation in respondents’ estimates of public opinion versus the range of true state opinions.
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Figure 6.1: Public perceptions of state-level support for same-sex marriage.
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Support for same−sex marriage 
 Perceptions versus Reality
Statement: “Same-sex couples should be allowed to marry. " Mean absolute error: 39.80
percentage points. Correlation: 0.38.
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Figure 6.2: Public perceptions of state-level support for amnesty for illegal aliens.
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Support for legalizing immigrants 
 Perceptions versus Reality
Statement: “Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not
been convicted of any felony crimes." Mean absolute error: 39.69 percentage points. Correlation: 0.21
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Figure 6.3: Public perceptions of state-level support for relaxing gun control laws.
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Support for weakening gun control 
 Perceptions versus Reality
Statement: “Laws covering the sale of firearms should be made less strict than they are." Mean absolute error: 42.05
percentage points. Correlation: 0.13.
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Figure 6.4: Public perceptions of state-level support for allowing religious exemptions in health
care.
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Support for religious exemptions 
 Perceptions versus Reality
Statement: “Let employers and insurers refuse to cover birth control and other health services that violate their religious
beliefs." Mean absolute error: 35.15 percentage points. Correlation: 0.13.
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Figure 6.5: Public perceptions of state-level support for banning abortion in all circumstances.
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Support for banning abortion 
 Perceptions versus Reality
Statement: “By law, abortion should never be permitted." Mean absolute error: 40.41 percentage points. Correlation:
0.28.
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A few trends are immediately evident. The y-axes have a much wider range than the x-axes,
meaning that there was much more variance in the public’s estimates than cross-state variation
in true opinion. A few respondents guess that 0% or 100% of their state support a policy, raising
questions about whether all of them took the task seriously. However, the vast majority of the
responses are in a range that suggests they are sincere guesses.2 This dispersion is the result of
most respondents being very inaccurate–on each issue, the mean absolute error is around 30-40
percentage points.
Despite these serious misperceptions, respondents are not randomly guessing. On all of the
issues, the correlations between guesses and state opinion are positive and often strong. These
relationships suggest that people are modestly aware of their states’ preferences. To be sure, most of
the guesses are quite inaccurate, but the positive correlations suggest that true opinion is influencing
people’s perceptions to some degree.
Third, the public’s average responses on most of the issues are biased in a conservative
direction, similar to Broockman and Skovron’s (2014) findings with state legislative candidates.
On a religious exemption for birth control, the public is fairly accurate on average, but this masks
the wide dispersion in the data. On same-sex marriage, gun control, immigration, and banning
abortion, the public tends to overestimate support for the conservative issue position, despite the
fact that these issues vary widely in how much support the conservative position commands. Again,
there is wide variance in the guesses on these issues, but the central tendency is to overestimate
support for the conservative position. This is despite the fact that these issues had very different
levels of overall support.
To investigate these patterns of misperceptions more, I divide the sample by party and by
ideology. To construct estimates of ideology without using self-reports, I fit an item-response
model to the issue questions that were asked in the survey and divide the respondents into liberal
and conservative based on which side of the midpoint they fall. More detail on this procedure is
in the Appendix. Broockman and Skovron (2014) find an ideology asymmetry with their sample
2The survey contained two attention checks, and respondents who failed them were removed.
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of candidates for state legislature, as conservatives having strong “looking-glass" perceptions but
liberals do not similarly overstate support for their own positions. In this case, though, ideology
does not moderate people’s perceptions. On all of the issues, there is no statistically significant
difference in the perceptions of liberals and conservatives. To illustrate, I present figures for the
marriage and immigration items, although the other items have very similar results.
Figure 6.6: Public perceptions of state-level support for same-sex marriage by ideology.
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 Perceptions versus Reality
Respondents classified as conservative or liberal by which side of the
Similarly, party does not seem to moderate people’s perceptions. On all five issues, dividing
the sample into Democrats, Republicans, and pure Independents shows no major differences in
average perceptions, as shown in Fig. 6.8 and Fig. 6.9. The blue line represents Democrats, the red
line Republicans, and the green line pure independents.
Across these issues, respondents were quite inaccurate in their estimates of opinion in their
states. However, the modest correlations between their estimates and true opinion suggest that
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Figure 6.7: Public perceptions of state-level support for amnesty for undocumented immigrants by
ideology.
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 Perceptions versus Reality
people are, on average, at least dimly aware of the political leanings of their state. Much like elites,
a majority of people also overstated support for conservative issue positions. However, unlike
elites, these perceptions were not significantly moderated by party or ideology. While we might
expect liberals, subject to motivated reasoning, to overstate support for their positions, this does
not seem to be the case. Instead, liberals join conservatives in believing that conservative positions
are more popular than they actually are.
CAN CORRECTING FALSE BELIEFS INFLUENCE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR?
We have seen that the public has inaccurate beliefs about public opinion. However, one might
object that these misperceptions are not particularly consequential. Unlike legislators, the average
member of the public might not have much reason to pay attention to public opinion, so their
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Figure 6.8: Public perceptions of state-level support for same-sex marriage by party.
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 Perceptions versus Reality
perceptions might not be important.
To test this issue, this section of the paper seeks to identify whether correcting false beliefs
about public opinion can strengthen or weaken people’s attitudes and/or change their behavior. On
one hand, research in psychology and behavioral economics consistently finds that social proof is
persuasive for changing behaviors and opinions. However, the results from the first section suggest
that, if people do respond to public opinion as a source of social pressure, they respond to an
inaccurate view of what their peers believe. Thus, an easy test for the influence of social perceptions
on public opinion is to expose people to corrective information.
For corrections to have a meaningful effect on people’s opinions and behavior, subjects must
not reject the corrections. However, in politicized contexts, people are likely to reject corrective
152
Figure 6.9: Public perceptions of state-level support for amnesty for undocumented immigrants by
party.
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information that counters their original beliefs, and such corrections often backfire (Nyhan and
Reifler 2010). Thus, we might have competing expectations about the efficacy of correcting
misperceptions of public opinion. Thus, I expect that only people who are told that their positions
are more popular than the initially believed will respond to the treatment by increasing in attitude
strength and willingness to express their positions. I expect respondents who are told that their
positions are not as popular as they initially believed will not react to the correction.
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Study One
This study uses a simple numerical correction, presenting respondents with accurate opinion data
from their state.
In a similar study, Rothschild and Malhotra (2014) expose respondents to false poll results
on three issues: reducing US troop levels in Afghanistan, more free trade agreements with North,
Central, and South America, and public financing of elections. They test one outcome variable,
support for the issue. The treatment consists solely of a false poll result, randomly drawn between
20 and 80%, for the national support for the issue. They conclude that polls can be “self-fulfilling
prophecies," causing people to shift their opinions to reflect what they are told is majority opinion.
This study differs in three important ways. First, the corrections are more naturalistic—I
use the same actual state opinion estimates that I used in the observational study above. This
design complicates the randomization of the experiment, but it does not require deception or
provide respondents with implausible information. Second, I take into account respondents’ prior
perceptions in my analysis, having asked them to estimate support for each issue pre-treatment.
Third, I expand the analysis to additional outcome variables.
The data for this study come from Amazon Mechanical Turk.(n = 634, 387 men, 530 whites,
278 Democrats, 110 Republicans). Respondents were randomly assigned to one of three issues
– same-sex marriage, amnesty for undocumented immigrants, or gun control. Among other
questions, I asked them to estimate the percent of people in their state who supported each of
the three issues. Those in the treatment group were then exposed to a block of large text that gave
the estimated support in their state, attributed to an academic survey. The control group proceeded
directly to the outcome variables.
I tested three outcome variables. The first was a five-point Likert scale on the issue the
respondent was assigned to. The second outcome, inspired by Noelle-Neumann’s (1974) “train
problem," asked the respondent to imagine him or herself in a conversation with a neighbor or
coworker in which the other person expressed an opinion about the issue that the respondent
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disagreed with. The question asked them to imagine whether or not they would argue in favor of
their opinion. A third, more behavioral outcome measure, asked respondents whether they would
like to receive information at the end of the survey about contacting their member of Congress to
express their views. Only 7.3% of the sample took advantage of this opportunity.
As expected, there was no main effect of the treatment, as different respondents were being
exposed to corrections that indicated that their positions were more or less popular, and the
variation in the corrective information should cancel itself out. However, even when we analyze
subsamples of people who were corrected in a positive direction (that their position is more popular
than they believed) or a negative direction (that their position is less popular than they believed),
there is no discernible effect of receiving the corrective information. Table 6.1 displays the results
of difference of means tests for these groups. The control groups in the second two rows consist
of respondents who would have received positive or negative corrections if they had been assigned
to treatment. Overall, there is no evidence that the corrections influenced attitude strength. Results
for the behavioral outcomes are similarly null.
Table 6.1: Treatment effects for five-point attitude strength items. All variables scaled from zero to
one.
95% confidence interval of difference in means
Entire sample (-.02, .10)
Positive correction (-.03, .15)
Negative correction (-.06, .10)
Beyond simply the direction, does the magnitude of the correction matter? Social proof theory
would predict that people who incorrectly believed their positions were unpopular would be
reassured by information that their position is actually popular. Table 6.2 presents results that take
into account the fact that different respondents were exposed to corrections of different magnitudes
and in different directions. I fit regression models to the data to account for the fact that the
treatment varied across respondents because the magnitude and the direction of the correction
varied based on the respondent’s initial estimate of support for the issue. The key variable is
the interaction of the treatment (correction) and the magnitude of the difference between the
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respondent’s estimate and true public opinion, which has been rescaled so that higher values reflect
corrections that tell respondents that their own position is more popular than they believed. In
general, the results suggest that the corrections did very little to influence people’s opinions or
behavior.
None of the treatment effects are statistically significant in the models predicting the behavioral
outcomes. In the opinion regression, the effect of a correction that tells people there positions
are more popular actually made them agree less with the position, contrary to what the theory
predicts. Moreover, this effect is present even when not interacted with the treatment. However,
control respondents did not see the correction, which suggests that it is likely that people’s original
estimates of public opinion were sticky, and that people who received a strong positive correction
for their position are actually just reacting to their initial misperception that their position was
unpopular and thus are less strongly supportive.
Figure 6.10 plots the effect of the magnitude of the correction on opinion. The left hand panel
is a placebo test, plotting the marginal effect of the correction those respondents would have seen
if they were treated. The right hand side is the actual effect of the magnitude in the treatment
group. This evidence is suggestive that the treatment was not strong enough to correct people’s
misperceptions. While the intercept shift in the treatment group provides modest evidence that
receiving good news about the popularity of one’s position boosted people’s attitude strength, the
negative slope is highly suggestive that people’s attitude strength remained more influenced by
their prior perceptions of public opinion than by the correction.
In this study, correcting people’s misperceptions about public opinion in their states did not
seem to affect their opinions or willingness to act politically.
Study Two
Why might people not have responded to the corrective information of Study One? While design
issues may have prevented people from internalizing the information about opinion in their states,
it is possible that the conditions for social influence to affect their opinions may not have been met.
156
Table 6.2: Results from corrections experiment.
Attitude strength Write to Congress Debate
(Intercept) 0.538∗ −2.351∗ 0.859∗
(0.044) (0.440) (0.254)
Perception 0.001 −0.007 −0.002
(0.001) (0.008) (0.005)
Treated 0.037 0.125 0.155
(0.031) (0.325) (0.179)
Magnitude of correction −0.002∗ 0.005 −0.003
(0.001) (0.010) (0.005)
Treated*correction magnitude 0.001 0.003 −0.001
(0.001) (0.013) (0.007)
N 624 623 599
R2 0.021
adj. R2 0.015
Resid. sd 0.380
AIC 330.345 744.229
BIC 419.036 832.135
logL −145.173 −352.115
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
The first column reports results for an OLS model of the five-point Likert item. The second column is a logit model
for desire to receive information on writing to Congress, and the third column is a logit model predicting willingness
to defend one’s opinions to a friend or coworker.
To test for that possibility, I conducted a similar study, again on Mechanical Turk (n = 387).
Study Two investigates the effect of information about public opinion within one’s own party.
The design of this study is very similar to Study One. However, the target group of the corrections
has been changed to be the respondent’s own party, or to other independents for independents.
People may not feel socially attached to the entire electorate, but partisanship does function as a
social attachment (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1960; Green, Palmquist and Schickler
2002) that might be more persuasive in a politicized context. Being an independent may function
more as a rejection of a social identity, but I hypothesize that independents may be subject to the
same kinds of social influence as partisans. As in Study One, respondents in the treatment group
were exposed to a large block of text that contained a result from a recent national poll, although
this time the value presented was support for the issue within their party (or independents), not
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Figure 6.10: Effects of the magnitude of corrections on opinion.
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x-axis: Correction measured as respondent’s perception of support for own position - true support for own position.
within the state. The issues in this experiment, as well as support for each one in each partisan
group, are reported in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3: Issues and support levels in Study Two.
Issue Democrat support Republican support Independent support Source
Fracking 26% 66% 35% Gallup
Path to citizenship 87% 69% 75% CBS
Marijuana legalization 60% 34% 55% CBS
Thus, respondents assigned to the immigration condition would see generally high levels of
support, while those in the other two conditions would see low or moderately high levels depending
on the issue. As in Study One, the design should not find a main effect of being assigned to
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treatment, as different respondents are exposed to different values of support in their party. Thus,
I divide the sample into those who would have seen that a majority of their party supports the
issue and those who would have seen that a majority of their party opposes the issue. (Even control
respondents were assigned to an issue, so they have a hypothetical value for the treatment.) Table
6.4 shows that there is no treatment effect in the entire sample. Those who saw that a majority
of their party supported the issue were slightly more favorable toward it than similar people
in the control condition, though not statistically significantly (p = 0.42). However, those who
were exposed to information that their party opposed an issue were less supportive of the policy
than respondents in the control who would have seen similar information. This group includes
Democrats and independents in the tracking condition and Republicans in the marijuana condition.
Table 6.4: Treatment effects for five-point attitude strength items. All variables scaled from zero to
one.
95% confidence interval of difference in means
Entire sample (-.07, .07)
Majority of party supports (-.07, .17)
Majority of party opposes (-.03, -.25)
The behavioral outcomes (willingness to engage in debate and desire to contact legislators)
did not have any statistically significant treatment effects. This study thus provides some evidence
that people respond to seeing that their party opposes issues by becoming more strongly opposed
themselves, although further evidence is certainly needed to establish the relationship more
strongly.
DISCUSSION
Members of the public have very inaccurate beliefs about public opinion in their states, and
evidence suggests that, on average, they are prone to the same conservative biases that color elites’
misperceptions of public opinion. However, a preliminary attempt to correct those beliefs with
real public opinion data seemed not to move people’s opinions or willingness to act. At this point,
I do not have sufficient evidence to disentangle whether respondents ignored the correction or
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whether their perceptions of public opinion play no role in their decision making to begin with.
Evidence from the observational study, though, suggests that most people have very inaccurate
perceptions of public opinion on the central issues of American politics, and that these perceptions
have similar biases to those of elites. Moreover, just as in the case of elites, liberals and Democrats
do not overestimate support for their own positions. Among the public, party and ideology do not
moderate perceptions in the way that they do for elites.
The experimental results provided mixed findings on whether these misperceptions can be
corrected and, more broadly, of the potential impacts of people’s beliefs about public opinion
on their attitudes and behavior. Correcting people’s misperceptions with information about the
true value of opinion in their states seemed to have little influence. However, people did seem to
respond to information that members of their party opposed policies by becoming more opposed
themselves. Perhaps unsurprisingly, average Americans are not well aware of the distribution of
opinion among their fellow citizens, but the possibility that their perceptions could influence their
beliefs makes these severe misperceptions potentially consequential.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this dissertation, I returned to the question of what politicians believe about public opinion,
a crucial element of representation. I found evidence of asymmetries in how state legislative
candidates and county party leaders perceive their constituents. These perceptual asymmetries
suggest that state-level American politicians believe they are representing a fundamentally different
group of constituents than they actually are, and the misperceptions have potential consequences
for representation in American politics. However, the central empirical finding of the dissertation
represents a significant and unresolved puzzle. What explains why contemporary state legislative
candidates and county party leaders have asymmetric misperceptions of their constituents’
preferences on so many issues? In short, the dissertation lacks a causal explanation for politicians’
misperceptions. The studies in this dissertation do not point to a single “smoking gun" explanation
for the observed patterns of misperceptions, but pieces of the evidence I have collected in the NCS
and NSPL provide initial insight into how state-level politicians relate to their districts and how
informational and perceptual biases influence their perceptions of public opinion. To conclude the
dissertation, this chapter highlights some of those findings and looks ahead to future directions in
my research agenda.
RULING OUT POSSIBLE CAUSES OF ASYMMETRIC MISPERCEPTIONS
The empirical analysis in Chapter 4 of the dissertation focuses on the mechanisms behind the
finding that that David Broockman and I uncovered in Chapter 3 – why do state-level American
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politicians have asymmetric misperceptions of their constituents’ preferences? In Chapter 4 and
Chapter 5, I used results from the elite surveys to investigate possible mechanisms behind
state-level politicians’ asymmetric misperceptions of public opinion, and I expanded my analysis
to include local party leaders’ perceptions. The evidence from our surveys points away from some
possible explanations of asymmetric misperceptions. This section reviews some possible causes of
misperceptions of public opinion that I or others have hypothesized may cause the observed pattern
of asymmetric misperceptions, but which lack compelling supporting evidence.
One set of possible explanations relates to various kinds of differential responsiveness. A
large body of empirical evidence suggests that politicians do not treat all constituents equally
in constituent service and that the views of different groups correlate with policy outcomes with
different strength. It is less clear, however, that this evidence implies that politicians’ perceptions
of public opinion would be shaped by these groups. My survey items ask candidates to estimate
public opinion among all people living in the district. Of course, candidates might unconsciously be
influence by the constituents about whom they think most often (Tversky and Kahneman 1973b),
so it is useful to consider whether candidates are more accurate in perceiving potentially politically
powerful groups than they are in perceiving the district as a whole. In Table 7.1, I analyze support
for items I study from the 2014 CCES among the general public, among voters the CCES records
as being validated as having voted in the 2014 general election, among respondents reporting a
family income above $120,000, and among whites only. The latter three groups are all ones that
might be hypothesized to have disproportionate influence on policymaking.
Politicians are not only responding to the wealthy or the donor class.
Several prominent studies have pointed to differential responsiveness to income groups as a
key representational inequality in contemporary American politics. By this telling, American
politicians only respond to the preferences of wealthy Americans, whose campaign donations and
other sources of privilege keep them in
In Table 7.1, I break down support for the items in the Chapter 3 study from the 2014 CCES
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Table 7.1: Support for issue items in 2014 CCES among subsets of voters.
Issue National
weighted
support
Support
among
validated
voters
Support
among over
$120,000
Support
among whites
“Allow gays and lesbians
to marry legally.”
56% 54% 67% 59%
“Let employers and
insurers refuse to cover
birth control and other
health services that violate
their religious beliefs.”
43% 47% 41% 42%
“Require background
checks for all gun sales,
including at gun shows
and over the Internet.”
87% 86% 87% 87%
“Ban assault rifles.” 61% 60% 64% 62%
“Allow police to question
anyone they think may be
in the country illegally.”
37% 41% 34% 40%
“Grant legal status to all
illegal immigrants who
have held jobs and paid
taxes for at least 3 years,
and not been convicted of
any felony crimes.”
47% 46% 52% 44%
“Always allow a woman
to obtain an abortion as a
matter of choice.”
57% 54% 65% 58%
by income group. The CCES income measure is very fine-grained, so I collapse respondents who
reported a family income of over $120,000 into one group of “high-income" citizens, representing
about ten percent of the raw sample of the CCES. Simply put, not all of the issues in my study
are ones on which income predicts opinions particularly well. As Branham, Soroka and Wlezien
(2017) point out, a relatively small number of national policy controversies are ones on which
high-income, middle-income, and low-income citizens disagree strongly. The issues on which
Broockman and I queried politicians’ perceptions fall into this group — they are not issues about
which high-income people consistently disagree with the rest of the public, and they are certainly
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not ones on which high-income people are systematically more likely to take the conservative
position.
There are additional ways to implement an analysis of this sort, and the measurement of who
counts as “wealthy" or “affluent" is an active area of debate in the literature. However, the evidence
suggests that differential responsiveness to citizens of different income levels is not a primary
driver of the asymmetric misperceptions I find in my study. In future work, it would be useful to
query politician’s perceptions of public opinion on issues that are more divisive among people of
different income groups.
Are politicians only responding to their white constituents?
My dissertation mostly did not engage with the role of race and ethnicity in representation,
but future work should address the extent to which politicians’ perceptions of public opinion in
their districts are biased toward the opinions of citizens from traditionally privileged racial/ethnic
groups. Evidence suggests that state legislative offices in the aggregate are biased against Black and
Latino constituents in the provision of constituent services (Butler and Broockman 2011) but that
Black legislators are more responsive to Black constituents (Broockman 2013). As in the case of
income, though, race is not a consistently strong predictor of attitudes on these items. The opinions
of whites across these issues is usually quite similar to that of the public overall. Moreover, the
plots in our MRP analyses show that the pattern of asymmetric misperceptions holds across the
ideological spectrum, from very conservative districts that are likely to be heavily white, to more
ideologically heterogenous and liberal districts.
Politicians are not only responding to voters.
Another possible explanation for misperceptions of public opinion might be that politicians
respond only to likely voters, and even though my survey items ask them to estimate opinion
among all citizens, they are estimating public opinion with a bias toward likely voters’ opinions.
Theories of representation often focus on the role of electoral sanction in pushing politicians to
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be responsive to public opinion. A strategic politician may think more about constituents who he
perceives as likely to vote, making them more accessible when he or she thinks about the district
as a whole.
To account for this possibility, Broockman and I built in an analysis of responsiveness to
voters only into our study in Chapter 3. We re-estimated public opinion using opinions from only
respondents that the 2014 CCES verifies as having voted in the general election, then re-estimated
the accuracy of politicians’ misperceptions of public opinion using this alternate measure of “true"
public opinion. As shown in Table 7.1, our results for state legislative candidates’ misperceptions
of public opinion hold for each issue even if we estimate public opinion using responses form only
validated voters in the CCES. On these issues, the CCES does not suggest that the opinions of
voters and nonvoters diverged significantly enough in 2014 to explain the broad misperceptions
that we found.
While actual differences in opinion between voters and nonvoters are not large enough to
explain our findings, further work should consider the extent to which perceived differences
between voters and non-voters drive politicians’ responsiveness to public opinion. I designed the
conjoint experiment in Chapter 4 in part to address this issue. The results suggest that politicians
believe that conservative or Republican citizens are more likely to vote, and this perception
might weigh into their evaluation of public opinion in the geographic constituency by bringing
conservative citizens to the top of their mind. Future work should investigate in more detail to
whom politicians believe they must be responsive and the role of the availability heuristic in
candidates’ perceptions of their districts.
The results are not confined only to successful or high-quality candidates.
The findings of asymmetric misperceptions are not just an artifact of the survey responses coming
from many unserious or low-quality candidates. In Figure 3.8, Broockman and I estimated a
regression including a number of predictors of error in perceptions of public opinion, including
state legislative professionalism and incumbency. As we might predict, incumbents, candidates
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running in states with more professionalized legislatures, and candidates running in more
competitive districts are more accurate in their perceptions. These marginal effects are small but
statistically significant; I estimate that an incumbent is between 1 and 2 percentage points more
accurate than a nonincumbent. These results suggest that higher-quality candidates make smaller
errors, but the pattern of asymmetric misperceptions does not disappear in professionalized states
or competitive legislatures (see Table 4.7).
Are elites committed to democratic principles?
Another possible explanation for asymmetric misperceptions that is not tested elsewhere in the
dissertation is that the asymmetries arise not from politicians’ information environments, but
from asymmetries in their commitment to democratic principles and/or to the trustee model of
representation. If Democrats believe more strongly that their role as representatives is to faithfully
translate public opinion into policy than Republicans do, they might pay closer attention to public
opinion and perceive it more accurately.
Asymmetries in commitment to democratic principles have been observed among the mass
public and political elites in the past (McClosky and Zaller 1984), with conservatives more willing
to endorse what might be considered violations of democratic norms, especially related to free
speech. Recently, scholars and observers have raised concerns about the potential for Donald
Trump’s presidency to erode democratic norms and institutions. The possibility that belief in
democratic norms has recently been a subject of considerable debate, particularly because of a
prominent analysis of World Values Survey data that suggested that young people globally are
less committed to democratic principles than past generations (Foa and Mounk 2016). However,
additional analyses of these data questioned Foa and Mounk’s (2016) interpretation (Inglehart
2016).1Nevertheless, recent global events have highlighted the issue of whether democratic norms
such as responsiveness to public opinion are important to political elites.
1See a discussion by Erik Voeten in THE MONKEY CAGE at https://www.washingtonpost.com/new
s/monkey-cage/wp/2016/12/05/that-viral-graph-about-millennials-declining-sup
port-for-democracy-its-very-misleading/?utm_term=.071625e0c57d
166
Several items on the 2012 NCS and the NSPL are helpful for a preliminary examination of
elites’ commitment to certain democratic norms. These items were designed by Nick Carnes as
part of an investigation of cynicism among political elites. Carnes (2016) finds that elites with more
experience holding office tend to be less cynical than those with less experience. However, Carnes
does not find significant partisan differences in endorsement of the cynicism items, suggesting that
differential cynicism among elites does not explain asymmetric misperceptions. In short, it doesn’t
seem to be the case that Republicans “think they can get away with it" while Democrats fear voters
will hold them accountable if they take extremist positions. These items were designed to focus
on cynicism, so they are not a perfect fit for studying the broader issue of politicians’s attitudes
toward democratic norms and their representational roles. However, they do give some insight
into how politicians perceive some of the mechanisms on which democratic governance relies. In
future studies, I plan to more carefully examine candidates’ view of their role as representatives,
including more detailed measurement of their attitudes about whether they view themselves as
trustees or delegates.
CONNECTING ELITES’ AND THE PUBLIC’S MISPERCEPTIONS OF PUBLIC
OPINION
While most of the studies in the dissertation focused on political elites, I also considered ordinary
citizens’ perceptions of public opinion in Chapter 6. In future work, I plan to expand my analysis
of perceptions of public opinion among the general public. Ordinary citizens’ perceptions of public
opinion are an indicator of how the broader political information environment shapes the perceived
prevalence of particular political attitudes, but they arise under a different set of informational
conditions. Members of the public have far fewer incentives than politicians to become informed
about public opinion, and they have access to perceptions of public opinion.
However, understanding both groups perceptions help us to develop a fuller picture of the
ways in which various sources of political information can shape perceptions of public opinion.
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Future work should also consider the extent to which elites’ and the public’s misperceptions of
public opinion may feed back on each other. If liberal citizens feel outnumbered and depress their
participation as predicted by the spiral of silence, elites may perceive them as being less numerous
than they actually are, exacerbating biases in representation. Connecting how misperceptions
among these two groups could exacerbate perceptual biases should be a direction for future work.
AN AGENDA FOR FUTURE WORK ON PERCEPTIONS OF PUBLIC OPINION
This dissertation used original data sources to reintroduce the study of politicians’ perceptions of
public opinion to the research agenda in political science. These findings raise additional questions
about how politicians form their perceptions of public opinion and how these perceptions influence
politicians’ decisions. Future work should address these questions, using surveys and/or other
methods. In this section, I review some of the limitations of this dissertation and outline directions
for future research.
Limitations of this dissertation
My dissertation advances the study of politicians’ perceptions of public opinion, but, like any study,
it has important limitations that I hasten to note. In this section, I review some of these limitations
and argue that, as a mostly descriptive project, this dissertation should be taken as a jumping-off
point for future studies of perceptions of public opinion in American politics.
General limitations of survey studies. As mentioned in Chapter 2, my reliance on surveys comes
at some cost. While our surveys achieve a response rate that is considerably higher than many
surveys of the general public, my findings rely on responses from only 18-20% of the eligible
populations of candidates and of party leaders. In an effort to analyze the representativeness of my
samples and to evaluate the possible generalizability of my results, I have presented analyses of
representativeness in Chapters 3 and 5 that split the sample on variables likely to be important
moderators of my findings, such as party, ideology, incumbency, and whether candidates won
their elections. When the analyses are conducted on subsets of the data, our general findings hold,
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although the magnitude of some estimates are attenuated. Future work could use more non-survey
measures to alleviate concerns over potential biases arising from the limitations of survey methods.
Survey population limitations and generalizability to other political elites. Our surveys focused
on state legislative candidates and on county party leaders. While both of these groups make
consequential political decisions, they are not representative of the entire population of elected
officials in the United States. As such, this dissertation cannot speak to whether my findings would
generalize to members of Congress or other kinds of political elites. Further work should attempt
to address the extent to which these patterns of misperceptions generalize to other political elites,
but extending the research to members of Congress will require considerable effort to secure the
cooperation of politicians.
The lack of economic issues. The analysis in this dissertation largely does not include economic
issues, particularly those related to taxes and redistribution. The CCES contained more suitable
items on social issues than on economic issues in 2012 and 2014. The relative lack of attention
to economic issues is a major limitation of this dissertation—economic issues are one of the most
important cleavages in American politics. In 2016, my team conducted a new version of the NCS.
This survey included additional items on politicians’ perceptions of public opinion on economic
issues including the minimum wage, tax rates, single-payer healthcare, and trade. My analysis of
candidates’ perceptions on these issues will add important breadth to the studies.
Robustness over time and thermostatic responses
A key limitation of my analysis is that it covers only a short period of time, during which
some important attributes of the political system remained constant. For example, In both the
2012 and 2014 elections (as well as in 2016, from which I have additional data), a Democrat
was president. Thus, I cannot analyze the extent to which thermostatic reactions to a Republican
president might influence perceptions of public opinion. In 2018, I will have the first opportunity to
collect state legislative candidates’ perceptions of public opinion during a Republican presidential
administration. The surveys all took place after the Tea Party movement came to prominence
(Skocpol and Williamson 2011), potentially shifting the patterns of grassroots engagement that
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Broockman and I hypothesize drove some of the asymmetry that we find in 2012 and 2014. It
would be helpful to have good measurements of elites’ perceptions of public opinion from earlier
time periods; unfortunately there are not many suitable studies. I plan to continue to collect data
in the coming years, which will help address the robustness of my findings to changing conditions
over time.
Directions for future work
This dissertation and the associated papers reintroduced the study of politicians’ perceptions
of public opinion to the agenda in political science. It represents the beginning of a research
agenda on how politicians form their perceptions of public opinion and how those perceptions
shape representation. This agenda has potentially broad implications for the conduct of American
politics. Elmendorf and Wood (2017) argue that the accumulation of empirical evidence of
politicians’ misperceptions means that election-law reform efforts should focus on informing elites
as part of their goals of increasing transparency. They also note, though, that the increased quality
and availability of detailed voter files could facilitate more precise gerrymandering, a potential
adverse consequence of increased elite knowledge about voters. Adapting to a new technological
environment, in which big data allows for even more precise estimation of public opinion, will
shape how politicians connect to their constituents.
Further research should continue to consider how politicians form their perceptions of public
opinion and why these perceptions matter for democratic governance. First, the causes and
consequences of asymmetric misperceptions of public opinion among political elites must be
examined in greater depth. Second, as emphasized by Elmendorf and Wood (2017), ways to
leverage new technologies in the measurement and communication of public opinion in order to
inform elites should be considered. Finally, researchers and activists interested in questions related
to representation should pay close attention to the role of perceptions in shaping important political
outcomes. Politicians are people, too, and their biases have potentially serious consequences for
the health of American democracy.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 3, Coauthored with David E. Broockman
FIGURES AND TABLES
Table A.1: Self-reported rates of contacting legislators by party.
Source ANES CCES ANES
Year 1980 1984 1988 1992 2008 2012
% of Democrats
Who Contacted MC 14.9% 13.8% 12.8% 14.6% 26.1% 18.0%
% of Republicans
Who Contacted MC 16.3% 15.3% 12.4% 12.9% 36.3% 23.1%
Republican advantage in
contacting legislators 9.4% 10.9% -3.1% -11.6% 39.0% 28.1%
Table A.2: Politicians’ mean error across all issues, broken down by ideology.
Self-reported ideology Mean misperception across issues
Extremely conservative 28.2
Conservative 24.6
Slightly conservative 20.8
Moderate 18.6
Slightly liberal 16.4
Liberal 16.1
Extremely liberal 17.8
Other 20.4
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Figure A.1: Politicians’ perceptions of district opinion and true district opinion, 2012 Study
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2012 NCS
Issue Items and Support Levels
Table A.3 gives the issue items and support levels.
Table A.3: Issue questions from the 2012 National Candidate Study, with weighted national levels
of support from the CCES.
National
Mean “Yes” Status quo
Issue Item Wording Support direction change? Source
“Same-sex couples should be
allowed to marry.”
53% Liberal Some states 2012 CCES
“Implement a universal
healthcare program to guarantee
coverage to all Americans,
regardless of income.”*
60% Liberal Debatable 2008 CCES
“Abolish all federal welfare 16% Conservative Yes 2010 CCES
programs.” Module
*As described in the text, the wording of this item on the CCES was slightly different than the
perception item we asked politicians, as the CCES item included the phrase “even if it means
raising taxes.”
Sampling Frame
To measure elite perceptions in 2012, we conducted the 2012 National Candidate Study (NCS),
a survey of candidates running for state legislature across the United States. In early August
2012 we gathered data on contact information for every candidate for state legislative office.
Many legislators only had email addresses, many more had only physical street addresses, and the
preponderance of candidates had both. We attempted to gather contact information for all 10,131
state legislative candidates though were unable to gather contact information for 306 (3%). This left
a total of 9,825 in the sampling frame. In mid-August we (citation removed for peer review) sent
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three waves of email solicitations to all 7,444 candidates for whom we had e-mail addresses. After
1,318 responses from this email solicitation, we then attempted to secure cooperation in a mail
version of the survey among a randomly selected1 5,000 candidates who had not yet responded.
These candidates were sent a postcard informing them that the survey would be arriving in the mail,
followed by a paper version of the survey one week later. An additional 589 candidates returned
this paper survey. In section A, we review the representativeness of these respondents.
Sample
1,907 politicians responded to the NCS in total, for a response rate of 19.5%, or about double the
typical response rate for opinion surveys of the mass public.
To ensure that only candidates themselves completed the survey, the online survey contained
a screener question that shut down the survey if the respondent identified himself or herself as
someone other than the candidate.2 The paper version of the survey included large type and a
screener question to encourage only candidates to complete it.
A follow-up online-only survey conducted in mid-November yielded 514 responses among the
1,907 respondents to the first wave of the study.
Perception Items
Among other questions, the surveys queried politicians for their perceptions of the opinions of the
constituents in the districts they were running to represent on three issues: same-sex marriage,
universal health care, and welfare. Specifically, we asked legislators “What percent of your
constituents” would “agree with” three “statements” that had also appeared on large national
public opinion surveys: “Implement a universal healthcare program to guarantee coverage to all
Americans, regardless of income,” “Same-sex couples should be allowed to marry,” and “Abolish
1We conducted blocked sampling on state and incumbency, retaining the probability that each individual candidate
was selected but ensuring greater balance in the resulting sample on these variables.
2Fewer than 2.5% of survey takers identified themselves as non-candidates and were screened out.
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all federal welfare programs.”3
We expected the public’s attitudes on same-sex marriage, universal healthcare, and welfare
programs would provide reasonable cases to study broader principles of representation for several
reasons. Most importantly, these issues were highly salient in both national and state mass politics
in 2012, with both national and state legislators making high-stakes policy decisions on these
issues that affected tens of millions of Americans.4 Moreover, these issues tap into what many see
as the two core ‘dimensions’ of public opinion: degree of economic redistribution and government
involvement in the economy in the case of universal healthcare and welfare programs, and social
conservatism and traditionalism in the case of same-sex marriage. These issues also present a
wealth of available public opinion data. While the debate over same-sex marriage is only about
a decade old, proposals for public healthcare programs and welfare reform have been around for
much longer, suggesting that these issues might not be “hard" for both elites and the public to offer
positions on.
Elsewhere in the survey, we also asked candidates whether they agreed or disagreed with eleven
issue statements, including the statements about same-sex marriage and universal health care noted
above.
3The 2014 NCS asked politicians about “residents of their districts,” but the 2012 survey asked them about
“constituents.’ Political scientists familiar with the work of Fenno (1977) may wonder whether the word “constituent”
is excessively vague – e.g., Fenno (1977) refers to legislators’ “multiple constituencies.” Based on pilot testing with a
number of current and former legislators we found that this word was the word of choice for legislators to refer to the
residents of their legal electoral districts.
4We expect readers are familiar with the significant policy battles being waged on each issue in 2012, but for the
sake of unfamiliar readers and posterity we record the highlights here. First, the fight over universal healthcare and the
generosity of the welfare state have been one of the most enduring battles in American politics over the last century,
recurring at all levels of government since the early 20th century and especially in the last two decades in the form of
high-profile fights during the Clinton and Obama administrations. Recently, the Affordable Care Act and the Supreme
Court’s decision pertaining to the Medicaid expansion associated with it have forced state governments to decide
whether and how to expand their Medicaid rolls. Many of the regulations and subsidies built into the ‘Obamacare’ law
flow through state governments, meaning that Americans’ health care will be significantly impacted by the decisions
made by their state legislators. Health care captures about 15% of US GDP and determine the life changes of millions
of Americans every year – needless to say, we believe the issue qualifies as politically and substantively significant by
any standards. In the case of same-sex marriage, the debate over government recognition of same-sex relationships has
raged for more than a decade, and it has been a cross-cutting cleavage, pitting religion against partisanship in many
cases (Camp 2008; Stone 2012). During the 2000s, many state legislatures voted to initiate statutory or constitutional
bans on same-sex marriage (Lupia, Krupnikov, Levine, Piston and Von Hagen-Jamar 2010). Increasingly, some state
legislatures have passed bills to legalize same-sex marriage. More such bills were on the agenda in 2013.
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Response Rate and Representativeness
Party
The sample is slightly unbalanced on party, with more Democrats than Republicans.
Democrats Republicans p-value
Response rate 20.1% 15.5% 0.00
2012 Obama Vote Share and Professionalization
Figure A.2 plots Obama vote share in the districts with Democratic (top left) and Republican
(top right) respondents against the distribution for all districts. If anything, our Democratic
respondents come from more liberal districts than the population, while the districts from which
we have Republican respondents are representative. The bottom panel shows that the distribution
of legislative professionalization in districts where we have respondents matches the overall
distribution well.
Incumbency
The sample is well-balanced on incumbency.
Incumbents Non-incumbents p-value
Response rate 14.4% 14.8% 0.46
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Figure A.2: Representativeness of politicians who responded to the 2012 NCS, by party,
presidential vote share in the district, and state legislative professionalization.
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2014 NATIONAL CANDIDATE STUDY
Response Rate and Representativeness
In the main text, we report representativeness results for the 2014 NCS broken down by district
presidential vote share, state legislative professionalization, and party. In this section we review
other aspects of the representativeness of our respondents.
Party
The sample is unbalanced on party, with higher response rates among Democrats.
Democrats Republicans p-value
Response rate 24.6% 16.7% 0.00
Incumbency
The sample is slightly unbalanced on incumbency. 14.3% of candidates we identified as already
sitting in a state legislature responded, while 21.5% of candidates we could not identify as sitting
in a state legislature responded. As shown above, our results are robust to only considering
incumbents.
Incumbents Non-incumbents p-value
Response rate 14.3% 21.5% 0.00
Chamber type
There were not major differences in response rates between candidates running for the upper and
lower houses of state legislatures.
Lower chamber Upper chamber p-value
Response rate 19.4% 18.1 % 0.17
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Candidate Survey Questionnaire Item Wording
This section summarizes the wording of National Candidate Study items included in the regression
model of perception accuracy.
Ideology: ‘ One way that people talk about politics in the United States is in terms of left, right, and
center, or liberal, conservative, and moderate. Where would you place yourself on that spectrum?’
Number of polls: ‘During the course of this campaign, how many polls will your campaign run?’
Other variables included in the OLS model were taken from Project Vote Smart’s database.
Comparison of NCS and CCES Issue Item Wordings
Table A.4: Comparison of NCS and CCES Issue Item Wordings
NCS CCES
“Allow gays and lesbians to marry
legally.”
“Do you favor or oppose allowing gays and lesbians
to marry legally?”
“Let employers and insurers refuse to
cover birth control and other health
services that violate their religious
beliefs.”
“Tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation
in principle... Let employers and insurers refuse to
cover birth control and other health services that
violate their religious beliefs.”
“Require background checks for all gun
sales, including at gun shows and over the
Internet.”
“On the issue of gun regulation, are you for or against
each of the following proposals?... Background
checks for all sales, including at gun shows and
over the Internet.”
“Ban assault rifles.” “On the issue of gun regulation, are you for
or against each of the following proposals?...Ban
assault rifles.”
“Allow police to question anyone they
think may be in the country illegally.”
“What do you think the U.S. government should do
about immigration? Select all that apply. ... Allow
police to question anyone they think may be in the
country illegally.”
“Grant legal status to all illegal
immigrants who have held jobs and
paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not
been convicted of any felony crimes.”
“What do you think the U.S. government should do
about immigration? Select all that apply. ... Grant
legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held
jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not
been convicted of any felony crimes.”
“Always allow a woman to obtain an
abortion as a matter of choice.”
“Do you support or oppose each of the following
proposals? ... Always allow a woman to obtain an
abortion as a matter of choice.”
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COMPARISON OF CCES ESTIMATES OF PUBLIC OPINION TO OTHER NATIONAL
SURVEYS
In this section, we compare the national weighted mean support for our CCES items to
contemporary surveys conducted by other firms that had similar topics and/or wording. One
potential concern with the CCES surveys is that the highly engaged nature of the CCES sample
could distort our measures of public opinion. There are more polls for some issues than for others.
However, reassuringly, the CCES national marginals are similar to the national marginals these
other surveys, suggesting no serious representativeness problems with the CCES sample that would
lead us to underestimate conservatism by using the CCES data. The one exception is an item
we originally asked about making abortion illegal in almost all cases, where the CCES estimate
appears very far from other surveys, we believe because of a question wording issue; we describe
this in further detail below. We were also unable to find any data from other polls in the November
2013 - November 2015 range on a question like the second immigration question we asked that
had appeared on the CCES: “Allow police to question anyone they think may be in the country
illegally.”
For each issue, below on the pages that follow we report a table of all of the surveys found
in the database at pollingreport.com from November 2013 to November 2015 whose wording and
subject matter is reasonably similar enough to allow for comparisons to the CCES items. In the
table for each issue area, we also report the poll sources and field dates for these polls along with
the question wording and the percent of the sample that reported being in favor of the policy. (In
some cases, we have collapsed multiple response options into one “favor" category.) We then report
the CCES marginal from the item we used in our analysis. The marginals in these other polls line
up extremely closely to the CCES marginals.
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Background checks for guns
Organization Dates Wording Percent in favor
CBS News/New
York Times
Dec. 4-8, 2013 “Do you favor or oppose a federal
law requiring background checks
on all potential gun buyers?"
85
Gallup Oct. 7-11, 2015. “Would you favor or oppose a
law which would require universal
background checks for all gun
purchases in the U.S. using a
centralized database across all 50
states?"
86
Pew July 14-20, 2015 “Please tell me if you would
favor or oppose the following
proposals about gun policy. First,
[see below]? ... Making private gun
sales and sales at gun shows subject
to background checks"
85
2014 CCES 87
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Assault weapons ban
Organization Dates Wording Percent in favor
Quinnipiac Mar. 26-Apr. 1, 2013 “Do you support or oppose a
nationwide ban on the sale of
assault weapons?"
59
Pew July 14-20, 2015 “Please tell me if you would favor
or oppose the following proposals
about gun policy. First, [see
below]? ...A ban on assault-style
weapons"
57
2014 CCES 61
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Amnesty for undocumented immigrants
On this issue, it appears if anything that the CCES underestimates voter liberalism relative to other
polls, which would bias against our findings.
Organization Dates Wording Percent in favor
ABC News /
Washington Post
Sept. 4-7,
2014
“Do you think undocumented immigrants
currently living in the United States
should or should not be given the right to
live and work here legally?"
46
- Jan. 20-23,
2014
- 49
- Sept 4-7,
2014
- 46
- July 16-19,
2015
- 60
Gallup June
15-July 10,
2015
“Which comes closest to your view about
what government policy should be toward
illegal immigrants currently residing in
the United States? Should the government
deport all illegal immigrants back to their
home country, allow illegal immigrants
to remain in the United States in order
to work, but only for a limited amount
of time, or allow illegal immigrants to
remain in the United States and become
U.S. citizens but only if they meet certain
requirements over a period of time?"
65
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Public Religion
Research
Institute
June 10-14,
2015
“Which statement comes closest to
your view about how the immigration
system should deal with immigrants
who are currently living in the U.S.
illegally? The immigration system
should allow them a way to become
citizens provided they meet certain
requirements, or allow them to
become permanent legal residents but
not citizens, or identify and deport
them?" (citizens and permanent legal
residents)
76
- Feb. 4-8,
2015
- 68
- Nov. 25-30,
2014
- 77
- July 23-27,
2014
- 75
- Nov. 6-10,
2013
- 77
CBS News Jan. 9-12,
2015
“Barack Obama recently issued an
executive order that would allow some
illegal immigrants already in the U.S.
to stay here temporarily and apply for
a work permit if certain requirements
are met. Do you favor or oppose this
immigration policy?"
62
185
ABC
News/Washington
Post
Dec. 11-14,
2014
“Obama has taken an executive
action under which as many as four
million of the country’s undocumented
immigrants will not face deportation
over the next three years if they pass
a background check and meet other
requirements. Most will need to show
that they have been in the United
States for at least five years and have
children who were born here. Do you
support or oppose this immigration
program?"
52
NBC News/Wall
Street Journal
Poll
Nov. 14-17,
2014
“Now, as you may know, there
is a proposal to create a pathway
to citizenship that would allow
foreigners staying illegally in the
United States the opportunity to
eventually become legal American
citizens. Do you strongly favor,
somewhat favor, somewhat oppose,
or strongly oppose this proposal?"
(Strongly and somewhat favor)
57
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- - “And, thinking some more about this:
If a proposed pathway to citizenship
allowed foreigners staying illegally
in the United States the opportunity
to eventually become legal American
citizens if they pay a fine, any back
taxes, pass a security background
check, and take other required steps,
would you strongly favor, somewhat
favor, somewhat oppose, or strongly
oppose this proposal?"
72
CNN/ORC Jan.
31-Feb.
2, 2014
“Here are some questions about how
the U.S. government should treat
illegal immigrants who have been in
this country for a number of years,
hold a job, speak English and are
willing to pay any back taxes that they
owe. Would you favor or oppose a
bill that allowed those immigrants to
stay in this country rather than being
deported and eventually allow them to
apply for U.S. citizenship?"
81
2014 CCES 47
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Same-sex marriage
Organization Dates Wording Percent in favor
CBS News Poll Sept. 12-15, 2014 “Do you think it should be legal or
not legal for same-sex couples to
marry?"
56
- Oct. 21-25, 2015 - 56
- June 10-14, 2015 - 57
- Feb. 13-17, 2015 - 60
- Sept. 12-15, 2014 - 56
- July 29 - Aug. 4, 2014 - 53
- Feb. 19-23, 2014 - 56
Quinnipiac
University
Sept. 17-21, 2015 “Do you support or oppose
allowing same-sex couples to get
married?"
55
- July 23-28, 2015 - 53
- May 19-26, 2015 - 56
- Apr. 16-21, 2015 - 58
NBC News June 14-18, 2015 “The U.S. Supreme Court
could decide that gays have a
constitutional right to marry,
which would have the effect of
legalizing gay marriage throughout
the country. Would you favor or
oppose the Supreme Court taking
this action?"
57
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- Apr. 26-30,
2015
- 58
NBC News/Wall
Street Journal
March 1-5,
2015
“Do you favor or oppose allowing
gay and lesbian couples to enter into
same-sex marriages?" (Strongly favor
and somewhat favor)
59
CNN/ORC May 29-31,
2015
“Do you think gays and lesbians do
or do not have a constitutional right
to get married and have their marriage
recognized by law as valid?"
63
- Feb. 12-15,
2015
- 63
ABC
News/Washington
Post
4/16-20/15 “Overall, do you support or oppose
allowing gays and lesbians to marry
legally?"
56
- Feb.
27-Mar.
2, 2014
- 59
- May
29-June 1,
2014
- 56
- July 16-19,
2015
“Do you support or oppose the U.S.
Supreme Court ruling legalizing gay
marriage?"
52
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- Oct. 9-12,
2014
“Do you support or oppose the
Supreme Court action this week that
allows gay marriages to go forward in
several more states?"
56
McClatchy-Marist
Poll
Aug. 4-7,
2014.
“Do you strongly favor, favor, oppose,
or strongly oppose allowing gays and
lesbians to marry legally?" (Strongly
favor and favor)
54
Bloomberg March
7-10, 2014
“Do you support or oppose allowing
same-sex couples to get married?"
55
Public Religion
Research
Institute
Nov.
12-Dec. 18,
2013
“All in all, do you strongly favor, favor,
oppose, or strongly oppose allowing
gay and lesbian couples to marry
legally?” (Strongly favor and favor)
53
Suffolk
University/USA
Today
April 8-13,
2015
“Do you strongly favor, favor, oppose,
or strongly oppose allowing gays and
lesbians to marry legally?"
51
2014 CCES 56
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Religious exemptions for birth control mandate
Organization Dates Wording Percent in favor
CBS March 20-23, 2014 “What about companies and
non-religious organizations?
Do you think these employers
should have to cover the cost of
prescription birth control for their
female employees as part of their
health insurance plans, or should
these employers be able to opt out
of covering that, based on religious
objections?"
51
2014 CCES 43
Abortion Legal
Although abortion is a relatively commonly polled issue, we were only able to find one poll
that closely mirrored the CCES wording. That poll, from Pew, matched the CCES marginal very
closely.
Organization Dates Wording Percent in favor
Pew Sept 2-9, 2014 “Do you think abortion should be...
legal in all cases, legal in most
cases, illegal in most cases, or
illegal in all cases?"
55
2014 CCES 57
Abortion Illegal Except In Special Cases
The CCES appears to produce very misleading results for one item we originally included in
the perceptions battery on the NCS: “Permit abortion only in case of rape, incest or when the
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woman’s life is in danger.” Fully 50% of respondents to the CCES agreed with this statement. We
suspect this represents a significant overestimate of the share of respondents who think abortion
should only be legal in these circumstances. Of the 50% of respondents who agreed with this
item, 37% agreed that abortion should always be legal as a matter of personal choice, consistent
with pro-choice respondents missing the word ‘only’ in the item wording. In addition, in the
ANES when respondents are given several mutually exclusive statements about abortion, only
28% indicate that this statement best describes their view, about half the share as in the CCES.5
Because of these problems with this survey item, we have excluded it from our analysis.
5http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/toptable/tab4c_2b.htm.
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DETAILS OF MRP ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
Estimation of an MRP model proceeds in two stages. First, a hierarchical logistic choice model
is estimated for the opinion item being studied. Our models include predictors at three different
levels. At the individual level, we include random effects for the respondent’s education, gender,
and race/ethnicity. At the state-house and -senate district level, we include individual district
random effects, fixed effects for the districts’ median household income, Obama’s share of the
2012 Presidential vote in the district,and, for the same-sex marriage, religious exemptions, and
abortion models, percentage Mormon or evangelical (see Lax and Phillips (2009a, 2013)). State
random effects, centered around regional random effects, complete the individual model.6
The general form of the model is a varying intercept, varying slope model:
θj = logit
−1(Xjβ +
∑
s
αSS(j)) (A.1)
where j indexes cells, each of which is identified by the unique combination of race, gender,
education, and district, and S represents subsets of the grouping variables. β represents the fixed
effects and is modeled with a uniform prior distribution. αS are random effects, modeled with
hierarchical Gaussian priors.
The response model is specified as:
Pr(y = 1) = logit−1(β0 +α
gender
j[c] +α
race
k[c] +α
edu
l[c] +α
gender×race
m[c] +α
district
d[c] +α
state
s[c] +α
region
r[c] ) (A.2)
The individual-level random effects are modeled as:
αgenderj ∼ N(0, σ2gender) for j = 1, 2 (A.3)
αracek ∼ N(0, σ2race) for k = 1, 2, 3 (A.4)
6The models are estimated using the glmer() function in R.
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αagel ∼ N(0, σ2age) for l = 1...4 (A.5)
αedum ∼ N(0, σ2edu) for m = 1...4 (A.6)
The district, state and region effects are modeled:
αdistrictd ∼ N(αstates[c] + βpresvote+ βincome, σ2district) for d = 1...4335 (A.7)
αstates ∼ N(αregion[r] , σ2state) for s = 1...50 (A.8)
αregionr ∼ N(0, σ2region) for r = 1...4 (A.9)
This model yields predictions for the share of individuals in any given state legislative district
who support same-sex marriage or universal health care in all possible combinations of race,
gender, and education.
Poststratification
The final step in constructing district-level estimates is poststratification. We first use data from
the US Census American Community Survey 2014 5-Year file to calculate the share of individuals
in each state legislative district that fall into each ‘cell’: for example, of all the individuals living
in California’s 17th State Assembly district, what share of them are white college-educated white
women? These official US Census estimates are exceptionally accurate.
We then merge these cell-level district proportion estimates from the Census with our cell-level
opinion estimates from the multilevel regression model to construct the district-level opinion
estimates. This poststratification process is a straightforward aggregation process by which
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estimates for each cell θj in each district are summed in proportion to the share of the district
that they represent. Note that the cells in each district are exhaustive and mutually exclusive.
θdistrict =
∑
j∈Jdistrict Njθj∑
j∈Jdistrict Nj
(A.10)
The result of this poststratification process are estimates of district support for each issue for
each of the nation’s state legislative districts.
Allocation of Survey Respondents to Districts and MRP Weights
In fitting the multilevel choice models, respondents were matched to 2014 state legislative districts
using ZIP codes. Because some ZIP codes straddle state legislative boundaries, we estimated the
likelihood that each respondent had been assigned to the correct upper and lower house district by
taking the percentage of the zip code contained in that district. The vast majority of respondents
can be assigned to districts deterministically, but some might have been in multiple districts. For
these respondents, we calculated the probability that they were in each district given their race,
using data from the US Census on the racial composition of each state legislative districts. We then
weighted responses by these values, such that every response in the original data represented one
or more rows in the estimation data with weights that summed to one. The multilevel regression
takes these weights into account. The same procedure is used in the county-level analysis to match
respondents to counties.
Uncertainty in MRP Estimates
To characterize the uncertainty in our MRP estimates of district opinion, we simulate predicted
cell probabilities from our multilevel models and use those simulated cell probabilities.
We follow Kastellec et al. (2015) by using arm::sim to simulate cell probabilities, then we
re-poststratify many times to simulate district-level probabilities. The simulated predictions are
developed from drawing from simulations of the random and fixed effects drawn from a posterior
under a flat prior and conditioned on the estimated variance-covariance of the random effects.
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From the simulated cell proportions, we estimate 1,000 sets of MRP estimates for each district
for each issue. Then, we use these estimates to simulate two test statistics: candidates’ mean
absolute error and candidates’ mean conservative error. We take the 95% empirical interval of
these simulations as our measure of the credible interval for the test statistics.
Table A.5 shows 95% intervals for the candidates’ mean overestimates of conservative policy
support using the simulated MRP estimates.
Table A.5: 95% simulation intervals for conservative overestimation by party
Issue All Politicians Democrats Only Republicans Only
Same-sex Marriage [8.06, 10.27] [2.64, 4.86] [16.08, 18.38]
Religious Exemptions [5.56, 7.44] [-0.87, 1.05] [15.12, 17]
Ban assault weapons [21.49, 24.18] [16.17, 18.97] [29.39, 32.15]
Background check [35.22, 37.2] [31.01, 32.94] [41.39, 43.41]
Abortion always legal [10.25, 13.09] [6.02, 8.88] [16.39, 19.28]
Amnesty for undoc. immigrants [7.38, 9.27] [4.09, 5.99] [12.17, 14.07]
Police question immigrants [12.27, 14.33] [9.1, 11.21] [16.97, 19.07]
Table A.6 shows 95% intervals for the candidates’ mean absolute errors computed using the
simulated MRP estimates.
Table A.6: 95% simulation intervals for absolute error by party
Issue All Politicians Democrats Only Republicans Only
Same-sex marriage [16.14, 16.99] [13.49, 14.06] [19.91, 21.54]
Religious exemptions [16.8, 17.32] [14.08, 14.39] [20.66, 21.88]
Guns: ban assault weapons [25.28, 27.19] [21.6, 23.21] [30.68, 33.14]
Guns: background check [35.77, 37.62] [31.68, 33.45] [41.75, 43.7]
Abortion legal [16.86, 18.29] [14.82, 15.92] [19.64, 21.82]
Immigration: amnesty [15.99, 16.77] [13.77, 14.42] [19.19, 20.26]
Immigration: Police question [19.12, 20.21] [17.23, 18.23] [21.89, 23.27]
Robustness to Alternate Specifications of MRP Models
To test the robustness of our MRP estimates to alternative specifications of the multilevel model,
we re-estimate the models using only one district-level predictor, as is recommended (at least
with respect to a state-level MRP, using one state-level predictor) by Lax and Phillips (2013). We
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re-estimate the MRP models using the same procedure as above, except one set of predictions uses
district-level presidential vote as the only fixed effect, excluding district median household income,
and the other using only household income, but excluding presidential vote. We then simulate from
these fitted models as we did in Section A, generating two new sets of predictions and confidence
intervals.
Below we repeat Tables A.5 and A.6 using each of the two additional sets of simulated MRP
estimates. Tables A.7 and A.9 show versions of Table A.6 estimated without the use of household
income and without the use of Presidential vote, respectively. Tables A.8 and A.10 show versions
of Table A.5 estimated without the use of household income and without the use of Presidential
vote, respectively. The results are quite similar, suggesting that our MRP estimates are not sensitive
to the inclusion or exclusion of particular district-level predictors or the use of only one predictor.
Table A.7: 95% simulation intervals for absolute error by party, using MRP estimates from a model
using only 2012 presidential vote as a district-level predictor.
Issue All Politicians Democrats Only Republicans Only
Same-sex marriage [16.01, 17.06] [13.49, 14.22] [19.56, 21.61]
Religious exemptions [16.82, 17.35] [14.12, 14.43] [20.69, 21.91]
Guns: Ban assault weapons [25.13, 27.03] [21.45, 23.15] [30.44, 32.98]
Guns: Background check [35.39, 37.35] [31.26, 33.19] [41.4, 43.47]
Abortion legal [16.66, 18.33] [14.8, 16.08] [19.19, 21.7]
Immigration: amnesty [15.95, 16.66] [13.73, 14.34] [19.12, 20.14]
Immigration: police question [19.11, 20.17] [17.24, 18.19] [21.94, 23.24]
Table A.8: 95% simulation intervals for conservative overestimation by party, using MRP estimates
from a model using only 2012 presidential vote as a district-level predictor.
Issue All Politicians Democrats Only Republicans Only
Same-sex marriage [7.22, 10.15] [1.78, 4.74] [15.34, 18.3]
Religious exemptions [5.36, 7.24] [-1.03, 0.87] [14.93, 16.82]
Guns: Ban assault weapons [21.12, 23.8] [15.85, 18.56] [29, 31.81]
Guns: Background check [34.81, 36.91] [30.52, 32.64] [41.02, 43.2]
Abortion legal [9.52, 12.77] [5.29, 8.63] [15.59, 18.96]
Immigration: amnesty [7.44, 9.23] [4.11, 5.92] [12.19, 14.03]
Immigration: police question [12.25, 14.19] [9.07, 11.07] [16.98, 18.93]
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Table A.9: 95% simulation intervals for absolute error by party, using MRP estimates from a model
using only median district household income as a district-level predictor.
Issue All Politicians Democrats Only Republicans Only
Same-sex marriage [17.28, 18.58] [14.74, 15.84] [20.6, 23.11]
Religious exemptions [17.84, 18.7] [15.25, 15.9] [21.27, 23.24]
Guns: Ban assault weapons [25.32, 27.79] [21.69, 23.84] [30.5, 34.14]
Guns: Background check [35.45, 37.73] [31.12, 33.43] [41.74, 44.09]
Abortion legal [17.84, 19.99] [16.09, 17.72] [20.09, 23.47]
Immigration: amnesty [16.85, 17.84] [14.63, 15.52] [19.85, 21.41]
Immigration: police question [19.87, 21.17] [17.89, 19.14] [22.79, 24.41]
Table A.10: 95% simulation intervals for conservative overestimation by party, using MRP
estimates from a model using only median district household income as a district-level predictor.
Issue All Politicians Democrats Only Republicans Only
Same-sex marriage [7.02, 10.87] [1.16, 5.05] [15.72, 19.61]
Religious exemptions [4.93, 7.98] [-1.88, 1.19] [15.06, 18.19]
Guns: Ban assault weapons [20.19, 24.03] [14.35, 18.38] [28.6, 32.72]
Guns: Background check [34.7, 37.23] [30.17, 32.8] [41.29, 43.8]
Abortion legal [9.26, 13.75] [4.35, 8.92] [16.23, 20.6]
Immigration: amnesty [7.66, 10.04] [3.83, 6.27] [13.15, 15.55]
Immigration: police question [12.16, 14.75] [8.77, 11.42] [17.17, 19.83]
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REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY ANALYSIS OF PARTISAN DIFFERENCES IN
CONTACTING POLITICIANS
The main text claims that Republican politicians are especially likely to hear from Republican
constituents relative to how often Democratic politicians are to hear from Democratic constituents.
This descriptive claim is demonstrated to hold in the 2008 CCES in Table 3.7 in the main text. Our
claims in the main text about who Democratic and Republican politicians tend to hear from do
not depend on any causal interpretation of these differences. For example, it may be the case that
Republican citizens in districts that elect Republicans tend to be more active for some other reason.
However, here we show that it appears this descriptive claim may indeed be driven, at least in part,
by an underlying causal behavioral process among Republican citizens. In particular, in Table A.11,
we formally analyze a regression discontinuity to see whether the descriptive finding presented
in the ‘Partisan Asymmetries in Contact and Activism’ section of the main paper has a causal
underpinning such that having a Repubican MC causes Republicans to be more likely to reach out
to their MC. We specify the regression discontinuities at the district level using Republican winning
percentage as the running variable. We use the Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014a) method
for robust inference, as implemented in the rdrobust package for R (Calonico, Cattaneo and
Titiunik 2014b). We test four outcome variables at the discontinuity, using local linear fits in the
optimally selected bandwidth:7 the percent of contacts coming from Democrats and Republicans
in each district, and the percent of Democrats and of Republicans in each district who report
contacting. These results suggest that the main driver of the asymmetry in contacting is that
Republican citizens are especially likely to contact Republican legislators.
Figure A.3 shows the apparent effect of electing a Republican on Republicans’ and Democrats’
contacting behavior visually. Figure A.4 shows the implications for politicians’ perspective.
One important caveat to this analysis is that regression discontinuity designs estimate causal
effects that are local to the kinds of areas that are at the cutpoint—in this case, highly competitive
7See Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014a) for more information on the optimal bandwidth selection procedure
we implement.
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Table A.11: Regression discontinuity results: Effects of 2006 US House election results on 2008
CCES self-reported contacting of US House Members
Estimate: Effect
Outcome of Republican Victory Robust 95% CI Robust p-value
Percent of Dems contacting 5.25 [-6.03, 14.87] 0.41
Percent of Reps contacting 15.30 [8.00, 23.51] 0.00
Percent of contacts from Dems -7.71 [-19.02, 1.33] 0.09
Percent of contacts from Reps 5.97 [-2.62, 16.11] 0.16
districts. As a result, please note that the results in Table A.11 test the causal effect of a Republican
just winning in marginal districts whereas the key claim our broader analysis relies on is different,
the simple descriptive difference shown in Table 3.7 between all Democratic and Republican
districts.
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Figure A.3: Republican citizens contact Republican politicians especially often
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Notes: The top panel plots the percent of Republicans in each district who reported contacting
their US House Member’s office in the 2008 CCES. The x-axis records the Republican margin of
victory in the 2006 elections, such that the right half of the figure describes contacting behavior
from 2007-2008 in districts where Republican candidates served during that period because they
won a 2006 House election. The bottom panel shows the same for Democrats, who do not show
the same dramatic increase. The Figure shows that Republican citizens contact Republican
representatives especially often.
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Figure A.4: Republican politicians hear from Republican citizens especially disproportionately
0
25
50
75
−0.25 0.00 0.25
Republican margin of victory, 2006 Election
Pe
rc
e
n
t o
f c
on
ta
ct
s 
to
 o
ffi
ce
 c
om
in
g 
fro
m
 R
ep
ub
lic
an
s,
 
20
08
 C
CE
S Percent of contacts coming from Republicans
Notes: This Figure plots the proportion of total contacts to the office that come from Republicans.
The black line represents a “null" under which all citizens contact equally. Democratic
politicians hear from Republicans disproportionately; Republican politicians hear from
Republican constituents especially disproportionately.
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HOW MISPERCEPTIONS VARY WITH THE PARTISAN IMBALANCE IN
CONSTITUENCY CONTACT
In the main text, we speculate that the general pattern that politicians in 2012 and 2014 overestimate
conservatism and that Republicans do so especially may result from biases in who participates
in the public spheres they inhabit, which we proxy with data on constituent contact. One
implication of this hypothesis is that there should be variation in the strength of conservative
misperceptions politicians hold within party that corresponds with variation in the strength of the
Republican-leaning imbalance in constituent contact in their districts.
To test this implication, we undertake an additional analysis of the contacting data to extend the
results more fully to state legislative districts. This analysis should be regarded as exploratory, as
it has at least three important limitations. First, the data on contacting behavior are from 2008, the
most recent year in which the CCES asked this question, but our data on politicians’ perceptions
and public opinion are from 2012 and 2014. (Using the 2012 ANES data is not feasible because
the sample size is far, far too small, and the ANES data does not have the necessary geographic
identifiers available.) Second, the CCES data asks about contacting Congress, while our focus is
on state legislative politicians. Finally, sample sizes are extremely small, so these estimates are
very noisy. Measurement error in dependent variables biases estimates toward zero (Achen 1982),
and the measurement error in the dependent variable of contacting is very large. In some districts,
we are even missing data altogether, and these districts are dropped from the analysis.
For our analysis, we first estimate contacting rates for Democrats and Republicans in each
district. We then calculate a dependent variable called “Republican Contact Advantage” which
is the share of individuals who said they contacted their legislator who are Republicans minus
the share that are Democrats. Higher values of this variable correspond to districts where
politicians should hear from Republicans more overwhelmingly. For our independent variable we
overestimation of conservatism, calculated as the mean difference between the MRP estimates and
the politicians’ perceptions of public opinion across the issues the politician was asked about.
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Again emphasizing the previous caveats, we do find some evidence of an association between
higher rates of contacting by Republican constituents and increased conservative misperceptions
among politicians. The first column of Table A.12 shows that the larger the Republican contact
advantage in a district, the more a politician in that district overestimates conservatism. This
regression also includes dummies for whether a politician is a Republican and for which issue
questions they were shown (as we rotated which perceptions questions we asked and there are
different mean levels of conservatism overestimation on different questions).
With this said, a simple alternative explanation for this finding that we cannot rule out is that the
presence of more active conservatives, not their higher levels of contacting and other public sphere
behavior, are what drives this result. To try to deal with this alternative explanation, we include
a control for district-level McCain vote share in 2008, as this is the year the CCES contacting
question was asked. In the presence of this control, the coefficient is still positive and substantively
significant but is statistically insignificant. Unfortunately, it is not necessarily straightforward how
to parse this result. As Achen (1982) shows, when two correlated dependent variables are entered
into a regression, regression favors the variable that is more precisely measured, and true McCain
vote share in each district is much more precisely measured than is the contacting behavior we
estimated from the CCES sample survey, which contains a great deal of measurement error.
To try to reduce the measurement error in our dependent variable, we also analyzed the data at a
higher level of analysis, the state level, in Table A.13. There we test the hypothesis that politicians
misperceive public opinion more in states where Republicans are especially active relative to
Democrats. We find a similar pattern of findings in that analysis, with a coefficient twice the size
as the coefficient on the district-level analysis. However, again, this coefficient reduces in size and
its standard error increases when we include the colinear predictor of McCain vote share—but, the
coefficient remains positive and substantively large in magnitude. In both cases, we cannot be sure
to what extent the facts of measurement error in multivariate regression or simple omitted variable
bias is responsible.
In summary, although we urge caution in interpreting these results, they do seem to be
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consistent with our interpretation that asymmetric rates of contact from conservative citizens could
be a potential mechanism for state legislative politicians’ misperceptions of public opinion in their
districts.
Table A.12: Politicians who hear from Republicans especially often overestimate constituency
conservatism especially: district-level results.
DV = Mean Overestimation of Conservatism
Republican Contact Advantage 3.89* 0.91
in District (0.80) (0.87)
McCain 2008 Vote Share 0.15*
(0.02)
Republican Politician 12.02* 11.88*
(0.75) (0.76)
Dummies for Questions Answered Yes Yes
Constant 15.22 ∗ 14.18 ∗
(5.12) (5.18)
N 1117 1026
R2 0.23 0.26
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
Table A.13: Politicians who hear from Republicans especially often overestimate constituency
conservatism especially: state-level results.
DV = Mean Overestimation of Conservatism
Republican Contact Advantage 6.96* 2.80
in State (2.98) (4.13)
McCain 2008 Vote Share 0.10
(0.07)
Republican Politician 11.99* 11.96*
(0.79) (0.77)
Dummies for Questions Answered Yes Yes
Constant 18.67** 14.50
(7.83) (8.95)
N 1,543 1,543
R2 0.21 0.21
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state.
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 5, Coauthored with David E. Broockman,
Nicholas Carnes and Melody Crowder-Meyer
REPRESENTATIVENESS
The respondents were broadly representative of the sampling frame. Response rates were nearly
identical by region; for Republican (18.0%) and Democratic party chairs (17.9%); and for party
leaders previously identified as men (18.2%) and women (18.5%). One potential concern with the
data is that only party chairs in uncompetitive areas would respond. However, Figure B.1 indicates
that the underlying partisan composition of the areas where our respondents are from is fairly
representative.
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Figure B.1: Obama 2012 County Vote Share Among Survey Respondents and Non-Respondents
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Another possibility is that only county party chairs from very small counties would be willing
to respond to our survey, undermining the external validity of our inferences. Figure B.2 shows
that, if anything, the opposite is the case: we received a similar response rate in counties of all
sizes, and very slightly more responses from larger counties.
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Figure B.2: County Population Among Respondents and Non-Respondents
5 10 15 5 10 15
Democratic Chairs Republican Chairs
All Chairs Responded To Survey
Did Not Respond To Survey
Di
str
ibu
tio
n 
of
 C
ha
irs
 in
 S
tu
dy
Log(County Population)
Graphs by Party of Chair
CONJOINT EXPERIMENT
Table B.2 lists the attributes that the hypothetical candidates could have. Attributes were fully
randomized, with the exception of age, which was constant, with the first profile always being 43
years old and the second profile always being 47 years old. Two different sents of first names were
used for the two profiles in order to ensure that no pair of candidates had the same name. Figure
B.3 shows how a respondent on the online survey would have seen the experiment.
DETAILS OF MRP ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
Estimation of an MRP model proceeds in two stages. First, a hierarchical logistic choice model
is estimated for the opinion item being studied. Our models include predictors at two different
levels. At the individual level, we include random effects for the respondent’s education, gender,
208
Table B.1: Predictors of Survey Response
and race/ethnicity. At the state level, we include individual state random effects and fixed effects
for Obama’s share of the 2012 Presidential vote in the state (see Lax and Phillips (2009a)). State
random effects are centered around regional random effects.1
Hierarchical Model
The general form of the model is a varying intercept, varying slope model:
θj = logit
−1(Xjβ +
∑
s
αSS(j)) (B.1)
where j indexes cells, each of which is identified by the unique combination of race, gender,
education, and state, and S represents subsets of the grouping variables. β represents the fixed
effects and is modeled with a uniform prior distribution. αS are random effects, modeled with
hierarchical Gaussian priors.
1The models are estimated using the bglmer() function in R.
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Figure B.3: Survey Instrument Example
The response model is specified as:2
Pr(y = 1) = logit−1(β0 + α
gender
j[c] + α
race
k[c] + α
edu
l[c] + α
gender×race
m[c] + α
state
s[c] + α
region
r[c] ) (B.2)
The individual-level random effects are modeled as:
2The model for the other issues is the same except that it does not use the fixed effects for state percent Mormon
and evangelical.
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Table B.2: Treatments in Conjoint Experiment
Attribute Values
Name (gender) Male names: Donald, Laurence, Nathan, Nicholas, Samuel,
Alexander, Andrew, Christopher, Charles, Daniel.
Female names: Donna, Lauren, Natalie, Nicole, Samantha,
Alexandra, Andrea, Charlotte, Christina, Danielle. (No pair
of candidates had the same name.)
Age 43, 47
Occupation Attorney, business executive, investor, lawyer, nurse,
small business owner, social worker, teacher, receptionist,
restaurant server, factory worker
Experience in party Active and well known in county party organization,
active and well known in group important to the party,
frequent campaign volunteer for the last four election
cycles, frequent campaign volunteer in last election cycle,
none
Life circumstances Has a great deal of free time, has two young children,
has flexible work hours, is independently wealthy, military
veteran
Talents Assertive, experienced fundraiser for local charities, hard
worker, physically attractive, talented public speaker, well
known in community
Positions and ideology Much more conservative than the typical voter from your
party in your county, somewhat more conservative than
the typical voter from your party in your county, similar
views to the typical voter from your party in your county,
somewhat more liberal than the typical voter from your
party in your county, much more liberal than the typical
voter than the typical voter from your party in your county
αgenderj ∼ N(0, σ2gender) for j = 1, 2 (B.3)
αracek ∼ N(0, σ2race) for k = 1, 2, 3 (B.4)
αagel ∼ N(0, σ2age) for l = 1...4 (B.5)
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αedum ∼ N(0, σ2edu) for m = 1...4 (B.6)
The state and region effects are modeled:
αstates ∼ N(αregion[r] + βpresvote, σ2state) for s = 1...50 (B.7)
αregionr ∼ N(0, σ2region) for r = 1...4 (B.8)
This model yields predictions for the share of individuals in any given state who support
same-sex marriage or universal health care in all possible combinations of race, gender, and
education. Because of the CCES’ large sample size, the state-level random effects dominate the
estimation, meaning MRP makes only slight adjustments to the disaggregated data from the CCES.
Poststratification
The final step in constructing state-level estimates is poststratification. We first use data from the
US Census American Community Survey 2013 5-Year file to calculate the share of individuals
in each state that fall into each ‘cell’: for example, of all the individuals living in California,
what share of them are college-educated white women? These official US Census estimates are
exceptionally accurate.
We then merge these cell-level state proportion estimates from the Census with our cell-level
opinion estimates from the multilevel regression model to construct the state-level opinion
estimates. This poststratification process is a straightforward aggregation process by which
estimates for each cell θj in each state are summed in proportion to the share of the state that
they represent. Note that the cells in each state are exhaustive and mutually exclusive.
θstate =
∑
j∈Jstate Njθj∑
j∈Jstate Nj
(B.9)
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The result of this poststratification process are estimates of state support for each issue for each
of the nation’s states.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 6
Details of MRP Estimation Procedure
Estimation of an MRP model proceeds in two stages. First, a hierarchical logistic choice model is
estimated for the opinion item being studied. At the individual level, we include random effects
for the respondent’s education, gender, and race/ethnicity. At the state level, state random effects,
centered around regional random effects, complete the individual model.1
The general form of the model is a varying intercept, varying slope model:
θj = logit
−1(Xjβ +
∑
s
αSS(j)) (C.1)
where j indexes cells, each of which is identified by the unique combination of race, gender,
education, and state, and S represents subsets of the grouping variables. β represents the fixed
effects and is modeled with a uniform prior distribution. αS are random effects, modeled with
hierarchical Gaussian priors.
The response model for is specified as:
Pr(y = 1) = logit−1(β0 + α
gender
j[c] + α
race
k[c] + α
edu
l[c] + α
gender×race
m[c] + +α
state
s[c] + α
region
r[c] ) (C.2)
1The models are estimated using the bglmer() function in R.
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The individual-level random effects are modeled as:
αgenderj ∼ N(0, σ2gender) for j = 1, 2 (C.3)
αracek ∼ N(0, σ2race) for k = 1, 2, 3 (C.4)
αagel ∼ N(0, σ2age) for l = 1...4 (C.5)
αedum ∼ N(0, σ2edu) for m = 1...4 (C.6)
The state and region effects are modeled:
αstates ∼ N(αregion[r] + βDPSP, σ2state) for s = 1...50 (C.7)
αregionr ∼ N(0, σ2region) for r = 1...4 (C.8)
This model yields predictions for the share of individuals in any given state who support each
issue in all possible combinations of race, gender, and education.
Poststratification
The final step in constructing state-level estimates is poststratification. I first use data from the US
Census American Community Survey 2013 5-Year file to calculate the share of individuals in each
state that fall into each ‘cell’: for example, of all the individuals living in California’, what share
of them are white college-educated white women?
I then merge these cell-level state proportion estimates from the Census with the cell-level
opinion estimates from the multilevel regression model to construct the district-level opinion
estimates. This poststratification process is a straightforward aggregation process by which
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estimates for each cell θj in each state are summed in proportion to the share of the state that
they represent. Note that the cells in each state are exhaustive and mutually exclusive.
θdistrict =
∑
j∈Jdistrict Njθj∑
j∈Jdistrict Nj
(C.9)
The result of this poststratification process are estimates of state support for each of the issues.
Questions used for ideology estimation
The following issue questions were used to estimate respondent ideology in the SSI data.
Responses were fit to a one-dimensional item-response model using MCMCpack in R (Martin,
Quinn and Park 2011).
• I support free trade and oppose special taxes on the import of non-American-made goods.
• There should be strong restrictions on the purchase and possession of guns.
• Implement a universal healthcare program to guarantee coverage to all Americans, regardless
of income.
• Laws covering the sale of firearms should be made less strict than they are.
• The US should immediately act to destroy Iran?s nuclear weapons development facilities.
• Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3
years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes.
• Increase taxes for those making over $250,000 per year
• Regulate greenhouse gas emissions by instituting a carbon tax or cap and trade system.
• Allow doctors to prescribe marijuana to patients.
• Require minors to obtain parental consent to receive an abortion.
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• The government should provide parents with vouchers to send their children to any school
they choose, be it private, public, or religious.
• Same-sex couples should be allowed to marry.
• Legalize the purchase and possession of small amounts of marijuana.
• The US should contribute more funding and troops to UN peacekeeping missions.
• The government should not provide any funding to the arts.
• Allow illegal immigrants brought to the US as children to apply for citizenship.
• Give preference to racial minorities in employment and college admissions in order to correct
for past discrimination.
• Let employers and insurers refuse to cover birth control and other health services that violate
their religious beliefs.
• Allow more offshore oil drilling.
• By law, abortion should never be permitted.
• I support the death penalty in my state.
• Government spending can stimulate economic growth.
• The federal government should subsidize student loans for low income students.
• The minimum wage employers must pay their workers should be increased.
• The federal government should try to reduce the income differences between rich and poor
Americans.
• The federal government should do more about protecting the environment and natural
resources.
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To validate the IRT-based ideology measure, I plot it against the respondents’ seven-point
self-reported ideology in Fig. C.1.
Figure C.1: Respondents’ self-reported ideologies and ideologies estimated from the issue
questions battery.
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l l l
l l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
ll
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
Extremely liberal
Liberal
Slightly liberal
Moderate
Slightly conservative
Conservative
Extremely conservative
−2 −1 0 1 2
Estimated ideal point
Se
lf−
re
po
rte
d 
id
eo
lo
gy
218
Bibliography
Achen, Christopher. 1978. “Measuring Representation.” American Journal of Political Science
22:475–510.
Achen, Christopher H. 1977. “Measuring Representation: Perils of the Correlation Coefficient.”
American Journal of Political Science 21:805–815.
Achen, Christopher H. 1982. Interpreting and using regression. Vol. 29 Sage.
Achen, Christopher H. and Larry M. Bartels. 2016. Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do
Not Produce Responsive Government. Princeton University Press.
Ahler, Douglas J. and David E. Broockman. 2017. “The Delegate Paradox: Why Polarized
Politicians Can Represent Citizens Best.” Journal of Politics Forthcoming. Available at https:
//papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2958017.
Aldrich, John H. and David W. Rhode. 2000. “The Republican Revolution and the House
Appropriations Committee.” Journal of Politics 62:1–33.
Ansolabehere, Stephen and Brian Schaffner. 2013. “CCES Common Content, 2012.” Computer
file.
URL: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/21447
Ansolabehere, Stephen and Brian Schaffner. 2015. “CCES Common Content, 2014.” Computer
file.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/XFXJVY
Ansolabehere, Stephen and Shanto Iyengar. 1994. “Of horseshoes and horse races: Experimental
studies of the impact of poll results on electoral behavior.” Political Communication
11(4):413–430.
Arnold, R. Douglas. 1990. The Logic of Congressional Action. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Bafumi, Joseph and Michael C Herron. 2010. “Leapfrog representation and extremism: A
study of American voters and their members in Congress.” American Political Science Review
104(03):519–542.
Bartels, Larry M. 1985. “Expectations and preferences in presidential nominating campaigns.”
American Political Science Review 79(03):804–815.
219
Bartels, Larry M. 1991. “Constituency Opinion and Congressional Policy Making: The Reagan
Defense Buildup.” American Political Science Review 85:457–474.
Bartels, Larry M. 2008. Unequal Democracy. Princeton.
Bartels, Larry M. 2010. Unequal democracy: The political economy of the new gilded age.
Princeton University Press.
Bawn, Kathleen, Martin Cohen, David Karol, Seth Masket, Hans Noel and John Zaller. 2012. “A
Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics.”
Perspectives on Politics 10(3):571–597.
Belchior, Ana M. 2012. “Explaining MPs’ perceptions of voters’ positions in a party-mediated
representation system: Evidence from the Portuguese case.” Party Politics pp. 1–20.
Bendor, Jonathan and John G Bullock. 2008. “Lethal incompetence: Voters, officials, and systems.”
Critical Review 20(1-2):1–23.
Bergan, Daniel E. 2009. “Does Grassroots Lobbying Work? A Field Experiment Measuring the
Effects of an Email Lobbying Campaign on Legislative Behavior.” American Politics Research
37:327–352.
Bergan, Daniel E. and Richard T. Cole. 2015. “Call Your Legislator: A Field Experimental Study
of the Impact of Citizen Contacts on Legislative Voting.” Political Behavior 37(1):27–42.
Berinsky, Adam J and Gabriel S Lenz. 2014. “Red Scare? Revisiting Joe McCarthy’s Influence on
1950s Elections.” Public Opinion Quarterly p. nfu019.
Blee, Kathleen M. and Kimberly A. Creasap. 2010. “Conservative and Right-Wing Movements.”
Annual Review of Sociology 269-286.
Brand, John A. 1969. Concillors, Activists, and Electors: Democratic Relationships in Scottish
Cities. In Comparative Legislative Behavior: Fronteirs of Research, ed. Samuel C. Patterson
and John C. Wahlke. University of Iowa Press.
Branham, J. Alexander, Stuart Soroka and Christopher Wlezien. 2017. “When Do the Rich Win?”
Political Science Quarterly 132(1):43–62.
Brody, Richard A. and Benjamin I. Page. 1972. “Comment: The Assessment of Policy Voting.”
American Political Science Review 66:450–458.
Broockman, David E. 2013. “Black politicians are more intrinsically motivated to advance Blacks’
interests: A field experiment manipulating political incentives.” American Journal of Political
Science 57(3):521–536.
Broockman, David E. and Christopher Skovron. 2014. “What Politicians Believe About Their
Constituents: Asymmetric Misperceptions and Prospects for Constituency Control.” Manuscript,
University of California, Berkeley.
220
Broockman, David E. and Timothy J. Ryan. 2016. “Preaching to the Choir: Americans
Prefer Communicating to Copartisan Elected Officials.” American Journal of Political Science
60(4):1093–1107.
Butler, Daniel M. 2014. Representing the Advantaged: How Politicians Reinforce Inequality.
Cambridge University Press.
Butler, Daniel M. and Adam Dynes. 2016. “How Politicians Discount the Opinions of Constituents
with Whom They Disagree.” American Journal of Political Science 60(4):975–989.
Butler, Daniel M and David E Broockman. 2011. “Do politicians racially discriminate against
constituents? A field experiment on state legislators.” American Journal of Political Science
55(3):463–477.
Butler, Daniel M. and David W. Nickerson. 2011. “Can Learning Constituency Opinion Affect
How Legislators Vote? Results from a Field Experiment.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science
6:55–83.
Calonico, Sebastian, Matias D. Cattaneo and Rocío Titiunik. 2014a. “Robust Nonparametric
Confidence Intervals for Regression-Discontinuity Designs.” Econometrica 82(6):2295–2326.
Calonico, Sebastian, Matias D. Cattaneo and Rocío Titiunik. 2014b. “rdrobust: An R
Package for Robust Nonparametric Inference in Regression-Discontinuity Designs.” R Journal
7(1):38–51.
Camp, Bayliss J. 2008. “Mobilizing the Base and Embarrassing the Opposition: Defense
of Marriage Referenda and Cross-Cutting Electoral Cleavages.” Sociological Perspectives
51(4):713–733.
Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. The American
Voter. New York: Wiley.
Canes-Wrone, Brandice, David W. Brady and John F. Cogan. 2002. “Out of Step, Out of Office:
Electoral Accountability and House Members’ Voting.” The American Political Science Review
96:127–140.
Carmines, Edward G and James Woods. 2002. “The role of party activists in the evolution of the
abortion issue.” Political Behavior 24(4):361–377.
Carnes, Nicholas. 2016. “Rage Within the Machine? Political Cynicism Among Candidates and
Party Leaders.” Working paper, Duke University.
Carr, Matthew A., Gerald Gamm and Justin H. Phillips. 2016. “Origins of the Culture War: Social
Issues in State Party Platforms, 1960-2014.” Working Paper, available at http://www.colu
mbia.edu/~jhp2121/workingpapers/CultureWar.pdf.
Carson, Jamie L., Gregory Koger, Matthew J. Lebo and Everett Young. 2010. “The Electoral Costs
of Party Loyalty in Congress.” American Journal of Political Science 54(3):598–616.
221
Caughey, Devin and Christopher Warshaw. 2016. “The dynamics of state policy liberalism,
1936–2014.” American Journal of Political Science 60(4):899–913.
Ceci, Stephen J and Edward L Kain. 1982. “Jumping on the bandwagon with the underdog: The
impact of attitude polls on polling behavior.” Public Opinion Quarterly 46(2):228–242.
Cialdini, Robert B and Noah J Goldstein. 2004. “Social influence: Compliance and conformity.”
Annu. Rev. Psychol. 55:591–621.
Clausen, Aage R. 1977. “The Accuracy of Leader Perceptions of Constituency Views.” Legislative
Studies Quarterly 2(4):361–384.
Cluverius, John. 2017. “How the Flattened Costs of Grassroots Lobbying Affect Legislator
Responsiveness.” Political Research Quarterly .
Cohen, Marty, David Karol, Hans Noel and John Zaller. 2008. The Party Decides: Presidential
Nominations Before and After Reform. University of Chicago.
Converse, Philip E. 1964. The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics. In Ideology and
Discontent, ed. David E. Apter. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Converse, Philip E. and Roy Pierce. 1986. Political Representation in France. Belknap.
Crowder-Meyer, Melody. 2011. The Party’s Still Going: County Party Strength, Activity, and
Influence. In The State of the Parties, ed. John Green and Daniel Coffey. 6th ed. chapter 7,
pp. 115–134.
Crowder-Meyer, Melody. 2013. “Gendered Recruitment without Trying: How Local Party
Recruiters Affect Women’s Representation.” Politics and Gender 9(4):390–413.
DeCanio, Samuel. 2005. “State Autonomy and American Political Development: How Mass
Democracy Promoted State Power.” Studies in American Political Development 19(2):117–136.
DeCanio, Samuel. 2006. “Mass opinion and American political development.” Critical Review
17(3-4):339–350.
Delli Carpini, Michael X. and Scott Keeter. 1996. What Americans Know About Politics and Why
It Matters. Yale University Press.
Deutsch, Morton and Harold B Gerard. 1955. “A study of normative and informational
social influences upon individual judgment.” The journal of abnormal and social psychology
51(3):629.
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper.
Druckman, James N. and Lawrence R. Jacobs. 2006. “Lumpers and Splitters: The Public Opinion
Information that Politicians Collect and Use.” Public Opinion Quarterly 70(4):453.
Edsall, Thomas B. 2014. “Would Stronger Parties Mean Less Polarization?” The New York Times.
URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/22/opinion/would-stronger-parties-mean-less-polarization.html
222
Eggers, Andrew C and Benjamin E Lauderdale. 2016. “Simulating Counterfactual
Representation.” Political Analysis 24(2):281–290.
Ellis, Christopher and James A Stimson. 2012a. Ideology in America. Cambridge University Press.
Ellis, Christopher and James A Stimson. 2012b. Ideology in America. Cambridge University Press.
Elmendorf, Christopher S. and Abby K. Wood. 2017. “Elite Political Ignorance: Law, Data, and the
Representation of (Mis)Perceived Electorates.” UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper Series.
Enos, Ryan D and Eitan D Hersh. 2015. “Campaign Perceptions of Electoral Closeness:
Uncertainty, Fear and Over-Confidence.” British Journal of Political Science pp. 1–19.
Erikson, Robert S. 2013. Policy Responsiveness to Public Opinion. Oxford University Press.
Erikson, Robert S, Michael B MacKuen and James A Stimson. 2002. The macro polity. Cambridge
University Press.
Erikson, Robert S., Norman R. Luttbeg and William V. Holloway. 1975. “Knowing One’s
District: How Legislators Predict Referendum Voting.” American Journal of Political Science
19(5):231–246.
Fang, Lee. 2013. The Machine: A Field Guide to the Resurgent Right. The New Press.
Feinstein, Brian D. and Eric Schickler. 2008. “Platforms and Partners: The Civil Rights
Realignment Reconsidered.” Studies in American Political Development 22(1):1–31.
Fenno, Richard F. 1977. “U.S. House Members In Their Constituencies: An Exploration.”
American Political Science Review 71(3):883–917.
Fenno, Richard F. 1978. Home Style: House Members in Their Districts. Boston: Little, Brown.
Fields, James M and Howard Schuman. 1976. “Public beliefs about the beliefs of the public.”
Public Opinion Quarterly 40(4):427–448.
Fiorina, Morris P. and Matthew S. Levendusky. 2006. Disconnected: The political class versus
the people. In Red and Blue Nation? Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences of America’s
Polarized Politics. Brookings pp. 49–71.
Fiorina, Morris P and Samuel J Abrams. 2012. Disconnect: the breakdown of representation in
American politics. Vol. 11 University of Oklahoma Press.
Fiorina, Morris P, Samuel J Abrams and Jeremy Pope. 2005. Culture war? Pearson Longman New
York.
Foa, Roberto Stefan and Yascha Mounk. 2016. “The Democratic Disconnect.” Journal of
Democracy 27(3):5–17.
Geer, John Gray. 1996. From tea leaves to opinion polls: A theory of democratic leadership.
Columbia University Press.
223
Gilens, Martin. 2012. Affluence and influence: Economic inequality and political power in
America. Princeton University Press.
Gilens, Martin and Benjamin I Page. 2014. “Testing theories of American politics: Elites, interest
groups, and average citizens.” Perspectives on politics 12(03):564–581.
Glynn, Carroll J. 1989. “Perceptions of others’ opinions as a component of public opinion.” Social
Science Research 18(1):53–69.
Glynn, Carroll J, Andrew F Hayes and James Shanahan. 1997. “Perceived Support for One’s
Opinions and Willingness to Speak Out: A Meta-Analysis of Survey Studies on the" Spiral of
Silence".” Public opinion quarterly pp. 452–463.
Goss, Kristin A. 2008. Disarmed: The Missing Movement for Gun Control in America. Princeton
University Press.
Green, Donald, Bradley Palmquist and Eric Schickler. 2002. Partisan Hearts and Minds. New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
Grimmer, Justin. 2013. Representational Style in Congress: What Legislators Say and Why It
Matters. Cambridge University Press.
Grimmer, Justin, Solomon Messing and Sean J Westwood. 2012. “How words and money
cultivate a personal vote: The effect of legislator credit claiming on constituent credit allocation.”
American Political Science Review 106(04):703–719.
Grose, Christian R. 2014. “Field Experimental Work on Political Institutions.” Annual Review of
Political Science 17(1):355–370.
Grossmann, Matt and David A Hopkins. 2015a. “Ideological Republicans and group
interest Democrats: The asymmetry of American party politics.” Perspectives on Politics
13(01):119–139.
Grossmann, Matt and David A. Hopkins. 2015b. “Ideological Republicans and Group Interest
Democrats: The Asymmetry of American Party Politics.” Perspectives on Politics .
Grossmann, Matt and David A. Hopkins. 2016. Asymmetric Politics: Ideological Republicans and
Group Interest Democrats. Oxford University Press.
Groves, Robert M. 2006. “Nonresponse rates and nonresponse bias in household surveys.” Public
opinion quarterly pp. 646–675.
Groves, Robert M and Emilia Peytcheva. 2008. “The impact of nonresponse rates on nonresponse
bias: a meta-analysis.” Public opinion quarterly 72(2):167–189.
Hacker, Jacob S. and Paul Pierson. 2005. “Abandoning the Middle: The Bush Tax Cuts and the
Limits of Democratic Control.” Perspectives on Politics 3:33–53.
Hacker, Jacob S. and Paul Pierson. 2011. Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the
Rich Richer – and Turned Its Back on the Middle Class. Simon and Schuster.
224
Hacker, Jacob S. and Paul Pierson. 2015. Confronting Asymmetric Polarization. In Solutions to
Political Polarization in America. Cambridge University Press.
Hainmueller, Jens, Daniel J Hopkins and Teppei Yamamoto. 2014. “Causal Inference in Conjoint
Analysis: Understanding Multidimensional Choices via Stated Preference Experiments.”
Political Analysis 22(1):1–30.
Hall, Andrew B. 2015. “What Happens When Extremists Win Primaries?” American Political
Science Review 109(01):18–42.
Hall, Andrew B. and James M. Snyder. 2015. “Candidate Ideology and Electoral Success.”
Working Paper.
Hanretty, Chris, Benjamin E Lauderdale and Nick Vivyan. 2016. “Comparing strategies for
estimating constituency opinion from national survey samples.” Political Science Research and
Methods pp. 1–21.
Hassell, Hans. 2016a. “Party Control of Party Primaries: Party Influence in Nominations of the US
Senate.” Journal of Politics .
Hassell, Hans. 2016b. “The Party’s Primary: Party Elites’ Control of Nominations for the US
House and Senate.” Manuscript, available at http://people.cornellcollege.edu/
hhassell/Scholarly%20Work/The%20Party’s%20Primary%20Manuscript.
pdf.
Hedlund, Ronald D. and H. Paul Friesema. 1972. “Representatives’ Perceptions of Constituency
Opinion.” Journal of Politics 34(3):730–752.
Henderson, John and John Brooks. 2016. “Mediating the Electoral Connection: The Information
Effects of Voter Signals on Legislative Behavior.” The Journal of Politics 78(3):653–669.
Herbst, Susan. 1993. Numbered Voices: How Opinion Polling Has Shaped American Politics.
Hersh, Eitan D. 2015. Hacking the Electorate: How Campaigns Perceive Voters. Cambridge
University Press.
Hill, Seth J. 2017. “Representation of Primary Electorates in Congressional Roll Call Votes.”
Working paper, available at http://www.sethjhill.com/SJH_PrimariesRollCal
ls.pdf.
Holmberg, Soren. 1989. “Political Representation in Sweden.” Scandinavian Political Studies
12(1).
Huckfeldt, R Robert. 1980. “Variable responses to neighborhood social contexts: Assimilation,
conflict, and tipping points.” Political Behavior 2(3):231–257.
Huckfeldt, R Robert. 1984. “Political loyalties and social class ties: the mechanisms of contextual
influence.” American Journal of Political Science pp. 399–417.
225
Huckfeldt, Robert and John T. Sprague. 1995. Citizens, Politics, and Social Communication:
Influence in an Election Campaign. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Inglehart, Ronald. 2016. “The Danger of Deconsolidation: How Much Should We Worry?” Journal
of Democracy 27(3):18–23.
Jacobs, Lawrence R. and Robert Y. Shapiro. 1995. “The Rise of Presidential Polling The Nixon
White House in Historical Perspective.” Public Opinion Quarterly 59(2):163–195.
Jacobs, Lawrence R. and Robert Y. Shapiro. 2000. Politicians Don’t Pander: Political
Manipulation and the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Jacobson, Gary C. 2011. “Barack Obama, the Tea Party, and the 2010 midterm elections.” Paper
presented at the annual meeting of Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.
Jacobson, Gary C. 2013. “How the economy and partisanship shaped the 2012 presidential and
congressional elections.” Political Science Quarterly 128(1):1–38.
Jennings, M Kent. 1992. “Ideological thinking among mass publics and political elites.” Public
Opinion Quarterly 56(4):419–441.
Jewell, Malcolm E. 1983. “Legislator-Constituency Relations in Representative Process.”
Legislative Studies Quarterly 8(3):303–337.
Kastellec, Jonathan, Jeffrey R. Lax, Michael Malecki and Justin H. Phillips. 2015. “Polarizing the
Electoral Connection: Partisan Representation in Supreme Court Confirmation Politics.” Journal
of Politics 77(3):787–804.
Kastellec, Jonathan P., Jeffrey Lax and Justin Phillips. 2010. “Estimating State Public Opinion
With Multi-Level Regression and Poststratification using R.”.
Key, V.O. 1961. Public Opinion and American Democracy. New York: Knopf.
Kingdon, John W. 1967. “Politicians’ Beliefs about Voters.” American Political Science Review
61(1):137–145.
Koger, Gregory, Seth Masket and Hans Noel. 2009. “Partisan Webs: Information Exchange and
Party Networks.” British Journal of Political Science 39:633–653.
Kollman, Ken. 1998. Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and Interest Group Strategies. Princeton
University Press.
Kousser, Thad, Jeffrey B. Lewis and Seth E. Masket. 2007. “Ideological adaptation? The survival
instinct of threatened legislators.” Journal of Politics 69(3):828–843.
Kousser, Thad, Scott Lucas, Seth Masket and Eric McGhee. 2015. “Kingmakers or
Cheerleaders? Party Power and the Causal Effects of Endorsements.” Political Research
Quarterly 68(3):443–456.
226
Krimmel, Katherine, Jeffrey R Lax and Justin H Phillips. 2016. “Gay Rights in Congress: Public
Opinion and (Mis) Representation.” Public Opinion Quarterly 80(4):888–913.
Krosnick, Jon A. 1990. “Americans’ Perceptions of Presidential Candidates: A Test of the
Projection Hypothesis.” Journal of Social Issues 42(2):159–182.
Kuklinski, James H. and Richard C. Elling. 1977. “Representation Role, Constituency Opinion,
and Legislative Roll-Call Behavior.” American Journal of Political Science 21(1):135–147.
La Raja, Raymond L. and Brian F. Schaffner. 2015. Campaign Finance and Political Polarization:
When Purists Prevail. Michigan.
Lawless, Jennifer L. 2012. Becoming A Candidate: Political Ambition and the Decision to Run for
Office. Cambridge University Press.
Lax, Jeffrey and Justin Phillips. 2009a. “Gay Rights in the States: Public Opinion and Policy
Responsiveness.” American Political Science Review 103(3):367–85.
Lax, Jeffrey R. and Justin H. Phillips. 2009b. “How Should We Estimate Public Opinion in the
States?” American Journal of Political Science 53(1):107–121.
Lax, Jeffrey R. and Justin H. Phillips. 2012. “The Democratic Deficit in State Policymaking.”
American Journal of Political Science 56(1):148–66.
Lax, Jeffrey R. and Justin H. Phillips. 2013. “How Should We Estimate Sub-National Opinion
Using MRP? Preliminary Findings and Recommendations.” Paper presented at the meeting of
the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.
Lax, Jeffrey R., Justin H. Phillips and Adam Zelizer. 2017. “Who Listens to Whom?: Assessing
Inequalities in Representation.” Working paper.
Layman, Geoffrey C, Thomas M Carsey, John C Green, Richard Herrera and Rosalyn Cooperman.
2010. “Activists and conflict extension in American party politics.” American Political Science
Review 104(02):324–346.
Lee, Frances E. 2009. Beyond Ideology. Chicago.
Lelkes, Yphtach and Paul M Sniderman. 2016. “The Ideological Asymmetry of the American
Party System.” British Journal of Political Science 46(4):825–844.
Lupia, Arthur. 2015. Uninformed: Why People Seem to Know So Little about Politics and What
We Can Do about It. Oxford University Press.
Lupia, Arthur, Yanna Krupnikov, Adam Seth Levine, Spencer Piston and Alexander Von
Hagen-Jamar. 2010. “Why State Constitutions Differ in their Treatment of Same-Sex Marriage.”
The Journal of Politics 72(5):1222–1235.
MacGuffie, Robert. 2009. “Rocking the Town Halls - Best Practices.” Available
at http://d35brb9zkkbdsd.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/
07/townhallactionmemo.pdf.
227
Maestas, Cherie. 2000. “Professional legislatures and ambitious politicians: Policy responsiveness
of state institutions.” Legislative Studies Quarterly pp. 663–690.
Maestas, Cherie. 2003. “The incentive to listen: Progressive ambition, resources, and opinion
monitoring among state legislators.” The Journal of Politics 65(2):439–456.
Maner, Jon K, Douglas T Kenrick, D Vaughn Becker, Theresa E Robertson, Brian Hofer, Steven L
Neuberg, Andrew W Delton, Jonathan Butner and Mark Schaller. 2005. “Functional projection:
how fundamental social motives can bias interpersonal perception.” Journal of personality and
social psychology 88(1):63.
Mann, Thomas E. 1978. Unsafe at Any Margin: Interpreting Congressional Elections. Washington:
American Enterprise Institute.
Mann, Thomas E and Norman J Ornstein. 2013. It’s even worse than it looks: How the American
constitutional system collided with the new politics of extremism. Basic Books.
Martin, Andrew D., Kevin M. Quinn and Jong Hee Park. 2011. “MCMCpack: Markov Chain
Monte Carlo in R.” Journal of Statistical Software 42(9):22.
URL: http://www.jstatsoft.org/v42/i09/
Masket, Seth E. 2007. “It Takes an Outsider: Extralegislative Organization and Partisanship in the
California Assembly, 1849–2006.” American Journal of Political Science 51(3):482–497.
Masket, Seth E. 2009. No Middle Ground: How Informal Party Organizations Control
Nominations and Polarize Legislatures. Michigan.
Masket, Seth E. 2016. The Inevitable Party. Oxford University Press.
Mayhew, David R. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University Press.
McCarty, Nolan. 2015a. What we know and do not know about our polarized politics. In Political
Polarization in American Politics, ed. Daniel J. Hopkins and John Sides. Bloomsbury.
McCarty, Nolan. 2015b. What we know and do not know about our polarized politics. In Political
Polarization in American Politics, ed. Daniel J. Hopkins and John Sides. Bloomsbury.
McCarty, Nolan and Boris Shor. 2015. “Partisan Polarization in the United States: Diagnoses and
Avenues for Reform.” Working Paper, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714013.
McCarty, Nolan T., Keith T. Poole and Howard L. Rosenthal. 2006. Polarized America: The Dance
of Ideology and Unequal Riches. MIT Press.
McClosky, Herbert and John R. Zaller. 1984. The American Ethos: Public Attitudes Toward
Capitalism and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
McCrone, Donald J. and James H. Kuklinski. 1979. “The Delegate Theory of Representation.”
American Journal of Political Science 23(2):278–300.
228
Miler, Kristina C. 2007. “The View from the Hill: Legislative Perceptions of the District.”
Legislative Studies Quarterly 32(4):597–628.
Miler, Kristina C. 2009. “The limitations of heuristics for political elites.” Political psychology
30(6):863–894.
Miler, Kristina C. 2010. Constituency representation in Congress: the view from Capitol Hill.
Cambridge University Press.
Miller, MIchael G. 2016. “The Power of an Hour: Effects of Candidate Time Expenditure in State
Legislative Elections.” Working paper, Barnard College, Columbia University.
Miller, Warren E. and Donald W. Stokes. 1963. “Constituency Influence in Congress.” American
Political Science Review 57:45–56.
Mullen, Brian, John F Dovidio, Craig Johnson and Carolyn Copper. 1992. “In-group-out-group
differences in social projection.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 28(5):422–440.
Mutz, Diana C. 1992. “Mass Media and the Depoliticization of Personal Experience.” American
Journal of Political Science 36:438–508.
Mutz, Diana C. 1997. “Mechanisms of momentum: does thinking make it so?” The Journal of
Politics 59(01):104–125.
Mutz, Diana C. 1998. Impersonal influence: How perceptions of mass collectives affect political
attitudes. Cambridge University Press.
Nadeau, Richard, Edouard Cloutier and J-H Guay. 1993. “New evidence about the existence of
a bandwagon effect in the opinion formation process.” International Political Science Review
14(2):203–213.
Nall, Clayton. 2014. “The Political Consequences of Spatial Policies: How Interstate Highways
Facilitated Geographic Polarization.” Journal of Politics .
Niven, David. 2006. “Throwing your hat out of the ring: Negative recruitment and the gender
imbalance in state legislative candidacy.” Politics and Gender 2(4):473–489.
Noel, Hans. 2012. “The Coalition Merchants: The Ideological Roots of the Civil Rights
Realignment.” Journal of Politics 74(1):156–173.
Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth. 1974. “The spiral of silence a theory of public opinion.” Journal of
communication 24(2):43–51.
Norris, Pippa and Joni Lovendusky. 2004. “Why Parties Fail to Learn: Electoral Defeat, Selective
Perception and British Party Politics.” Party Politics .
Nyhan, Brendan, Eric McGhee, John Sides, Seth Masket and Steven Greene. 2012. “One vote out
of step? The effects of salient roll call votes in the 2010 election.” American Politics Research
40(5):844–879.
229
Nyhan, Brendan and Jason Reifler. 2010. “When corrections fail: The persistence of political
misperceptions.” Political Behavior 32(2):303–330.
Page, Benjamin I., Larry M. Bartels and Jason Seawright. 2013. Democracy and the Policy
Preferences of Wealthy Americans. Perspectives on Politics.
Park, David K., Andrew Gelman and Joseph Bafumi. 2004. “Bayesian Multilevel Estimation with
Poststratification: State-Level Estimates from National Polls.” Political Analysis 12.
Persily, Nathaniel. 2014. “Interview with Rebecca Rolfes.” Available at http:
//www.gailfosler.com/party-control-solution-partisanship-int
erview-nathaniel-persily.
Persily, Nathaniel. 2015. Stronger Parties as a Solution to Polarization. In Solutions to Political
Polarization in America. Cambridge University Press.
Pildes, Richard. 2015. How to fix polarized politics? Strengthen political parties. In Political
Polarization in American Politics. Bloomsbury.
Rogers, Steven. 2014a. “Accountability in State Legislatures: How Parties Perform in Office and
State Legislative Elections.”.
Rogers, Steven. 2014b. “Electoral Accountability for State Legislative Roll-Calls and Ideological
Representation.” http://www.stevenmrogers.com/Statements/Rogers-IndividualAccountability.pdf.
Ross, Lee, David Greene and Pamela House. 1977. “The “false consensus effect": An egocentric
bias in social perception and attribution processes.” Journal of experimental social psychology
13(3):279–301.
Rothschild, David and Neil Malhotra. 2014. “Are public opinion polls self-fulfilling prophecies?”
Research & Politics 1.
Sanbonmatsu, Kira. 2006. “The legislative party and candidate recruitment in the American states.”
Party Politics 12(2):233–256.
Schlozman, Kay Lehman, Sidney Verba and Henry Brady. 2012. The Unheavenly Chorus: Unequal
Political Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy. Princeton University Press.
Sherwood, Gregory G. 1981. “Self-serving biases in person perception: A reexamination of
projection as a mechanism of defense.” Psychological Bulletin 90(3):445.
Shor, Boris. 2015. Polarization in American State Legislatures. In American Gridlock: The
Sources, Character, and Impact of Political Polarization, ed. James A. Thurber and Antoine
Yoshinaka. Cambridge University Press.
Simon, Herbert A. 1954. “Bandwagon and underdog effects and the possibility of election
predictions.” Public Opinion Quarterly 18(3):245–253.
Skocpol, Theda and Alexander Hertel-Fernandez. 2016. “The Koch Network and Republican Party
Extremism.” Perspectives on Politics 14(3):681–699.
230
Skocpol, Theda and Vanessa Williamson. 2011. The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican
Conservatism. Oxford.
Soroka, Stuart N and Christopher Wlezien. 2010. Degrees of democracy: Politics, public opinion,
and policy. Cambridge University Press.
Squire, Peverill. 2007. “Measuring State Legislative Professionalism: The Squire Index Revisited.”
State Politics and Policy Quarterly 7:211–227.
Stimson, James A. 1995. “Opinion and Representation.” American Political Science Review
89:179–183.
Stimson, James A, Michael B MacKuen and Robert S Erikson. 1995. “Dynamic representation.”
American Political Science Review 89(03):543–565.
Stone, Amy L. 2012. Gay Rights at the Ballot Box. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Stone, Walter J and Alan I Abramowitz. 1983. “Winning may not be everything, but it’s more
than we thought: Presidential party activists in 1980.” American Political Science Review
77(04):945–956.
Tausanovitch, Chris and Christopher Warshaw. 2014. “Representation in municipal government.”
American Political Science Review 108(3):605–641.
Theriault, Sean M. 2006. “Party Polarization in the US Congress.” Party Politics 12(4):483–503.
Theriault, Sean M. 2013. The Gingrich Senators. Oxford University Press.
Thomsen, Danielle M. 2014. “Ideological moderates won’t run: How party fit matters for partisan
polarization in Congress.” Journal of Politics 76(3):786–797.
Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman. 1973a. “Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and
probability.” Cognitive psychology 5(2):207–232.
Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman. 1973b. “Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and
probability.” Cognitive psychology 5(2):207–232.
Uslaner, Eric M. and Ronald E. Weber. 1979. “U.S. State Legislators’ Opinions and Perceptions
of Constituency Attitudes.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 4(4):563–585.
Warshaw, Christopher and Jonathan Rodden. 2012. “How Should We Measure District-Level
Public Opinion on Individual Issues?” Journal of Politics 74(1):203–219.
Weissberg, Robert. 1978. “Collective vs. dyadic representation in Congress.” The American
Political Science Review pp. 535–547.
Whitby, Kenny J. 2000. The color of representation: Congressional behavior and black interests.
University of Michigan Press.
Wlezien, Christopher. 1995. “The Public as Thermostat: Dynamics of Preferences for Spending.”
American Journal of Political Science 39:981–1000.
231
